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O
ur issue begins with Professor Todd Pettys’ annual review of the
United States Supreme Court’s civil cases from the past Term. This
Term, much of the notable action was on the civil side—rulings on
the Affordable Care Act, the First Amendment, campaign finance, affirmative
action, the religious rights of closely held corporations, and more. American
Judges Association members who have given the AJA their e-mail addresses
received this article as soon as it was published, only a month after the end of the
Court’s Term.
Professor Donna Shestowsky summarizes the
findings of research she conducted in which she
studied how litigants evaluate legal procedures
(e.g., mediation, nonbinding arbitration, trial) at
the inception of their civil cases. Her results are
consistent with the procedural-justice findings
Court Review articles have been highlighting for
years: Litigants prefer procedures that provide
them with the opportunity for direct participation in the resolution of their cases.
Federal law clerk Michael Langan and attorney Jason Halpin, a former clerk,
provide an overview of civil practice involving cross-motions in both state and
federal court. Judges handling civil cases will find helpful citations to both fed-
eral and state caselaw on the procedural rules that sometimes trip up practition-
ers—and judges—handling cross-motion practice.
Judge (now professor) Raymond McKoski takes up the problem of and oppor-
tunities for courts communicating with the “political branches,” including “judi-
cial impact statements, state of the judiciary messages, judicial opinions, service
on legislative and executive commissions, and testifying before, and consulting
with, governmental committees and officials.” His article focuses on the ABA’s
Model Code of Judicial Conduct, and Judge McKoski concludes with specific
recommendations for judges.—SL & AT 
Court Review, the quarterly journal of the American
Judges Association, invites the submission of unso-
licited, original articles, essays, and book reviews.
Court Review seeks to provide practical, useful infor-
mation to the working judges of the United States and
Canada.  In each issue, we hope to provide information
that will be of use to judges in their everyday work,
whether in highlighting new procedures or methods of
trial, court, or case management, providing substantive
information regarding an area of law likely to be
encountered by many judges, or by providing back-
ground information (such as psychology or other social
science research) that can be used by judges in their
work.  Guidelines for the submission of manuscripts
for Court Review are set forth on page 125 of this issue.
Court Review reserves the right to edit, condense, or
reject material submitted for publication.
Advertising: Court Review accepts advertising for prod-
ucts and services of interest to judges. For informa-
tion, contact Shelley Rockwell at (757) 259-1841.
Cover photo, Mary S. Watkins (maryswatkins@
mac.com). The cover photo is the Clarence M.
Mitchell, Jr., Courthouse in Baltimore, Maryland. Con-
structed between 1895 and 1899, the courthouse
occupies a full city block. The Circuit Court for Balti-
more City occupies the building, which was rededi-
cated in 1985 in the name of Mitchell, a well-known
civil-rights leader from Baltimore. For more informa-
tion about the courthouse and Mitchell, go to
http://goo.gl/Lg813p.
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It has been my privilege to represent the American JudgesAssociation at a great many meetings and conferences overthe past year.  Our organization is widely respected. 
The organization and its leadership are acknowledged as an
effective “Voice of the Judiciary®,” for “Making Better Judges®,”
for high-quality conferences, for excellent judicial-education
programs, and for the developing AJA brand in the area of pro-
cedural fairness.  At our midyear meeting in May, the new Ari-
zona Chief Justice, Scott Bales, particularly commented on the
value of Court Review, our quarterly journal, as a
scholarly yet practical tool for judges at all levels to
learn more about cutting-edge topics such as those
in this edition. 
During the many conversations I’ve had with
judicial leaders, I’ve often heard the statement, “We
need to collaborate.”  AJA is establishing itself as an
important collaborator in the constellation of orga-
nizations seeking to improve access to fair and
impartial justice for all.  
AJA is now collaborating with state organizations in the
United States, provincial court organizations in Canada, and
volunteer organizations on a number of criminal- and civil-jus-
tice reforms. Here are some examples. In October, I represented
AJA at the National Association of Drug Court Professionals’
two-day Doing Justice Executive Summit on criminal sentenc-
ing and pretrial reform. That led to the development of an
important resolution now adopted by CCJ/COSA and AJA call-
ing for all criminal-justice reform efforts to be explicitly
informed by evidence-based practices. The AJA has a designated
place on the Pretrial Justice Working Group, a standing, multi-
disciplinary working group of national leaders in criminal jus-
tice, which works on issues of pretrial justice reform.  In June, I
participated in the Working Group’s Pretrial Justice Reform
Forum to foster state-court leadership on evidence-based pre-
trial practices. Attendees included representatives from the
states of Arizona, Wisconsin, Idaho, and Indiana. The AJA
boasts active membership in each of those states.  
Next year, we look forward to a collaborative conference on
“Justice for All” with the State of Washington’s Administrative
Office of the Courts and the National Association of State Judi-
cial Educators to be held in Seattle on October 4-8, 2015. The
AJA is collaborating with the National Association of Women
Judges’ award-winning Informed Voter Project. And our new
collaboration with the Conference of Chief Jus-
tices’ Judicial Family Institute will bring a wide
variety of resources that will support the secu-
rity, mental, physical, and financial wellness of
AJA members and their families.  
Networking over the past year has informed
me that all of our peer organizations are finding
it challenging to attract new and younger mem-
bers. It is key to the vitality of organizations like
AJA that new and younger members be added to our active ros-
ters. It’s equally important that new and younger judges appre-
ciate the benefit of belonging to organizations like AJA, so we
need to learn how to make a better case for that proposition.
Our members are nationally respected for work they do in
their own states. The AJA is pleased to honor many at our
annual meetings. This year AJA is very proud to congratulate
Past President Steve Leben, a judge on the Kansas Court of
Appeals and the coeditor of Court Review, on receiving this
year’s William H. Rehnquist Award for Judicial Excellence. That
award will be presented to him by Chief Justice of the United
States John H. Roberts Jr. at a dinner at the United States
Supreme Court on November 20.   
I’ve loved my year as your president, and I look forward to
our annual conference in Las Vegas, October 5-10, 2014.  Please
come too.
President’s Column
Elliott Zide
Footnotes
1. No. 12-872.
2. 134 S. Ct. 2 (2013). For an account of the difficulties, see Lyle
Denniston, Argument Recap: A Bad Way to Open a Term, SCOTUS-
BLOG, Oct. 7, 2013, http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/10/argu-
ment-recap-a-bad-way-to-open-a-term.
3. 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014).
4. During that 12-year period, only four non-Christians provided the
prayers, and all four of those appeared in 2008, when the town
first heard rumblings of litigation.
5. 463 U.S.783 (1983).
6. 134 S. Ct. at 1819.
7. Id. at 1822-23.
8. Id. at 1823; see also id. at 1824 (“Absent a pattern of prayers that
over time denigrate, proselytize, or betray an impermissible gov-
ernment purpose, a challenge based solely on the content of a
prayer will not likely establish a constitutional violation.”).
9. Id. at 1838 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment); cf. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 693-94 (2005)
(Thomas, J., concurring); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 640-41
(1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Writing solely for himself, Justice
Thomas also reiterated his view that the Establishment Clause is
a “federalism provision” principally aimed at preventing Congress
both from establishing a national religion and from interfering
The Court’s 2013-2014 Term did not begin auspiciously. InMadigan v. Levin1—the first orally argued case of the newsession—the justices were slated to decide whether the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act leaves employees of
state and local governments free to bring age-discrimination
claims under Section 1983 and the Equal Protection Clause.
After a variety of procedural and substantive difficulties
emerged during oral argument, however, the Court declared
that its grant of certiorari had been improvident.2 Happily,
Madigan proved to be a quickly forgotten bump in the road.
Over the following nine months, the Court handed down yet
another set of important and interesting rulings in civil cases,
on matters ranging from abortion clinics’ buffer zones to
Younger abstention. Like the civic leaders of Greece, New
York, we will begin by turning our thoughts to prayer.
FIRST AMENDMENT: ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
In Town of Greece v. Galloway,3 a 5-4 Court upheld Greece’s
practice of inviting local clergy and laypeople to open each of
the town’s monthly board meetings with a prayer. During the
12-year period at issue, Greece never denied a non-Christian’s
request to serve as a prayer-giver, but the overwhelming
majority of those who were solicited by the town’s staff or who
volunteered on their own initiative were Christian ministers.4
The town did not screen the prayers in advance, nor did it
provide advice about the kinds of things that the prayers
should or should not include. Many of the prayers were
explicitly Christian in content.
Joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia,
Thomas, and Alito, Justice Kennedy found the Court’s 1983
ruling in Marsh v. Chambers5 all but dispositive. Upholding
the Nebraska legislature’s practice of beginning each day with
a prayer, the Marsh Court had relied heavily upon its histori-
cal survey of the legislative prayer practices that prevailed
from the colonial era through the following two centuries.
Writing in Town of Greece, Justice Kennedy found that “Marsh
stands for the proposition that it is not necessary to define the
precise boundary of the Establishment Clause where history
shows that the specific practice is permitted.”6 Many of the
founding-era prayers offered in Congress and elsewhere were
sectarian in nature, the Court said, and so the fact that tenets
of Christianity appeared prominently in many of the prayers
in Greece’s town meetings was not constitutionally problem-
atic. “Once it invites prayer into the public sphere,” Justice
Kennedy wrote, “government must permit a prayer giver to
address his or her own God or gods as conscience dictates,
unfettered by what an administrator or judge considers to be
nonsectarian.”7 That does not necessarily mean, however, that
the Constitution places no limits on the prayers’ contents:
If the course and practice over time shows that the invo-
cations denigrate nonbelievers or religious minorities,
threaten damnation, or preach conversion, many pre-
sent may consider the prayer to fall short of the desire
to elevate the purpose of the occasion and to unite law-
makers in their common effort. That circumstance
would present a different case than the one presently
before the Court.8
In a portion of his opinion joined only by Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Alito, Justice Kennedy found that nonbe-
lievers in attendance at Greece’s board meetings were not psy-
chologically coerced into participating in the prayers. Justices
Thomas and Scalia wrote separately to reiterate their view that,
when it comes to finding Establishment Clause violations, the
only kind of coercion that matters is “actual legal coercion,”
where those who resist face law-backed threats of penalties.9
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with states’ choices about whether to establish religions of their
own. Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1835-37 (Thomas, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in the judgment).
10. Id. at 1851 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
11. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 266, § 120E1/2(b). The statute applied only
during such facilities’ business hours and required that the buffer
zones be “clearly marked and posted.” Id. § 120E1/2(c).
12. 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014).
13. Id. at 2544 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
14. Id. at 2541 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
15. Id. at 2548 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
16. Id. at 2550 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
17. 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).
18. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
Justice Kagan dissented, joined by Justices Ginsburg,
Breyer, and Sotomayor. She found that Greece’s actions dif-
fered from those of the Nebraska legislature in Marsh in prob-
lematic ways but that the town could have cured the consti-
tutional defects either by advising the prayer-givers to “speak
in nonsectarian terms, common to diverse religious groups,”
or by ensuring that clergy representing different faiths deliver
the prayers so that “the government does not identify itself
with one religion or align itself with that faith’s citizens.”10
FIRST AMENDMENT: SPEECH
ABORTION CLINICS AND BUFFER ZONES
In 2007, Massachusetts made it a crime to “knowingly
enter or remain on a public way or sidewalk” within 35 feet of
the entrance or driveway to a facility (other than a hospital)
that performs abortions.11 The statute exempted those who
were entering or leaving such a facility, those who were agents
or employees of the facility and acting within the scope of
their employment, certain government officials, and people
who were merely passing through. Several individuals chal-
lenged the law, saying that they wished to engage abortion-
seeking women in non-confrontational “sidewalk counseling”
and to offer them anti-abortion literature—things that they
could not do nearly as easily when categorically barred from
entering the buffer zones defined by state law. In McCullen v.
Coakley,12 all nine justices agreed that the statute violated the
First Amendment, but they were divided on the reasons.
Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the majority, joined by Jus-
tices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. In their judg-
ment, the Massachusetts statute was content-neutral. The law
was driven not by a desire to squelch anti-abortion speech, the
Court said, but rather by the need to deal with the safety and
access issues that arise when large numbers of people congre-
gate outside abortion clinics. The majority nevertheless held
the law unconstitutional because it burdened substantially
more speech than was necessary to achieve the state’s objec-
tives. The Court said that the state could, for example, rely
more heavily upon an unchallenged state law that makes it a
crime to knowingly impede a person’s entry into a clinic; it
could adopt legislation modeled on the federal Freedom of
Access to Clinic Entrances Act (which bans the use of force,
physical obstruction, and intimidation against a person seek-
ing reproductive services); or it could adopt legislation mod-
eled on a New York City ordinance that makes it a crime to
follow and harass a person within close proximity to an abor-
tion clinic’s entrance.
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment, joined by Jus-
tices Kennedy and Thomas. He insisted that the statute was
content-based and that strict scrutiny thus ought to be
applied. “Every objective indication shows,” he wrote, “that
the [statute’s] primary purpose
is to restrict speech that
opposes abortion.”13 By finding
the law content-neutral, he
argued, the majority had “car-
rie[d] forward this Court’s prac-
tice of giving abortion-rights
advocates a pass when it comes
to suppressing the free-speech
rights of their opponents.”14 He
conceded that he likely agreed
with the majority’s finding that
the law was insufficiently tai-
lored but said that he declined
to join that part of the Chief
Justice’s opinion because he
“prefer[ed] not to take part in the assembling of an apparent
but specious unanimity.”15 Justice Alito similarly concurred
in the judgment, finding that the statute “blatantly discrimi-
nates based on viewpoint.”16
CAMPAIGN FINANCE
In McCutcheon v. FEC,17 the Court voted 5-4 to strike down
federal aggregate limits on campaign contributions. The Fed-
eral Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), as amended by
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, imposes base
limits on how much an individual may contribute per election
cycle to a given federal candidate, party committee, or politi-
cal action committee. That legislation also imposed aggregate
limits on how much an individual could contribute in an elec-
tion cycle to all federal candidates and to certain political
committees. The government’s primary rationale for the
aggregate limits was that they prevented donors from circum-
venting the base limits and from thereby triggering the same
quid pro quo corruption concerns that the base limits were
intended to address. 
Wishing to make sizable contributions to federal candi-
dates across the country and to a variety of Republican
national party committees, Shaun McCutcheon bumped up
against the aggregate limits during the 2011-2012 election
season and believed he would encounter the same difficulty in
the future. He filed suit, alleging that those limits impinged
upon his First Amendment rights of speech and association.
The Republican National Committee (RNC) joined the chal-
lenge, arguing that this was a welcome opportunity for the
justices to reject the constitutional distinction that the Court
drew in Buckley v. Valeo18 between expenditures and contribu-
tions. Under Buckley, the Court strictly scrutinizes restric-
tions on campaign expenditures but reviews restrictions on
campaign contributions somewhat more leniently. The RNC
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19. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1446.
20. Id. at 1441.
21. Cf., e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 412-
20 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
22. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1464 (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment).
23. Id. at 1465 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Citizens United, Inc. v.
FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)).
24. 132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012).
25. 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014).
26. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
27. Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2638. 
28. Id. at 2632.
29. Id. at 2645 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 2638 n.19.
urged the Court to apply
strict scrutiny across the
board.
In a plurality opinion
joined by Justices Scalia,
Kennedy, and Alito, Chief
Justice Roberts declined the
RNC’s invitation to abandon
the expenditure-contribution
distinction but nevertheless
concluded that the aggregate
limits on contributions did
not adequately serve the Gov-
ernment’s interest in avoiding
quid pro quo corruption. The
Chief Justice acknowledged that the Buckley Court had
upheld FECA’s aggregate limit, but he pointed out that the
Court had only “spent a total of three sentences” on the issue
and that the litigants in Buckley had focused most of their
energies elsewhere.19 Taking a fresh look at the matter, and
pointing to a range of ways in which circumventing the base
limits is either illegal or impractical (or could be made so by
Congress), the plurality concluded that the aggregate limits
placed unwarranted constraints on donors’ First Amendment
rights. The Chief Justice acknowledged that the ruling was
likely to be unpopular in some circles but insisted that it
flowed from the demands of the First Amendment. “If the
First Amendment protects flag burning, funeral protests, and
Nazi parades—despite the profound offense such spectacles
cause,” Chief Justice Robert wrote, “it surely protects political
campaign speech despite popular opposition.”20
Concurring in the judgment, Justice Thomas reiterated his
view that the Court should abandon Buckley’s distinction
between contributions and expenditures and should review
limitations on the former just as skeptically as it reviews lim-
itations on the latter.21 He nevertheless expressed satisfaction
that the plurality’s opinion “continues to chip away at [Buck-
ley’s] footings.”22
Joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, Justice
Breyer dissented, embracing the Government’s defense of the
aggregate limits. “Taken together with Citizens United v. Fed-
eral Election Commission,” he wrote, “today’s decision eviscer-
ates our Nation’s campaign finance laws, leaving a remnant
incapable of dealing with the grave problems of democratic
legitimacy that those laws were intended to resolve.”23
PUBLIC-SECTOR UNIONS
Two years ago, writing for a 5-4 majority in Knox v. Service
Employees International Union,24 Justice Alito stated in dictum
that allowing state and local governments to force their
employees to pay fees to unions—even if those employees are
not themselves union members—raises serious First Amend-
ment concerns. In Harris v. Quinn,25 decided this past Term,
litigants and their amici launched a full-fledged effort to per-
suade the Court to close that circle by overruling Abood v.
Detroit Board of Education26 and holding that public employees
who decline to join a union have a First Amendment right to
refuse to contribute to that union’s expenses, even if they ben-
efit from the union’s collective-bargaining activities. Writing
again for the same five-justice majority, Justice Alito declined
that invitation but once again made it clear that Abood’s
longevity is far from assured.
The dispute in Harris concerned individuals who work as
“personal assistants” in Illinois, providing in-home care for
Medicaid recipients. The personal assistants are jointly
employed by the State of Illinois (which compensates them)
and by Medicaid beneficiaries (who hire and supervise them).
SEUI Illinois & Indiana serves as the personal assistants’
exclusive bargaining representative with the state. The plain-
tiffs were personal assistants who declined to join the union
and who objected to a requirement that they pay the union an
“agency fee” to help cover the costs of collective bargaining. A
ruling in the plaintiffs’ favor on that point would have neces-
sitated overruling Abood.
Led by Justice Alito, the Court refrained from abandoning
Abood, choosing instead to find that precedent distinguish-
able. Abood, the Court reasoned, applies only to “full-fledged
public employees,” rather than to those whose work—like
that of the personal assistants here—is controlled in signifi-
cant ways by non-governmental employers.27 Freed of Abood’s
constraints, the majority found that the agency-fee require-
ment violated the plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights by com-
pelling them to speak. Justice Alito nevertheless devoted 13
pages of his slip opinion to dictum arguing that Abood was
thinly reasoned and is “questionable on several grounds.”28
Justice Kagan wrote for the dissenters, finding Abood indis-
tinguishable but expressing relief that the majority stopped
short of overruling that decision altogether. Recognizing that
Abood’s future nevertheless remains in doubt, Justice Kagan
insisted that it be preserved. “Our precedent about precedent,
fairly understood and applied,” she wrote, “makes it impossi-
ble for this Court to reverse that decision.”29 The majority dis-
missed Justice Kagan’s discussion of stare decisis as “beside the
point.”30
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES’ TESTIMONY
Suppose that a public employee testifies truthfully in a
court proceeding about information he learned while doing
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31. 134 S. Ct. 2369 (2014).
32. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
33. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2379 (emphasis added). The Court further
held, however, that because this doctrinal matter had not been
clearly settled at the time Franks took action against Lane, Franks
was protected by qualified immunity.
34. Id. at 2384 (Thomas, J., concurring).
35. 134 S. Ct. 2056 (2014).
36. Id. at 2061.
37. The Court ruled in Fisher v. University of Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2411
(2013), that when reviewing a public university’s race-conscious
efforts to assemble a diverse class of entering students, a court
must not defer to the university’s choice of means. The court
“must ultimately be satisfied that no workable race-neutral alter-
natives would produce the educational benefits of diversity.” Id. at
2420.
38. 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014).
39. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
40. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
41. 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
42. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the Univ. of
Mich., 701 F.3d 466, 477 (6th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (quoting Seat-
tle Sch. Dist., 458 U.S. at 472), rev’d sub nom. Schuette v. Coalition
to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014).
his job but that the act of testifying is not itself among that
employee’s typical job responsibilities. Does the First Amend-
ment protect the employee against any adverse action that the
testimony might provoke his employer to take against him?
That was the question before the Court in Lane v. Franks.31
While working as the director of an Alabama-funded program,
Edward Lane uncovered evidence that a member of the
Alabama legislature was billing the state for work she never
actually performed. When federal officials subsequently
launched criminal proceedings against the legislator, Lane tes-
tified both before the grand jury and then again at trial. When
Steve Franks, Lane’s supervisor, terminated Lane’s employ-
ment not long thereafter, Lane brought suit against Franks
and others, claiming a retaliatory violation of his First
Amendment rights. The Eleventh Circuit held that the First
Amendment offered Lane no protection. Under Garcetti v.
Ceballos,32 the court of appeals reasoned, Lane was testifying
as a state employee—not as a citizen—because he was testify-
ing about information he learned during the course of his
employment.
Led by Justice Sotomayor, the Court unanimously reversed,
explaining that “[t]he critical question under Garcetti is
whether the speech at issue is itself ordinarily within the scope
of an employee’s duties, not whether it merely concerns those
duties.”33 The Court declined to say whether the First Amend-
ment protects employees (such as police officers and crime-
lab technicians) whose jobs do ordinarily include testifying in
judicial proceedings. In a brief concurring opinion joined by
Justices Scalia and Alito, Justice Thomas reiterated that that
important question was reserved “for another day.”34
VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION
Nearly 10 years after President George W. Bush made a last-
minute change of dinner plans while campaigning in Jack-
sonville, Oregon, a unanimous Court in Wood v. Moss35 finally
resolved the dinner decision’s legal consequences. Scrambling
to protect the President after he decided to eat in the outdoor
patio area of a local restaurant, members of the Secret Service
had moved a group of protestors to a location that was a little
farther away from President Bush than a group that had gath-
ered to voice their admiration of him. The protestors alleged
that the Secret Service agents had committed viewpoint dis-
crimination in violation of the First Amendment.
Just as it had done in several prior cases, the Court assumed,
without deciding, that the First Amendment creates an implied
right of action for damages against federal officials. Writing for
the Court, Justice Ginsburg
explained that the agents were
nevertheless entitled to qualified
immunity because “[n]o decision
of this Court so much as hinted
[to the agents] that their on-the-
spot action was unlawful because
they failed to keep the protestors
and supporters, throughout the
episode, equidistant from the
President.”36 The Court relied
heavily upon a map that the
plaintiffs had attached to their
complaint, which showed that,
until the Secret Service moved
them, the protestors had a direct
line of sight to—and were within
weapons range of—the Presi-
dent’s dining location, while a
two-story building stood between the President and the spot
where his supporters had gathered.
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
RACE-BASED PREFERENCES IN PUBLIC UNIVERSITY
ADMISSIONS
For the second consecutive year,37 the Court handed down
a major decision concerning racial preferences in public uni-
versities’ admissions processes. At issue in Schuette v. Coalition
to Defend Affirmative Action38 was a 2006 amendment to the
Michigan Constitution forbidding racial preferences in
(among other things) public education. A few years earlier,
the Court had upheld the University of Michigan Law School’s
race-conscious efforts to assemble a diverse student body,
finding that the school’s efforts were narrowly tailored to
achieve a compelling state purpose.39 The Court had not said
that such efforts were constitutionally required, however, and
Michigan voters opted to bring them to an end.
Citing the “political-process doctrine”—a doctrine it traced
to Hunter v. Erickson40 and Washington v. Seattle School District
No. 141—the en banc Sixth Circuit found that the Michigan
amendment violated the Equal Protection Clause because it
“(1) has a racial focus, targeting a policy or program that
‘inures primarily to the benefit of the minority’; and (2) real-
locates political power or reorders the decisionmaking process
in a way that places special burdens on a minority group’s
ability to achieve its goals through that process.”42
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43. Justice Kagan did not participate in the case.
44. The plurality said that Hunter stands for “the unremarkable prin-
ciple that the State may not alter the procedures of government to
target racial minorities.” Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1632. As for Seat-
tle School District No. 1, the plurality concluded that key passages
on which the Sixth Circuit had seized “went well beyond the
analysis needed to resolve the case.” Id. at 1634.
45. Id. at 1637.
46. Id. at 1647 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
47. Id. at 1648 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
48. He did, however, briefly express skepticism about the doctrine.
See id. at 1651 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he
principle that underlies Hunter and Seattle runs up against a com-
peting principle . . . favor[ing] decisionmaking through the demo-
cratic process.”).
49. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S.
701, 748 (2007).
50. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1675 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 1639 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
52. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
53. 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014). The dispute in Noel Canning arose when
the National Labor Relations Board ordered a Pepsi-Cola distribu-
tor to execute a collective-bargaining agreement with a labor
union. The distributor argued that the board’s order was illegiti-
mate because three of the board’s members had been invalidly
appointed by President Obama during purported Senate recesses.
54. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
55. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2561.
56. Id. at 2564.
57. Id. at 2567. The Court noted that neither house of Congress is per-
mitted to adjourn mid-session without the consent of the other
for a period of “more than three days.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl.
4. “A Senate recess that is so short that it does not require the con-
sent of the House,” the majority reasoned, “is not long enough to
trigger the President’s recess-appointments power.”  Noel Canning,
134 S. Ct. at 2566.
A divided Supreme Court
reversed.43 In a plurality opin-
ion joined by Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Alito, Jus-
tice Kennedy rejected the polit-
ical-process doctrine and con-
cluded that Hunter and Seattle
School District No.1 were best
understood as having been
decided on other grounds.44
The plurality said that the polit-
ical-process doctrine unwisely
presumed that racial categories
can be clearly delineated and
that members of an identified
racial group share common
political interests. Perhaps even
more fundamentally, the plural-
ity said, “[i]t is demeaning to
the democratic process to presume that the voters are not
capable of deciding an issue of this sensitivity on decent and
rational grounds.”45
Joined by Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia concurred in the
judgment, arguing that the plurality had stretched too far to
find rationales on which the outcomes in Hunter and Seattle
School District No. 1 could be justified. Justice Scalia feared
that lurking in the plurality’s refusal to overrule those cases
was a willingness to accept “the proposition that a facially
neutral law may deny equal protection solely because it has a
disparate racial impact.”46 A party alleging racial discrimina-
tion in violation of the Equal Protection Clause must prove
discriminatory purpose, Justice Scalia wrote, and those chal-
lenging Michigan’s constitutional amendment “do not have a
prayer of proving it here.”47
Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment, finding it unnec-
essary to decide whether to embrace the political-process doc-
trine because, in his view, Michigan voters had not reordered
the political process.48 He concluded that the Constitution
posed no obstacles to the Michigan amendment.
Joined by Justice Ginsburg, Justice Sotomayor dissented,
strongly embracing the Sixth Circuit’s articulation of the polit-
ical-process doctrine and arguing that it demanded invalida-
tion of the Michigan amendment. Linking the Court’s con-
trary ruling to Chief Justice Roberts’s declaration in 2007 that
“[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to
stop discriminating on the basis of race,”49 she insisted that
this was “a sentiment out of touch with reality.”50 That claim
prompted Chief Justice Roberts to file a brief concurrence,
arguing that “[p]eople can disagree in good faith [about the
desirability of racial preferences], but it . . . does more harm
than good to question the openness and candor of those on
either side of the debate.”51
EXECUTIVE POWER: RECESS APPOINTMENTS
Ordinarily, of course, the President must obtain the Senate’s
“Advice and Consent” when appointing federal officers.52 In
NLRB v. Noel Canning,53 the Court resolved important issues
concerning the President’s ability to evade Senate obstacles by
exercising his power to “fill up all Vacancies that may happen
during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions
which shall expire at the End of their next Session.”54 Led by
Justice Breyer, a majority of the Court reached three signifi-
cant conclusions. First, the Court held that the term “Recess”
in the clause just quoted refers not only to breaks that happen
between formal sessions of Congress but also to breaks “of
substantial length” that occur within a given formal session.55
Between the founding and the present day, Justice Breyer
explained, presidents have made “countless” recess appoint-
ments during intra-session breaks, and the Senate has never
taken the position that such appointments are categorically
invalid.56 With respect to how long an intra-session break
must be in order to be deemed substantial, the Court found
that “a recess of more than 3 days but less than 10 days is pre-
sumptively too short to fall within the Clause.”57
Second, the Court found that the recess-appointments
power applies not only to vacancies that first arise during a
recess (a point on which everyone agreed) but also to vacan-
cies that arise before a recess and that continue to exist when
the Senate breaks. The majority conceded that its interpreta-
tion was in tension with the language of Article II (“Vacancies
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58. Id. at 2570.
59. Id. at 2574.
60. Id. at 2606 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). The majority
replied that Justice Scalia’s reading of the Constitution “would
render illegitimate thousands of recess appointments reaching all
the way back to the founding era.” Id. at 2577.
61. Id. at 2618 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
62. Nos. 13-354, 13-356, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 4505 (June 30, 2014).
63. The birth-control methods to which the corporations objected
were two kinds of morning-after pills and two kinds of
intrauterine devices, all of which can terminate fertilized eggs’
development.
64. The three closely held for-profit corporations before the Court
were Conestoga Wood Specialties, Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., and
Mardel.
65. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1(a), (b).
66. The majority reserved judgment, however, on whether this
approach would itself violate RFRA—a reservation that would
acquire great prominence just days after Hobby Lobby Stores came
down. On July 3, 2014, the Court granted Wheaton College’s
application for an order temporarily shielding it from having to
follow the precise certification process prescribed by the govern-
ment for nonprofit organizations with religious objections to the
contraception mandate. That order drew a sharp dissent from the
Court’s three female justices. See Wheaton College v. Burwell, No.
13A1284, __ S Ct. __, 2014 WL 3020426 (July 3, 2014).
that may happen during the Recess of the Senate”) but found
that a broad reading best served the framers’ purpose of ensur-
ing that the President can obtain the services of officers when
the Senate is not available to confirm their appointments. The
majority also relied heavily upon the fact that “[t]he tradition
of applying the Clause to pre-recess vacancies dates at least to
President James Madison” and has been followed over the
ensuing generations on scores of occasions.58
Finally, the Court held that, when calculating the length of
a recess, pro forma sessions cannot be ignored. During the
roughly month-long break at issue in this case, the Senate
held twice-weekly pro forma sessions. President Obama had
made the challenged appointments roughly in the middle of
that month-long break, one day after one pro forma session
and two days before the next. If the Court had disregarded
those pro forma sessions, the Senate’s break easily would have
been long enough to trigger the President’s recess-appoint-
ments power. The Court found, however, that “for purposes of
the Recess Appointments Clause, the Senate is in session
when it says it is, provided that, under its own rules, it retains
the capacity to transact Senate business.”59 As a result, the
challenged appointments in this case were made during a Sen-
ate break of only three days—a period not long enough to
bring the recess-appointments power into play.
Joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and
Alito, Justice Scalia concurred only in the judgment. In his
view, the recess-appointments power only comes into play
during breaks between formal sessions of Congress and
applies only “to vacancies that arise during the recess in
which they are filled.”60 Looking ahead to future separation-
of-powers disputes, Justice Scalia worried that the majority’s
“adverse-possession theory of executive power . . . will be
cited in diverse contexts, including those presently unimag-
ined, and will have the effect of aggrandizing the Presidency
beyond its constitutional bounds.”61
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT
In their final public sitting of the Term, the Court handed
down one of the year’s most highly anticipated rulings. The
issue in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,62 was whether the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) spares closely held
for-profit corporations from the federal requirement that they
provide their employees with health-insurance coverage for
federally approved forms of birth control that the corporations’
owners regarded as methods of abortion.63 By a 5-4 margin, the
Court held that RFRA does
indeed lift that requirement from
those corporations’ shoulders.64
RFRA states that the federal
government cannot “substan-
tially burden” a person’s exercise
of religion unless it can show
“that application of the burden to
the person . . . is the least restric-
tive means of furthering [a] com-
pelling governmental interest.”65
In an opinion by Justice Alito,
the Court first found that for-
profit corporations are “persons” within the meaning of the
statute. The Dictionary Act explicitly includes corporations in
that term’s definition, the Court said, and there is nothing
about RFRA’s context that suggests Congress intended a nar-
rower definition to apply. The Department of Health and
Human Services had conceded during the litigation that non-
profit corporations can be persons and can exercise religion
within the meaning of RFRA, and the Court could find no per-
suasive reason to believe Congress intended otherwise with
respect to corporations that seek a profit.
Having found RFRA applicable, the majority determined
that the contraception mandate substantially burdens the exer-
cise of religion by the plaintiff corporations and their owners
because, if they ignored the mandate, the companies faced sub-
stantial annual fines. Assuming (rather than finding) that the
contraception mandate furthered compelling governmental
interests, the majority then determined that there were less
restrictive means of achieving the government’s objectives. The
federal government itself, for example, could assume the cost
of providing the corporations’ female employees with full con-
traception coverage. Or the government could make available
to closely held for-profit corporations the same accommoda-
tion that it already provides to nonprofit organizations with
religious objections to the contraception mandate—namely,
permit them to certify that they object to certain forms of con-
traception, thereby triggering a duty on the part of their insur-
ance providers or third-party administrators to exclude those
forms of contraception from the entities’ group health-insur-
ance coverage and to provide separate payments for those con-
traceptive services.66 The majority stressed that its decision
“concerned solely . . . the contraceptive mandate” and “should
not be understood to hold that an insurance-coverage mandate
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67. Hobby Lobby Stores, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 4505, at *86-87.
68. Id. at *117 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at *97 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at *154 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
71. 134 S. Ct. 568 (2013).
72. Id. at 577-79. The Court reserved judgment on whether dismissal
was appropriate under Rule 12(b)(6), an issue not briefed by the
parties. See id. at 580.
73. Id. at 581.
74. The Court further explained that, “when a party bound by a
forum-selection clause flouts its contractual obligation and files
suit in a different forum, a § 1404(a) transfer of venue will not
carry with it the original venue’s choice-of-law rules.” Id. at 582.
75. 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
76. MBUSA distributed Daimler vehicles to dealerships throughout
the United States, including California.
77. Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. at 760.
78. Id. at 761-62 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.
462, 472 (1985)). Justice Sotomayor preferred to ground the
Court’s judgment on the finding that it would be unreasonable to
allow a California-based court to take jurisdiction in this instance,
“given that the case involves foreign plaintiffs suing a foreign
defendant based on foreign conduct, and given that a more appro-
priate forum is available.” Id. at 764 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in
the judgment).
must necessarily fall if it con-
flicts with an employer’s reli-
gious beliefs.”67 Justice
Kennedy emphasized the deci-
sion’s narrow scope in a sepa-
rate concurrence.
Justice Ginsburg dissented,
joined by Justices Breyer,
Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice
Ginsburg argued that the
majority’s decision would
place significant burdens upon
thousands of women who
worked for the plaintiff corporations and who desired the
forms of contraception to which their employers objected. She
found no reason to believe that Congress intended such a
result, noting (in a portion of her opinion joined only by Jus-
tice Sotomayor) that “[u]ntil this litigation, no decision of this
Court recognized a for-profit corporation’s qualification for a
religious exemption from a generally applicable law, whether
under the Free Exercise Clause or RFRA.”68 Even if RFRA did
apply, Justice Ginsburg wrote, the contraception mandate did
not substantially burden the plaintiffs’ exercise of religion
because neither the corporations nor their owners were them-
selves required to purchase or provide the contraceptives at
issue, and because women and their health-care providers—
not the corporations or their owners—would be the ones
deciding whether the contraception was desirable. By issuing
what she regarded as “a decision of startling breadth,”69 she
warned that the Court was “ventur[ing] into a minefield.”70
FEDERAL JURISDICTION
FORUM-SELECTION CLAUSES
In Atlantic Marine Construction Co. v. United States District
Court for the Western District of Texas,71 the Court clarified
when and how forum-selection clauses should be enforced.
When a dispute erupted between Virginia-based Atlantic
Marine Construction and Texas-based J-Crew Management, J-
Crew filed suit in the Western District of Texas, rather than in
the Eastern District of Virginia as prescribed by a forum-selec-
tion clause in the parties’ contract. Atlantic Marine moved to
dismiss the case altogether under Section 1406(a) or under
Rule 12(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or, in
the alternative, to transfer the case to Virginia under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a). The District Court denied both motions, and the
Fifth Circuit affirmed.
Led by Justice Alito, the Court unanimously reversed. The
justices agreed with the courts below that the forum-selection
clause did not render venue in Texas “wrong” or “improper”
and that dismissal under Section 1406(a) or Rule 12(b)(3)
was thus unwarranted.72 With respect to the motion to trans-
fer, however, the Court concluded that when a federal civil lit-
igant moves to transfer a case in accordance with a forum-
selection clause, “[o]nly under extraordinary circumstances
unrelated to the convenience of the parties should [the] §
1404(a) motion be denied.”73 The plaintiff bears the burden of
demonstrating that the forum-selection clause should be dis-
regarded due to public-interest concerns, the Court said, and
J-Crew had not carried that burden here.74
PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Companies with substantial business operations in multi-
ple states will be heartened by the Court’s ruling in Daimler
AG v. Bauman.75 Argentinian plaintiffs had filed a federal suit
in California against Daimler AG (Daimler), a German com-
pany. The plaintiffs argued that Daimler was subject to general
jurisdiction in California due to the operations in that state of
Mercedes-Benz USA (MBUSA), a Daimler subsidiary.76 The
Ninth Circuit held that MBUSA was Daimler’s agent for juris-
dictional purposes, that MBUSA’s California contacts were
thus attributable to Daimler, and that those contacts were suf-
ficient to subject Daimler to general jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court reversed. In an opinion for eight mem-
bers, Justice Ginsburg first found that the Ninth Circuit’s
agency analysis was too lenient because it “appear[ed] to sub-
ject foreign corporations to general jurisdiction whenever
they have an in-state subsidiary or affiliate.”77 More signifi-
cantly, the Court found that, even if MBUSA’s California con-
tacts were attributable to Daimler, it would violate the Due
Process Clause to subject Daimler to general jurisdiction
there. While acknowledging that a company could be subject
to general jurisdiction in states other than those of its place of
incorporation and principal place of business, the Court
recoiled from the suggestion that Daimler was subject to gen-
eral jurisdiction in every state where MBUSA had a significant
presence. “Such exorbitant exercises of all-purpose jurisdic-
tion,” Justice Ginsburg wrote, “would scarcely permit out-of-
state defendants ‘to structure their primary conduct with
some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and
will not render them liable to suit.’”78
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79. 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014).
80. Id. at 1122.
81. Id. at 1125.
82. Id. at 1125 n.9.
83. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 97
(1998) (statutory standing); Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. New-
dow, 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,
751 (1984)) (prudential standing).
84. 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014).
85. Static Control alleged that Lexmark made false statements about
its own products and about those manufactured by Static Control.
86. Id. at 1387 n.4 (internal quotation omitted). The Court dropped
an additional footnote to address, in dictum, one other self-
inflicted misunderstanding. The jurisdictional ban on “general-
ized grievances” flows from the requirements of Article III, Justice
Scalia explained, rather than—as the Court had elsewhere indi-
cated—from the Court’s assessment of prudential concerns. See id.
at 1387 n.3. 
87. Id. at 1388.
88. Id. at 1391.
89. 134 S Ct. 2334 (2014).
The Court again underscored the limitations on federal
courts’ jurisdictional reach in Walden v. Fiore.79 Anthony
Walden was a Georgia police officer who had been deputized
by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to work at
the Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport. Suspect-
ing illegal drug activity, Walden seized roughly $97,000 in
cash that Gina Fiore and Keith Gipson were carrying with
them while changing planes in Atlanta en route from Puerto
Rico to Nevada. Fiore and Gipson explained that they were
professional gamblers and that the cash represented their
“bank” and lawful winnings. Walden and his colleagues were
unpersuaded, however, and so Fiore and Gipson returned
home to Nevada empty-handed. After months of wrangling,
the DEA finally returned the money. Fiore and Gipson then
filed a Bivens action against Walden in federal district court in
Nevada, alleging (among other things) that he had resisted the
funds’ return by filing a false affidavit with the U.S. Attorney
in Georgia. Walden moved to dismiss, arguing that he was not
subject to personal jurisdiction in Nevada. The Ninth Circuit
rejected Walden’s argument, but the Supreme Court unani-
mously embraced it. 
Writing for the Court, Justice Thomas explained that,
under the familiar “minimum contacts” analysis, a federal
court must focus on “the defendant’s contacts with the forum
State itself, not the defendant’s contacts with persons who
reside there.”80 The Ninth Circuit had erred, the Court said,
by focusing on Walden’s knowledge that Fiore and Gipson
resided in Nevada and on the fact that those two plaintiffs suf-
fered foreseeable harm in that state, rather than on Walden’s
actual contacts with Nevada. Fiore and Gipson 
lacked access to their funds in Nevada not because any-
thing independently occurred there, but because
Nevada is where [they] chose to be at a time when they
desired to use the funds seized by [Walden]. [They]
would have experienced this same lack of access in Cal-
ifornia, Mississippi, or wherever else they might have
traveled and found themselves wanting more money
than they had.81
The Court acknowledged Fiore and Gipson’s warning that
this ruling could “bring about unfairness in cases where inten-
tional torts are committed via the Internet or other electronic
media,” but the justices said they were leaving “questions
about virtual contacts for another day.”82
PRUDENTIAL STANDING
AND THE “ZONE OF
INTERESTS”
Over the past few decades,
the Court had occasionally
indicated that whether a
plaintiff falls within the
“zone of interests” that Con-
gress intended to protect
with a given statute is a juris-
dictional issue concerning
“prudential” or “statutory”
standing.83 Taking their cue
from those and other prece-
dents, the parties in Lexmark
International, Inc. v. Static
Control Components, Inc.84
used the jurisdictional lan-
guage of standing when fram-
ing their disagreement about
whether Static Control could bring a false-advertising claim
against Lexmark under the Lanham Act.85 Writing for a unan-
imous Court, Justice Scalia explained that whether a plaintiff
falls within a statute’s zone of interests is really just a question
of whether the plaintiff has a federal cause of action. It is “mis-
leading” to call that a question of standing, Justice Scalia
wrote, “since the absence of a valid . . . cause of action does
not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction, i.e., the court’s
statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.”86
The dispute in Lexmark thus raised “a straightforward
question of statutory interpretation: Does the cause of action
[provided in the Lanham Act] extend to plaintiffs like Static
Control?”87 The Court concluded that it did. Sweeping aside
alternative formulations devised by the lower courts, Justice
Scalia and his colleagues held that a party has a false-advertis-
ing claim under the Lanham Act if the defendant’s “deception
of consumers causes them to withhold trade from the plain-
tiff” and thus inflicts upon the plaintiff an “economic or rep-
utational injury flowing directly from the deception wrought
by the defendant’s advertising.”88
STANDING AND RIPENESS
With one important exception, the Court’s ruling in Susan
B. Anthony List v. Driehaus89 was unremarkable. Susan B.
Anthony List (SBAL)—an organization that opposes abor-
tion—filed a federal action for declaratory and injunctive
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90. Id. at 2347 (quoting Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Compo-
nents, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386 (2014) (quoting Sprint Comm-
c’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584, 591 (2013))).
91. Id.
92. Sprint Commc’ns v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584, 591 (2013) (quoting
Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424
U.S. 800, 817 (1976)).
93. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
94. Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 690 F.3d 864, 867 (8th Cir. 2012)
(citing Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n,
457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 584 (2013).
95. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans,
491 U.S. 350, 368 (1989). 
96. Sprint Commc’ns, 134 S. Ct. at 593-94 (internal quotation omit-
ted).
97. Id. at 592 (quoting Huffman v. Pursue, 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975)).
98. 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014).
99. See Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,
415 U.S. 394 (1974); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Televi-
sion, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
100. In their quest to fend off competitors, broadcasters are hardly out
of the woods. See Emily Steel, After Ruling, Aereo’s Rivals Prepare
to Pounce, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2014, at B1.
relief, arguing that its First
Amendment rights were vio-
lated by an Ohio statute ren-
dering it a crime to make false
statements about candidates
for public office. SBAL had
already run into trouble with
state officials when it ran a
political advertisement assert-
ing that then-Congressman
Steven Driehaus voted in favor
of taxpayer-funded abortions,
and it feared it would
encounter similar trouble in
future elections. In an opinion
by Justice Thomas, the Court unanimously found that SBAL
faced an injury that was sufficiently imminent to satisfy the
requirements of Article III.
Of greater interest are the Court’s closing remarks concern-
ing the prudential requirements of ripeness. The Sixth Circuit
had found the case unripe, reasoning that SBAL would not
suffer undue hardship if adjudication of its constitutional
claims were delayed and that the factual record concerning
SBAL’s future political advocacy was insufficiently developed.
The Court cast at least a modicum of doubt on “the continu-
ing vitality” of those prudential requirements, noting that they
are “‘in some tension with our recent reaffirmation of the prin-
ciple that “a federal court’s obligation to hear and decide”
cases within its jurisdiction “is virtually unflagging.”’”90 But
the Court found that it did not yet need to resolve that tension
because those prudential requirements were “easily satisfied
here.”91
YOUNGER ABSTENTION
Emphasizing federal courts’ “virtually unflagging” obliga-
tion to adjudicate cases within their jurisdiction,92 the Court
in Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs clarified the limits of
the abstention doctrines eponymously associated with
Younger v. Harris.93 The dispute arose from Sprint’s claim that
federal law preempted Iowa’s regulation of intrastate access
charges for certain calls placed over the Internet. An Iowa
administrative agency had rejected that claim. While that rul-
ing was under review in an Iowa court, Sprint filed a federal
suit against the agency. The Eighth Circuit concluded that
abstention was appropriate, reasoning that Younger abstention
is warranted whenever “(1) there is an ongoing state judicial
proceeding, which (2) implicates important state interests,
and (3) the state proceedings provide an adequate opportu-
nity to raise constitutional challenges.”94
Led by Justice Ginsburg, the Court unanimously found
that the Eighth Circuit’s criteria swept too broadly. The Court
previously had indicated that Younger abstention is appropri-
ate if there are parallel state proceedings of one of three kinds:
criminal prosecutions, civil enforcement proceedings, or “civil
proceedings involving certain orders . . . uniquely in further-
ance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial func-
tions.”95 Stressing that Younger abstention “extends to th[os]e
three exceptional circumstances, but no further,”96 the Sprint
Communications Court explained that civil enforcement pro-
ceedings render Younger abstention appropriate only if those
proceedings are “‘akin to a criminal prosecution’” in the sense
that they were initiated by a state actor (typically following an
investigation) to sanction a party for wrongful conduct.97 The
justices found those circumstances absent here.
COPYRIGHTS
In American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc.,98
the Court ruled 6-3 that Aereo was violating copyrights held
by television broadcasters, producers, and others in broadcast
television programs. For a monthly fee, Aereo’s technology
enables a person to watch broadcast television programs on
Internet-connected devices. Upon receiving a request for a
specific program from a prospective viewer, Aereo devotes one
of its thousands of tiny antennae to the task of pulling down
the selected program’s broadcast signal for that viewer; it saves
a copy of that program on its hard drive (in a file dedicated to
that viewer) and then, with only a several-second delay
behind the original broadcast, it streams the program to the
viewer in an Internet-compatible format. Led by Justice
Breyer, a majority of the Court found that, with technological
updates, Aereo was replicating processes used by community
antenna television (CATV) systems—systems that the Court
had found permissible in a pair of rulings in 1968 and 1974,99
prompting Congress to amend the Copyright Act in 1976.
Under those 1976 amendments, the Court held, Aereo was
violating the copyright holders’ exclusive right to publicly
perform the copyrighted works.100
Joined by Justices Thomas and Alito, Justice Scalia dis-
sented. He argued that, because “Aereo’s automated system
does not relay any program, copyrighted or not, until a sub-
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scriber selects the program and tells Aereo to play it,” Aereo
was not itself performing the works.101 Justice Scalia reserved
judgment on whether Aereo could be held “secondarily”
liable under the Act for facilitating copyright infringements
by others.
PATENTS
In a pair of rulings handed down on the same day in early
June, the Court unanimously and pointedly reversed the Fed-
eral Circuit on patent matters. In Limelight Networks, Inc. v.
Akamai Technologies, Inc.102—a case concerning a patented
method of delivering electronic data—the Court held that a
party cannot be held liable for inducing patent infringement
under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) if no one has directly infringed the
patent in violation of 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) or some other statu-
tory provision. The Court said that, in reaching a contrary
conclusion on the facts of this case, “[t]he Federal Circuit’s
analysis fundamentally misunderstands what it means to
infringe a method patent.”103
In Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc.,104 the Court held
that a patent is not void for indefiniteness if the “patent’s
claims, viewed in light of the specification and prosecution
history, inform those skilled in the art about the scope of the
invention with reasonable certainty.”105 By finding the defi-
niteness requirement met if a patent’s claims are not “insol-
ubly ambiguous,” the Court said, the Federal Circuit had
adopted a test that was not “‘probative of the essential
inquiry’” and was “breed[ing] lower court confusion.”106
SECURITIES FRAUD
In Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice,107 the Court held that
the plaintiffs’ state-law class actions were not precluded by the
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA).
One of several measures aimed at curbing “perceived abuses
of the class-action vehicle in litigation involving nationally
traded securities,”108 SLUSA prohibits state-law class actions
alleging “a misrepresentation or omission of material fact in
connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security.”109
“Covered securities” consist primarily of those traded on
national exchanges.110 The plaintiffs here alleged that they
had purchased certificates of deposit on the strength of the
issuer’s fraudulent assurance
that their funds would be
invested, at least in part, in
nationally traded securities.
The defendants contended
that SLUSA precluded the
plaintiffs’ class actions.
A majority of the justices
rejected the defendants’ argu-
ment, finding that “[a] fraud-
ulent misrepresentation or
omission is not made ‘in con-
nection with’ . . . a ‘purchase
or sale of a covered security’
unless it is material to a deci-
sion by one or more individ-
uals (other than the fraud-
ster) to buy or to sell a ‘covered security.’”111 In this case, the
only entity that was making decisions about whether to buy
or sell covered securities was one of the alleged fraudsters—
the bank that issued the certificates of deposit. Because their
state-law claims fell beyond the reach of SLUSA’s preclusion
provision, the plaintiffs were allowed to proceed.112
In Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund,113 a majority of the
Court declined Halliburton’s suggestion that the Court make
it more difficult for private securities-fraud plaintiffs to prove
reliance upon defendants’ material misrepresentations. Under
the Court’s 1988 ruling in Basic Inc. v. Levinson,114 investors
are allowed to invoke a rebuttable presumption of reliance—a
presumption that is grounded in the assumption that the price
of a stock reflects all publicly available information about that
stock, including fraudulent statements made by company offi-
cials. In an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court found
that Halliburton’s arguments against the Basic framework
were not sufficiently persuasive to overcome the weight of
stare decisis.115 Joined by Justices Scalia and Alito, Justice
Thomas concurred only in the judgment, finding that
“[l]ogic, economic realities, and our subsequent jurispru-
dence have undermined the foundations of the Basic pre-
sumption, and stare decisis cannot prop up the façade that
remains.”116
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105. Id. at 2129.
106. Id. at 2130 (quoting Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis
Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40 (1997)).
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108. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71,
81 (2006).
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111. Chadbourne & Parke, 134 S. Ct. at 1066.
112. Justices Kennedy and Alito dissented, arguing that the Court’s
narrow reading of SLUSA’s preclusion provision 
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defendants to defend against multiple suits in various state
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rely on the stability that results from a national securities
market regulated by federal law.
Id. at 1074 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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SUPREMACY CLAUSE: 
PREEMPTION
In Northwest, Inc. v. Gins-
berg,117 the Court took up the
claim of Rabbi S. Binyomin
Ginsberg, whom Northwest Air-
lines had terminated from its
frequent-flyer program after the
airlines concluded that Ginsberg
was “abusing” the program by
(among other things) complain-
ing too frequently about such
matters as delayed luggage
delivery. Ginsberg claimed that, by terminating him on those
grounds, Northwest had breached its duty of good faith and
fair dealing. Northwest contended, however, that Ginsberg’s
state-law claim was preempted by the Airline Deregulation
Act of 1978 (ADA), which explicitly preempts any state “law,
regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of
law related to [an air carrier’s] price, route, or service.”118
With Justice Alito writing for the Court, the justices unan-
imously found Ginsberg’s claim preempted. The Court
observed that states vary with respect to how they view the
duty on which Ginsberg’s claim relied. In some states, the
duty of good faith and fair dealing is regarded as springing
from contracting parties’ reasonable expectations, while in
other states the duty is imposed upon parties pursuant to the
community’s public-policy judgments. When it comes to ADA
preemption, the source of the duty makes all the difference. If
a state regards the duty as flowing from the contracting par-
ties’ reasonable expectations, the Court said, then the duty is
essentially imposed by the parties themselves and falls outside
the terms of the ADA’s preemption provision. But if the duty is
imposed upon the parties by the state—as it was here—then
the duty flows from a “law, regulation, or other provision hav-
ing the force and effect of law” and so is explicitly preempted
by the ADA.
In CTS Corp. v. Waldburger,119 the Court found important
differences between statutes of limitations and statutes of
repose. Twenty-four years after CTS Corporation sold prop-
erty on which it had operated an electronics plant in North
Carolina, Peter Waldburger and others filed a state-law action
against CTS, alleging they had been harmed by toxic chemi-
cals CTS had stored there. North Carolina’s statute of repose
shielded tort defendants from lawsuits brought more than 10
years after their last culpable act. CTS sought the protection
of that statute, saying that its last culpable act was its sale of
the plant more than two decades earlier. Waldburger argued,
however, that North Carolina’s statute of repose was pre-
empted by the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).
Writing for a 7-2 majority, Justice Kennedy found no pre-
emption. He explained that a statute of limitations typically
establishes a period within which a harmed individual must
sue after being injured or discovering that he or she has been
harmed, while a statute of repose “puts an outer limit on the
right to bring a civil action,” typically measured “from the
date of the last culpable act or omission of the defendant.”120
Justice Kennedy pointed out that CERCLA’s preemption pro-
vision explicitly refers to states’ statutes of limitations but says
nothing explicitly about states’ statutes of repose. A congres-
sionally commissioned study group had acknowledged those
two different kinds of state statutes and had urged state law-
makers to remove both sets of obstacles for future plaintiffs.
Rather than await state action, however, Congress opted to
legislate—and when it did, it adopted a preemption provision
that dealt only with state statutes of limitations, evidently opt-
ing to leave the fate of state statutes of repose in state law-
makers’ hands.121
TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
In a 5-4 ruling that did not break along familiar lines, the
Court ruled in Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community122 that
Bay Mills—a federally recognized Indian tribe—was protected
by tribal sovereign immunity against an action brought
against it by the State of Michigan. Michigan had alleged that,
by opening a casino off tribal lands, the Tribe had violated
both the federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) and a
compact that the state and Bay Mills entered in 1993.
Joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy,
Breyer, and Sotomayor, Justice Kagan took as her starting
premises that Indian tribes are subject to Congress’s “plenary
control” as “‘domestic dependent nations,’” yet enjoy sover-
eign immunity to the extent Congress has chosen not to abro-
gate it.123 She then pointed out that IGRA partially abrogates
the tribes’ immunity for actions brought in federal court con-
cerning certain gaming activities “located on Indian lands”124
but lacks a comparable provision concerning gaming activities
off Indian lands. “This Court has no roving license, in even
ordinary cases of statutory interpretation, to disregard clear
[statutory] language,” Justice Kagan wrote, and is “still less”
empowered to rewrite statutes “when the consequence would
be to expand an abrogation of immunity.”125
Likely recognizing that its abrogation argument was not air-
tight, Michigan had urged the Court to hold that tribal sover-
eign immunity does not extend in the first instance to legal
actions concerning tribes’ commercial activities off tribal lands.
The Court had rejected that very proposition in its 1998 ruling
in Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies,
Inc.,126 however, and the Court declined to backtrack here. Cit-
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ing the principle of stare decisis as “a foundation stone of the
rule of law,”127 the majority concluded that Congress is now
the appropriate entity to decide whether the policy course
charted in Kiowa remains desirable.
The Court’s ruling in Kiowa provided the focal point of Jus-
tice Thomas’s dissent. Joined by Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, and
Alito, he argued that Kiowa was “unsupported by any ratio-
nale . . . , inconsistent with the limits on tribal sovereignty,
and an affront to state sovereignty.”128 Emphasizing that tribal
immunity is a doctrine of the Court’s—not Congress’s—cre-
ation, Justice Thomas believed the majority’s reluctance to
overturn Kiowa was misplaced. In the 16 years since Kiowa
was decided, he wrote, tribes’ gaming revenues had “more
than tripled,” giving rise to numerous concerns that—at least
when arising from tribes’ commercial activities off tribal
lands—states should be free to address without having to deal
with the obstacles that tribal immunity poses.129
Justice Scalia filed a separate, one-paragraph opinion,
expressing regret for having joined the majority in Kiowa and
saying that the Court itself should “clean up [the] mess that I
helped make,” rather than leave that task to Congress.130 Jus-
tice Ginsburg also filed a short separate opinion, drawing an
unfavorable connection between the Court’s broad construc-
tion of tribal immunity in Kiowa and the Court’s expansive
rulings in other cases concerning states’ sovereign immunity.
She predicted that “[n]either brand of immoderate, judicially
confirmed immunity . . . will have staying power.”131
OTHER NOTABLE RULINGS
In Ray Haluch Gravel Co. v. Central Pension Fund,132 the
Court unanimously held that “[w]hether [a] claim for attor-
ney’s fees is based on a statute, a contract, or both, the pen-
dency of a ruling on an award for fees and costs does not pre-
vent, as a general rule, the merits judgment from becoming
final for purposes of appeal.”133 In the case before it, the Court
thus ruled that the 30-day clock for filing a notice of appeal
began to run when the district court issued its ruling on the
merits, rather than when the district court subsequently ruled
on a motion for attorney’s fees.
In Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp.,134 the
Court unanimously held that a civil suit does not qualify as a
“mass action” under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005—
and so is not removable from state to federal court under that
legislation’s mass-action provisions135—when a state is the
lone named plaintiff in a lawsuit aimed at redressing injuries
suffered by many of that
state’s citizens.
Contributing to what can-
not be a good public-rela-
tions story for the Coca-Cola
Company, the Court held in
POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-
Cola Co.136 that POM Won-
derful—the producer of a
pomegranate-blueberry juice
blend—could bring a Lan-
ham Act unfair-competition
suit against Coca-Cola for
prominently placing the
words “pomegranate blue-
berry” on the label of a prod-
uct that, in reality, contains
only miniscule amounts of those juices. The Ninth Circuit
had ruled that POM Wonderful’s suit was precluded by the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, but the Court unanimously
reversed, finding that “the FDCA and the Lanham Act com-
plement each other in the federal regulation of misleading
food and beverage labels.”137
In Lawson v. FMR LLC,138 the Court held that a whistle-
blower-protecting provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 extends not only to the employees of public companies
but also to the employees of those companies’ contractors and
subcontractors.
Pointing out that equitable tolling is available only when it
comports with the lawmakers’ intent, the Court in Lozano v.
Montoya Alvarez139 held that the parties to the Hague Conven-
tion on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction did
not want courts to toll the one-year period after which it
becomes more difficult for a parent to secure the return of a
child who was taken to a different country by the other parent.
Citing the familiar Chevron-deference framework,140 the
Court in EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P.,141 upheld the
Environmental Protection Agency’s cost-efficiency formula for
determining the amount of air pollution that an upwind state
must eliminate to bring downwind states into compliance
with air-quality standards established pursuant to the Clean
Air Act.
The EPA received a mostly favorable split decision in Util-
ity Air Regulatory Group v. EPA.142 Piecing together the results
handed down by a splintered Court, one finds that the EPA
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currently lacks statutory authority to impose permitting
requirements on stationary entities based solely on their
potential to emit large amounts of greenhouse gases, but that
the agency may require stationary entities to employ “best
available control technology” for greenhouse-gas emissions if
those entities already are subject to permitting requirements
for more conventional pollutants.
In United States v. Quality Stores, Inc.,143 the Court unani-
mously concluded that severance payments made to involun-
tarily terminated employees are taxable wages under the Fed-
eral Insurance Contributions Act.
Rejecting the reasoning of several lower federal appellate
courts, the Court unanimously held in Fifth Third Bancorp v.
Dudenhoeffer144 that fiduciaries of employee-stock-ownership
plans are not entitled to a special presumption that they have
behaved prudently.
LOOKING AHEAD
At the time of this writing, the Court already has slated a
wide range of significant cases for its 2014-2015 docket. The
issues it intends to confront include, among others, the con-
stitutionality of redistricting efforts in Alabama;145 the consti-
tutionality of a state’s effort to tax all of the income of its res-
idents, including income earned and taxed in other states;146
the evidentiary requirements for removal from state to federal
court;147 whether a state prison’s ban on beards violates the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of
2000;148 whether and how a court may enforce the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission’s statutory duty to try
to conciliate discrimination claims before filing suit;149
whether federal agencies may revise their interpretive rules
without a notice-and-comment period;150 how to determine
whether a city’s sign ordinance is content-based or content-
neutral;151 whether the deadlines for filings claims under the
Federal Tort Claims Act are subject to equitable tolling;152 and
the scope of employers’ duty to accommodate pregnant
employees under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.153
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This article was adapted from Donna Shestowsky, The Psychology of
Procedural Preference: How Litigants Evaluate Legal Procedures Ex Ante,
99 IOWA L. REV. 637 (2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
2378622. Additional findings can be found in the original work. The
research was funded by the National Science Foundation under Grant
Number 0920995. The American Bar Association, Section on Litiga-
tion, and the Institute for Governmental Affairs at the University of
California, Davis, provided financial support during the first year of
the study. The University of California, Davis, School of Law also pro-
vided ongoing financial and human resources to support this project. 
Footnotes
1. Mary McQueen, President, Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, National
Public Radio Interview (Oct. 4, 2011). 
2. Stephen Stock, California Superior Courts in Crisis, NBC BAY AREA,
July 24, 2013, http://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/California-
Superior-Courts-in-Crisis-216668081.html. 
3. See Donna Shestowsky, The Psychology of Procedural Preference:
How Litigants Evaluate Legal Procedures Ex Ante, 99 IOWA L. REV.
637, n.5 (2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2378622.
4. The idea of “marketing” ADR options to litigants is reminiscent of
Frank Sander’s work during the 1970s, which focused on “fitting
the forum to the fuss” through ex ante screening and determina-
tion of the most appropriate procedures to be used, based on the
particulars of individual cases. See, e.g., Frank E. A. Sander &
Stephen B. Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss: A User-Friendly
Guide to Selecting an ADR Procedure, 10 NEGOT. J. 49 (1994); see
also Timothy Hedeen, Remodeling the Multi-Door Courthouse to
“Fit the Forum to the Folks”: How Screening and Preparation Will
Enhance ADR, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 941, 941 (2012) (proposing a
structural change in the delivery of ADR services through a pre-
mediation consultation process of screening and preparation that
focuses not only on disputes but on litigants as well).
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Know So Little, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 549, 577-79 (2008)
(providing an overview of the relevant findings); see also TOM R.
TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 4-5 (2006) (discussing the ben-
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ties). 
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Although portions of the United States economy havebegun to recover from the economic crisis that thecountry experienced from 2007 to 2009, the nation’s
judicial system has rebounded more slowly. Forty-three states
have substantially cut their judicial budgets.1 In many jurisdic-
tions, the waiting time for civil trials in state courts has dra-
matically increased—in at least one major metropolitan area,
the waiting time for many litigants has risen to five years.2 Bud-
gets for alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) programs have
also shrunk considerably.3 In light of these realities, many liti-
gants struggle to obtain civil justice. 
Empirical research designed to elucidate litigants’ prefer-
ences for legal procedures can help courts better serve their
constituents moving forward. For example, many courts offer
either mediation or arbitration as the only alternative to trial.
But which of these two procedures do litigants prefer? Proce-
dural preference research can provide such information and
consequently help inform program design. Such research can
also help lawyers be more responsive to their clients’ needs as
they consider their procedural options and better predict the
preferences of opposing parties. 
It is important for empirical research to elucidate how liti-
gants perceive procedures ex ante (before a legal procedure
resolves the dispute) as well as how they evaluate them ex post
(after the case has received a final disposition). Ex ante percep-
tions are relevant for understanding litigants’ viewpoints
regarding how to “fit the forum to the fuss.”4 Research on such
perceptions can help court personnel effectively “market” ADR
options to litigants, thereby mitigating burdens related to over-
stretched budgets, court dockets, and the waiting time for trial.
It can also be useful for anticipating resistance toward, or over-
eagerness to engage in, certain procedures in light of the case-
related, demographic, or relationship factors at play in a given
dispute. For these reasons, an understanding of litigants’ pre-
experience conceptualizations of legal procedures should be
considered foundational. 
In contrast, litigants’ ex post perceptions are important
because they tend to affect how inclined litigants are to volun-
tarily comply with the terms of the agreement or decision that
is reached for their case and how willing they are to abide by
the law moving forward.5 Although the architects of court pol-
icy are rightfully influenced by multiple factors, research on lit-
igants’ perceptions—both ex ante and ex post—can help to
inform the design and use of procedures that maximize the sub-
jective satisfaction of litigants and increase citizens’ respect for
the legal system. 
To contribute to this body of psychological literature, my
research team and I spearheaded the first multi-court study of
how civil litigants assess legal procedures ex ante.6 We noticed
that several aspects of litigant perceptions had not been fully
examined through empirical research. One open issue con-
cerned how litigants compare legal procedures such as media-
tion, judge trials, and non-binding arbitration. Nearly all of the
past studies had consisted of laboratory research, which typi-
cally involved surveying undergraduates who evaluated options
for resolving hypothetical disputes.7 How actual civil litigants
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8. See Robert J. MacCoun, Voice, Control, and Belonging: The Double-
Edged Sword of Procedural Fairness, 1 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 171,
173 (2005).
9. For review, see Shestowsky, supra note 3, at 651-53.
10. Id.
11. The Utah Court is located in Salt Lake City. In 2010, litigants filed
55,074 civil cases in the Utah Court. See UTAH DIST. COURTS,
FY2010 CASE TYPE BY COURT (2010), available at 
http://www.utcourts.gov/stats/files/2010FY/district/3-Summary.pdf.
12. The California Court is located in northern California, with
branches in Fairfield and Vallejo. For the 2010–2011 fiscal year,
the Solano County Court received 13,910 civil filings. JUDICIAL
COUNCIL OF CAL., 2012 COURT STATISTICS REPORT: STATE CASELOAD
TRENDS: 2001–2002 THROUGH 2010–2011, at 94 tbl.4b (2012),
available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/2012-Court-
Statistics-Report.pdf.
13. The Oregon Court is located in Multnomah County. In 2010, the
Oregon Court received 18,203 civil-case filings. OR. JUDICIAL DEP’T,
STATISTICAL REPORT RELATING TO THE CIRCUIT COURTS OF THE STATE OF
OREGON, at 2 tbl.1 (2010), available at http://courts.oregon.gov/
OJD/docs/OSCA/2010_Stats_Table_1.pdf.
14. This procedure was described to participants as follows: Sometimes
a judge can decide a case early on, so that a trial is never required.
This is because the judge has determined there is no question
about the facts, and the case can be decided on the basis of law
alone. The lawyers submit documents to the court and may make
a presentation to the judge at a hearing. Clients rarely attend and,
if they do, they do not speak during the hearing. The judge later
announces the outcome in writing, and explains why they decided
as they did. This outcome is based on legal rules or principles. A
party who is dissatisfied with the outcome can appeal it to a higher
court, which will require additional time and proceedings.
15. For a full set of descriptions, see Shestowsky, supra note 3, 701-03.
“Construct validity” refers to the “degree to which certain explana-
tory concepts or constructs account for performance on [a] test.”
SAMUEL MESSICK, VALIDITY OF TEST INTERPRETATION AND USE 7
(1990), available at http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED395031.pdf.
16. We created three versions of the survey, with the same questions
presented in different orders in each version.
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assess their options with respect to actual cases was not clear.8
To our knowledge, only two past field studies had examined the
ex ante perceptions of real litigants, and both were conducted in
a single jurisdiction and made limited inquiries into litigant
decision-making.9 Another open issue was whether litigants’
attraction to procedures is associated with demographic, rela-
tionship or attitudinal factors, or the substantive issues involved
in their cases. Laboratory research on ex ante preferences, and
arguably even lawyer intuition, suggest that many factors influ-
ence how desirable litigants perceive procedures to be, including
their culture, race or ethnicity, gender, the role they have in the
case (i.e., defendant or plaintiff), and the causes of action that
are involved.10 A third open issue was whether litigants have a
preference between the two ADR procedures that courts com-
monly offer—namely, mediation and non-binding arbitration. 
Our project differs from past field research on ex ante litigant
assessments of procedures in several ways. First, it surveys liti-
gants from three distinct state court systems, making it the first
multi-jurisdictional study of litigants’ ex ante preferences. Sec-
ond, the courts from which litigants were recruited offered both
mediation and non-binding arbitration, in addition to trial, for
the same cases. Thus, the study investigates preferences within
a real-world environment while maintaining a “laboratory-like”
setting by keeping the most important variables (i.e., the proce-
dures offered by the courts) relatively constant. Third, com-
pared to earlier research, this work examines how litigants eval-
uate a much larger variety of procedures and assesses a broader
set of factors that might predict attraction to procedures. 
METHOD
Participants were recruited from general jurisdiction trial
courts (the “study courts”) in three states: 
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake City, Utah
(“Utah Court”);11
Superior Court of Solano County, California (“California
Court”);12 and
Fourth Judicial District, Multnomah County, Oregon
(“Oregon Court”).13
For six two-week periods between May 2010 and May 2011,
we identified litigants who met the following study criteria in
each study court: their case must have been filed in one of the
courts during the two-week period and have been eligible for
trial as well as both mediation and non-binding arbitration at
that court. When the court did not provide litigant contact
information, the team researched addresses for the litigants to
prevent the data contamination that may have occurred by
sending the surveys to the attorneys to distribute to their
clients. Surveys were mailed to litigants within three weeks of
the date on which their case was filed. An introductory letter
and consent form explained that they would be compensated
for returning the survey. 
The survey collected demographic information (e.g., gender,
age group) about the litigants, the kind of litigants they were
(e.g., whether they were involved in the case as an individual or
were representing a company, organization, or group) as well as
some details about their case (e.g., whether they were the plain-
tiff, the defendant, or both (in cases involving counter-claims),
the type of legal issues that were involved, whether the parties
had a pre-existing relationship with each other, and how much
they valued a future relationship with the other party). They
rated the confidence they had in their case by providing a 0-
100% chance estimate of winning their case (“If you go to trial
for this case, what do you think your chances are of ‘win-
ning’?”). They also indicated their impression of the court
where the case was filed (1 = extremely negative to 9 =
extremely positive). See Table 1 for more details regarding the
information that was collected.
Other questions assessed how attractive litigants regarded
the following legal procedures: (1) Attorneys Negotiate without
Clients, (2) Attorneys Negotiate with Clients Present, (3) Medi-
ation, (4) Judge Decides without Trial,14 (5) Jury Trial, (6)
Judge Trial, (7) Binding Arbitration, and (8) Non-binding Arbi-
tration. Litigants read brief descriptions of these procedures15 to
ensure construct validity and then rated each in terms of how
attractive they perceived it to be for their own case (1 = not
attractive at all to 9 = extremely attractive).16
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TABLE 1: PARTICIPANT INFORMATION
FREQUENCY %
Court Location
California 59 14.3
Oregon 190 46.0
Utah 155 37.5
Missing Data 9 2.2
Role in Case
Defendant Only 156 37.8
Plaintiff Only 235 56.9
Both 12 2.9
Other 1 0.2
Missing Data 9 2.2
Party Type (Litigant)
Individual 287 69.5
Company 97 23.5
Group/Organization 27 6.5
Missing Data 6 1.5
Party Type (Opposing Party)
Individual 202 48.9
Company 156 37.8
Group/Organization 32 7.7
Missing Data 30 7.3
Was the Litigant a Defendant or Plaintiff Before?
Yes, Defendant Only 52 12.6
Yes, Plaintiff Only 70 16.9
Yes, Both 69 16.7
No, Neither 176 42.6
Missing Data 46 11.1
Litigant Age Group
18-25 14 3.4
26-35 80 19.4
36-45 74 17.9
46-55 92 22.3
56-65 82 19.9
66-75 48 11.6
76-80 6 1.5
Over 80 5 1.2
Missing Data 12 2.9
TABLE 1: PARTICIPANT INFORMATION (CONTINUED)
FREQUENCY %
Litigant Ethnicity/Race
American Indian or Alaska Native 6 1.5
Asian 17 4.1
Hispanic 12 2.9
Black or African American 20 4.8
Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander 4 1.0
White Non-Hispanic 324 78.5
Other 16 3.9
Missing Data 14 3.4
Litigant Gender
Female 176 42.6
Male 225 54.5
Missing Data 12 2.9
Relationship with Opposing Party 
Before Filing?
No 218 52.8
Yes 180 43.6
Missing Data 15 3.6
Insurance Company has an Interest 
in the Outcome?
Yes, Plaintiff’s insurance has an interest 26 6.3
Yes, Defendant’s insurance has an interest 83 20.1
Yes, Both Parties’ insurance have an interest 42 10.2
No, Neither Party’s insurance has an interest 190 46.0
Don’t Know 57 13.8
Missing Data 15 3.6
Note: N = 413. Missing data indicates litigants for whom a response to
the question was not obtained. Party Type and Opposing Party Type cal-
culations include participants (n = 4 and n = 7, respectively) who indi-
cated that more than one type applied to their case. 
PARTICIPANTS AND TYPES OF CASES
Four hundred thirteen litigants participated in this study.17
The majority of their cases involved only personal injury
(28.6%) or contracts (24.5%) issues. A variety of other types of
cases were included in the sample: property (11.1%), civil
rights (2.9%), employment (5.3%), medical practice (1.7%),
17. Ultimately, the mailings resulted in a 10% response rate. The data set
includes litigants with mailing addresses from 19 states; 7.02% had
addresses from outside of the states where the study courts were
located.
and “other” (10.9%). About one-eighth of cases (12.6%)
involved multiple causes of action.18
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We used our data to determine (1) litigants’ relative prefer-
ences for the various legal procedures and (2) whether case-
type, demographic, relationship or attitudinal factors predicted
how desirable litigants regarded each procedure. As with any
empirical study, it is important to keep in mind how to interpret
our findings. First, because ours was not a controlled laboratory
study, our data cannot be used to conclusively determine causal
relationships between litigants’ attraction to certain procedures
and the other factors we measured (e.g., that litigants’ attitudes
toward the court causes their level of attraction to the Judge
Trial, or that being female causes a relative dislike for Binding
Arbitration). Thus, although our interpretations of the findings
are certainly consistent with the analyses that we report, they
should not be taken as evidence that we discovered particular
causal relationships. Second, it is important to note that the
results do not necessarily generalize to how litigants might eval-
uate these same procedures ex post. Third, although, to our
knowledge, the data collected for this study represents the
largest data set of litigants’ ex ante perceptions of procedures
published to date, the response rate was 10%.19 Notably, and
perhaps expectedly, defendants opted out of the research at
higher rates than plaintiffs did.
A. PROCEDURAL PREFERENCES
Litigants evaluated the attractiveness of each procedure for
their case (1 = not attractive at all to 9 = extremely attractive).
To determine their relative preferences, we compared how
attractive they found the Judge Trial—the default legal proce-
dure20—to the other options. Litigants found the Judge Trial
significantly more attractive than all other examined proce-
dures except for Attorneys Negotiate with Clients Present and
Mediation. Litigant attraction to these two procedures did not
significantly differ from that of the Judge Trial. See Figure 1.
Additional analyses revealed that litigants preferred Media-
tion to all other procedures except for the Judge Trial and
Attorneys Negotiate with Clients Present (whose attractiveness
ratings did not significantly differ from that of Mediation).
They also liked Attorneys Negotiate with Clients Present more
than all of the other procedures except for the Judge Trial and
Mediation (whose attractiveness ratings did not significantly
differ from that of Attorneys Negotiate with Clients Present).
Thus, litigants preferred the Judge Trial, Mediation, and Attor-
neys Negotiate with Clients Present to all other examined pro-
cedures,21 and within this group of best-liked procedures, they
did not have a statistically significant preference.
Together, these findings have important implications for
courts because court administrators who want to encourage
the use of their voluntary programs should strive not only to
offer ADR options that litigants find especially appealing rela-
tive to each other, but ones that litigants find more appealing
(or at least not significantly less appealing) than trial itself, ex
ante. Our study found that not only did litigants prefer Media-
tion to Non-binding Arbitration, but they liked Mediation sig-
nificantly more than the Jury Trial (and viewed the attractive-
ness of Mediation and the Judge trial as statistically equiva-
lent). By contrast, litigants found Non-binding Arbitration sig-
nificantly less appealing than both the Judge and Jury Trial.22
From this perspective, Mediation seems like a better choice for
18. The percentages were calculated using n = 403, due to missing data
regarding case types.
19. As calculated, the 10% response rate likely reflects a gross under-
estimate of the true response rate and may significantly understate
the representativeness of the sample. Significant research was often
required to locate the addresses of litigants; it is possible that in
many cases none of the addresses used to reach a particular litigant
were correct, and thus, we should not have expected any of our
attempts to yield a completed survey. A 10% response rate is not
unusual for a survey study of laypeople who are contacted ran-
domly through the mail. 
20. A civil litigant must take affirmative action to demand a jury trial.
See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 631(f) (West 2012) (stating that “A
party waives trial by jury . . . (4) By failing to announce that a jury
is required, at the time the cause is first set for trial . . . or within
five days after notice of setting . . . .”); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 52.570
(West 2013) (stating that “[I]f either party . . . demands a jury trial
and deposits with the justice such trial fee as is required . . . the
issue must be tried by a jury and not the justice; but otherwise it
must be tried by the justice”); UTAH R. CIV. P. 38(b) (stating that
“Any party may demand a trial by jury . . . not later than 10 days
after the service of the last pleading directed to such issue”).
21. Hierarchical Linear Model analysis using Attorneys Negotiate with
Clients Present as the reference group confirmed this conclusion.
The results of this analysis are on file with the author. Other pref-
erence results are reported in Shestowsky, supra note 3 at 663-66.
22. See Shestowsky, supra note 3, at 663-64 (reporting that litigants
preferred the Judge Trial to Non-binding Arbitration).  A follow-
up analysis demonstrated that litigants also preferred the Jury
Trial to Non-binding Arbitration, t (406) = 3.45, p = .001.
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FIGURE 1: HOW LITIGANTS EVALUATED THE 
ATTRACTIVENESS OF LEGAL PROCEDURES
Court Review - Volume 50 129
Figure 1. Mean litigant attraction ratings of legal procedures. Error bars are
SEs of the ratings. Reported above each bar is the average litigant rating for
that procedure. Litigants rated their attraction to each procedure using a 9-
point Likert scale.
23. The “shuttle” model of mediation was not mentioned in the
description of Mediation that was provided to the participants. See
Shestowsky, supra note 3, at Appendix D. Shuttle mediation occurs
when mediators meet with the parties separately rather than in
joint session and “shuttle’ information back and forth between the
parties in an effort to reach an agreement. 
24. See, e.g., Valerie P. Hans, Jury Jokes and Legal Culture, CORNELL LAW
FACULTY PUBLICATIONS, Paper 635 (2013) (conducting a systemic
analysis of a body of jokes about the jury system, collected from a
variety of print and online sources). 
25. Studies show that jurors tend to discuss the case before delibera-
tion, despite admonition to the contrary. See Natasha K. Lakamp,
Deliberating Juror Predeliberation Discussions: Should California Fol-
low the Arizona Model?, 45 UCLA L. REV. 845, 853-54 (1998).
26. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities,
88 CORNELL L. REV. 119, 131 (2002) (explaining that the waiting
time for a judge’s trial and decision in federal court is shorter than
the waiting time in the jury queue).
27. To explore this issue, simultaneous multiple regression analyses
were conducted using the attraction rating for each procedure as
the outcome variable and a series of case-type, demographic, rela-
tionship, and attitudinal variables as predictors. Multiple regres-
sion is a common type of analysis used to predict an outcome (in
this case, the attractiveness rating for a procedure) based on mul-
tiple predictor variables. For each procedure, the intercept of the
regression models represents the mean attractiveness of the refer-
ence group. Thus, significant nominal predictors in the regression
model indicate groups within the variable that are associated with
a significant change in the attractiveness rating for a procedure
compared to the reference group’s average attractiveness rating for
that procedure. Similarly, significant continuous predictor vari-
ables are variables for which changes in the outcome variable cor-
respond significantly with changes in the predictor. The reference
group used in our model consisted of individual white males,
between 18 and 25 years of age, who have an individual opposing
party with whom they did not have a relationship before the law-
suit and have no interest in having a future relationship, who have
a personal injury case, where an insurance company had no inter-
est in the outcome of the case, who have not had experience as
either a plaintiff or defendant before, who have zero expectancy of
winning in trial, who filed in Oregon, who are plaintiffs in the cur-
rent case, and who have an extremely negative perception of the
court where their case is filed.
voluntary programs. Insofar as litigants might be more apt to
participate in good faith in settlement procedures they find
especially attractive, the fact that litigants favored Mediation to
Non-binding Arbitration could be an important finding for
mandatory programs as well. 
Litigants also preferred negotiations that would include the
attorneys along with their clients to negotiations that would
involve only the attorneys.  They liked Mediation as much as
the former but significantly more than the latter. This finding—
along with the fact that litigants preferred Mediation to all adju-
dicative procedures except the Judge Trial—suggests that they
want to be present for, and have the option to informally par-
ticipate in, the resolution process.23 This finding may come as a
surprise to attorneys who assume that they should conduct set-
tlement discussions on their own. Although case strategy might
sometimes call for excluding litigants from settlement negotia-
tions, lawyers might anticipate a desire on the part of clients to
observe or participate in the discussions themselves and should
discuss the advantages and disadvantages of that option in light
of their particular case.
Litigants also liked the Judge Trial significantly more than
the Jury Trial. At this juncture, explanations for this finding are
speculative. Perhaps litigants prefer the judge as fact-finder
based on negative depictions of jury trials in the mainstream
American media.24 Alternatively, some litigants may believe that
judges are better able to keep an open mind during the trial and
not predetermine the outcome.25 Other litigants may value
expediency and suspect that bench trials are more likely to pro-
mote it.26 Future research should seek to explore the greater
enthusiasm for the Judge Trial as compared to the Jury Trial.  
B. PREDICTORS OF ATTRACTION TO SPECIFIC 
PROCEDURES
One goal of this project was to determine whether case-type,
demographic, relationship or attitudinal variables predicted lit-
igants’ attraction to each procedure. To accomplish this goal, we
used multiple regression analysis. The variables used as predic-
tors are catalogued in Table 2.27 The model significantly pre-
dicted how attracted litigants were to every legal procedure
except for Mediation and Non-binding Arbitration. The latter
point suggests that court personnel can choose to offer one of
these two procedures without fearing (at least in light of the
predictor variables that we examined) that they will inadver-
TABLE 2: VARIABLES USED AS PREDICTORS
VARIABLE NAME LEVELS OF VARIABLE
Case Type/
Substantive Issue
personal injury, contract, employment, property, other,
or two or more case types
Role in Case defendant, plaintiff, or both
Party Type individual, company, or group or organization
Opposing Party Type individual, company, or group or organization
Defendant or 
Plaintiff Before
whether the litigant had been involved as either a
defendant or plaintiff in a previous case; yes or no
Age Group
whether the litigant was 18–25, 26–35, 36–45,
46–55, 56–65, 66–75, 76–80, or over 80
Race white/Caucasian or other
Gender male or female
Relationship Before 
Filing
whether the litigant knew or had a relationship with
the opposing party before the case was filed; yes or no
Insurance
whether an insurance company had any interest in the
outcome of the case; yes or no
Importance of Future 
Relationship
1 to 5 rating of the importance of having a relation-
ship with the opposing party in the future; 1 = not at
all important, 5 = extremely important
Confindence in Trial Win 0–100% estimate of chances of winning at trial
Court Location California, Oregon, or Utah
Impression of Court
1 to 9 rating of the litigant’s impression of the court
where the case has been filed; 1 = extremely nega-
tive, 9 = extremely positive
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TABLE 3
ATTYS 
NEGOTIATE W/O
CLIENTS PRESENT
ATTYS 
NEGOTIATE W/ 
CLIENTS PRESENT
MEDIATION NON-BINDINGARBITRATION
BINDING 
ARBITRATION
JUDGE DECIDES
W/O TRIAL JUDGE TRIAL JURY TRIAL
Case Type/
Substantive
Issue
Litigants whose cases 
concerned personal
injury issues only liked
this option less than
those with “other” case
types
Litigants with 2+ case
types liked this
option more than
those whose cases
concerned personal
injury issues only
Litigants with 2+ case
types liked the judge
trial more than those
whose cases concerned
personal injury issues
only
Litigants whose cases
involved property
issues only liked the
jury trial less than
those whose cases 
concerned personal
injury issues only
Role in Case
Litigants acting as
both plaintiff and
defendant liked bind-
ing arbitration more
than those acting as
plaintiff only
Party Type
Companies liked this
option more than 
individuals
Groups and organiza-
tions liked this option
less than individuals
Opposing
Party Type
Those opposing a 
company liked 
binding arbitration
more than those
opposing an 
individual
Litigants liked the
jury trial more when
the opposing party 
was a group or 
organization vs. an
individual
Defendant 
or Plaintiff
Before
Repeat litigants liked
binding arbitration
more than first-time
litigants
Relationship
Before
Those who had a pre-
vious relationship with
opposing party liked
this option less than
those who did not
Gender
Women liked binding
arbitration less than
men
Women liked the
jury trial less than
men
Race
Age Group
Younger litigants liked
this option more than
older litigants
Insurance
Those reporting that an
insurance company had
an interest in the case
liked this option more
than those who did not
Future
Relationship
Those who desired a
future relationship with
the opposing party liked
this option more than
those who did not
Confidence 
in Trial Win
The more confidence
litigants had in their
case, the less they
liked this option
The more confidence
they had in their
case, the more they
liked this option
The more confidence
they had in their case,
the more they liked
the judge trial
The more confidence
they had in their
case, the more they
liked the jury trial
Court 
Location
CA litigants liked the
jury trial less than
OR litigants
Impression 
of Court
The more favorably
the litigants viewed
the court, the more
they liked this option
The more favorably
litigants viewed the
court, the more they
liked this option
The more favorably lit-
igants viewed the
court, the more they
liked the judge trial
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28. See, e.g., Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts,
and the Use of Statistics in Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 29
MCGEORGE L. REV. 223 (1998); Lisa B. Bingham, The Repeat Player
Effect, 1 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 189 (1997). 
29. See PROTOCOLS FOR EXPEDITIOUS, COST-EFFECTIVE COMMERCIAL ARBI-
TRATION: KEY STEPS FOR BUSINESS USERS, COUNSEL, ARBITRATORS &
ARBITRATION PROVIDER INSTITUTIONS 6 (Thomas J. Stipanowich et al.
eds., College of Commercial Arbitrators 2010), available at
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/corporate/docs/2
011-cle-materials/10-Prevent-the-Runaway/10c-protocols-expe
ditious.pdf (“Although many arbitrators and some arbitration rules
aim to hold the line on excessive discovery, it is not unusual for
legal advocates to agree to litigation-like procedures for discovery,
even to the extent of employing standard civil procedural rules.”).
30. This interpretation resonates with laboratory research suggesting
that when participants have a strong case, they favor procedures in
which a third party has decision control. See, e.g., Larry B. Heuer
& Steven Penrod, Procedural Preference as a Function of Conflict
Intensity, 51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 700, 704 (1986)
(reporting on laboratory research in which they found “unequivo-
cal support” for the notion “that disputants with a strong case . . .
prefer the autocratic and arbitration procedures, whereas their
weak-case counterparts . . . prefer the moot, mediation, and bar-
gaining procedures”).
31. Some research has found that women exhibit enhanced concern for
the other party, a greater willingness to make concessions, and a
preference for collaborative strategies. See, e.g., Kwok Leung &
Michael Harris Bond, Effects of Cultural Femininity on Preferences
for Methods of Conflict Processing: A Cross-Cultural Study, 26 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 373, 388 (1990); Christine Rack,
Negotiated Justice: Gender & Ethnic Minority Bargaining Patterns in
the MetroCourt Study, 20 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 211, 220-24
(1999). 
tently favor the predilections of a subset of the litigants they
serve. Table 3 reports the statistically significant predictors for
each procedure. Some of these findings are especially worthy of
discussion. 
1. Repeat Litigants Liked Binding Arbitration More Than
First-Time Litigants
Binding Arbitration was the only procedure for which attrac-
tion was significantly associated with litigants’ past litigation
experience. Specifically, repeat litigants liked Binding Arbitra-
tion more than their first-time counterparts. This finding res-
onates with empirical research suggesting that Binding Arbitra-
tion awards tend to favor repeat players.28 It also aligns with the
notion that repeat litigants are more likely to appreciate the
hardship of protracted discovery and the threat of an appeal fol-
lowing a trial. This appreciation might lead repeat litigants to
prefer Binding Arbitration because it can limit the likelihood of
both extensive discovery and appeals. In light of this finding,
lawyers might attempt to “even the information playing field”
by having early discussions about the possible advantages asso-
ciated with Binding Arbitration, even for cases already filed in
court. Courts, too, can provide such information to litigants on
their websites or in informational material that explains differ-
ent alternatives to trial.
The comparative benefits of Binding Arbitration may be mit-
igated in large commercial disputes, which could explain why
companies did not like Binding Arbitration significantly more
than individual litigants did. Such disputes tend to introduce
costs traditionally associated with “big case” litigation.29 What is
unexpected is that litigants whose opposing party was a com-
pany liked Binding Arbitration more than litigants who opposed
an individual. This result is surprising given the bad press con-
cerning consumer and employment arbitration, which typically
involves cases wherein an individual opposes a corporation. 
2. Confidence in Trial Win was Associated with Attraction
to Court-Sponsored Adjudicative Procedures
The more confidence that litigants expressed regarding a
trial win, the more they liked the Judge Decides without Trial,
Jury Trial, and Judge Trial options. One interpretation of this
pattern is that the more confident litigants were about their
case, the more they expected jurors and judges to feel positively
about their case too, and vice versa.
The only other procedure significantly associated with trial-
win estimates was Attorneys Negotiate without the Clients. The
more litigants believed they would win at trial, the less they
wanted a negotiation that opened the door for compromise if
they would not be present for settlement discussions.30 The fact
that their estimates of success at trial were not associated with
how favorably they regarded the other procedures—including
trial-like Binding Arbitration—suggests that they were more
agnostic about whether these options would produce results
that reflected their own predictions. 
From a psychological perspective, litigants’ attraction to
court-sponsored adjudication as a function of the confidence
they have in their case might be due in part to the egocentric
bias. The egocentric bias, which is observed when individuals
construe information in a self-serving way, can lead litigants to
believe their case is much stronger than it is. In our study, 57%
of litigants thought they had at least a 90% chance of prevailing
at trial, and 24% believed they had a 100% chance. Only 16%
thought they had at most a 50% chance of winning. The fact
that higher confidence was associated with greater interest in
time-consuming and expensive procedures such as jury and
judge trials reinforces the importance of lawyers having early
discussions about procedures with their clients. Conversations
about the risks (as well as the financial and emotional costs)
associated with trial might provide litigants a broader perspec-
tive from which to consider their options. Courts can encour-
age such litigant education by enacting court rules that require
lawyers to have such discussions early in the litigation process,
and can reinforce it themselves via pamphlets or court websites.
The latter set of options would be especially important for liti-
gants who represent themselves.
3. Women Liked Jury Trial and Binding Arbitration Less
Than Men
Another intriguing finding that emerged was that women
liked the Jury Trial and Binding Arbitration less than men did.
In fact, these procedures were the only ones for which gender
was found to significantly predict procedure attraction.  In light
of research suggesting that women favor conflict avoidance,31
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32. See Alissa J. Strong, “But He Told Me It Was Safe!”: The Expanding
Tort of Negligent Misrepresentation, 40 U. MEM. L. REV. 105, 142
(2009) (“A problem that arises in personal injury cases is that
juries sympathize with and strongly desire to compensate the vic-
tim.”). But see Philip G. Peters, Jr., Hindsight Bias and Tort Liability:
Avoiding Premature Conclusions, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1277, 1293 (1999)
(“It is widely believed that plaintiffs benefit from jury sympathies.
Yet, an increasing body of evidence suggests that jurors begin their
job favoring tort defendants and doubting the motives of personal
injury plaintiffs . . . .”).
33. See Shestowsky, supra note 3, at 685.
34. Some empirical research suggests that trial has more of a negative
impact on underlying relationships between the parties than medi-
ation. See Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, Small Claims
Mediation in Maine: An Empirical Assessment, 33 ME. L. REV. 237,
256-68 (1981); Roselle L. Wissler, Mediation and Adjudication in the
Small Claims Court: The Effects of Process and Case Characteristics,
29 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 323, 351, 354-58 (1995). But see RICHARD J.
MAIMAN, AN EVALUATION OF SELECTED MEDIATION PROGRAMS IN THE
MASSACHUSETTS TRIAL COURT 7-9, 35, 37 (1997) (finding that liti-
gants were as likely to report that mediation had not improved
their relationship as to indicate that it had). 
35. See Tyler, supra note 5, at 25.
this pattern makes sense. What is unexpected, however, is that
no gender difference emerged with regard to the Judge Trial,
which is also adversarial in character. An implication of the lack
of gender differences in this category is that women find an
exception for Judge Trials compared to these other forms of
adjudication.
4. Personal Injury Litigants Liked Jury Trial More Than
Property Litigants, but Case Type Was Not a Major 
Predictor Otherwise
Litigants whose cases concerned personal injury matters
only liked the Jury Trial significantly more than those whose
cases involved property issues only. This finding fits with the
widely held perception that jury sympathy in personal injury
cases results in high damage awards to plaintiffs.32 Yet, the
appeal of the Jury Trial was not higher for plaintiffs than defen-
dants. This pattern is curious until one considers that attraction
to the Jury Trial was found to be related to confidence (i.e.,
higher confidence was associated with greater attraction to the
Jury Trial, and vice versa). Thus, it is possible that plaintiffs and
defendants in personal injury cases were equally attracted to
the Jury Trial but that their confidence in a trial win better
explained how attracted they were to this procedure. A follow-
up analysis designed to test this possibility revealed that the
relation between attraction to the Jury Trial and confidence in a
trial win for personal injury litigants did not differ significantly
between plaintiffs and defendants.33 This result supports the
notion that litigants’ attraction to the Jury Trial in personal
injury cases was better explained by the confidence they had in
their case than by their role as either a plaintiff or defendant.
Case type mattered in relatively few other instances. Those
whose cases concerned personal injury issues only liked the
Attorneys Negotiate with Clients Present option less than those
with other kinds of cases and liked the Judge Decides without
Trial option and the Judge Trial significantly less than those
with multiple causes of action. The latter result suggests that
those with more substantively complicated disputes valued the
prospect of having a judge decide their case more than did
those whose cases concerned personal injury matters only.
5. Relationship Variables Were Associated with Attraction
to the Negotiation Options, but Not with Attraction to
Adversarial Procedures such as Binding Arbitration or
Trial 
An interesting pattern emerged regarding the parties’ rela-
tionship with one another and how they perceived the two
negotiation options. Litigants who had a pre-existing relation-
ship with the opposing party liked Attorneys Negotiate without
the Clients Present less than those who did not, and vice versa.
But those with pre-existing relationships did not differ from lit-
igants without one in terms of how much they liked the Attor-
neys Negotiate with the Clients Present option. This somewhat
counterintuitive pattern suggests that although litigants with a
relationship history were agnostic about the negotiations that
would allow them to interact with the other party, the idea of
negotiations that would take place without them was relatively
unappealing. By contrast, the more litigants valued a future rela-
tionship with the other party, the more they liked Attorneys
Negotiate with the Clients Present, and vice versa. Thus, the
more litigants desired a future relationship, the more interested
they were in informally collaborating to resolve the conflict.
Although one might intuit that the more interested litigants
are in a future relationship with the opposing party, the less
interested they would be in adjudicative or adversarial proce-
dures (i.e., Judge Trial, Jury Trial, Judge Decides without Trial,
and Binding Arbitration), the data did not support this theory.
Accordingly, these findings suggest that litigants might not
appreciate the negative effects that such procedures might have
on their relationships34 or that they expect the benefits of hav-
ing a third party decide their case to outweigh any negative con-
sequences. 
6. Court Impressions Related to Attraction to Judicial 
Procedures 
The more favorably the litigants rated the court where their
case was filed, the more they liked the two options that granted
decision control to a judge—namely, the Judge Trial and Judge
Decides without Trial. The less favorably they viewed the court,
the less attracted they were to these two options. This pattern
resonates with findings by Tom Tyler and others, suggesting
that greater perceived institutional legitimacy is associated with
a greater preference for, and acceptance of, court decisions.35
The only other procedure that was significantly associated with
litigants’ regard for the court was Attorneys Negotiate without
the Clients Present: the more litigants liked the court, the more
they liked this procedure, and vice versa.  
7. Demographic Variables
Surprisingly, the findings suggest that factors that previous
scholars have speculated or observed to be associated with pro-
cedural preferences were rarely, if ever, significant predictors of
attraction to procedures. For example, litigants’ role in the case
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36. See supra Figure 1. 
37. See, e.g., Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, Mediation in
Small Claims Court: Achieving Compliance Through Consent, 18 LAW
& SOC’Y REV. 11, 20-22 (1984) (concluding that litigants in con-
sensual procedures such as mediation are more likely to perceive
the outcome as fair and just and, subsequently, are more likely to
comply with the outcome than in adjudicated cases); Mark S.
Umbreit et al., Victim-Offender Mediation: Three Decades of Practice
and Research, 22 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 279, 298 (2004) (concluding
that offenders who participate in programs that offer them more
opportunity to shape the outcome are more likely to comply with
the outcome and are less likely to re-offend than those who engage
in procedures that are more adjudicative). 
38. As Tom Tyler has argued, on the basis of compelling empirical
research, procedures that subjectively appeal to litigants can
inspire them to “obey the law” and reduce the need for govern-
mental intervention to ensure legal compliance. See Tyler, supra
note 5, at 3-4, 62.
was statistically significant only for Binding Arbitration (i.e., lit-
igants acting as both a plaintiff and defendant liked Binding
Arbitration more than those acting only as plaintiffs), and court
location was a significant predictor only for the Jury Trial (i.e.,
those with cases in California liked the Jury Trial less than those
with cases in Oregon). 
Even though previous studies found some factors to be pre-
dictive when evaluated individually, the overall pattern suggests
that when a multitude of case-type, demographic, relationship,
and attitudinal factors are considered simultaneously, relatively
few may actually be associated with attraction to procedures.
This finding is likely to come as a surprise to lawyers or court
administrators who have strong views regarding which proce-
dure is likely to appeal to a “certain kind of litigant” or “some-
one with a certain kind of case.” 
CONCLUSION
An important conclusion from this study is that litigants do
indeed have procedural preferences. They have great enthusi-
asm for procedures that theoretically provide litigants with the
opportunity for direct participation in the resolution of their
cases—namely, Mediation and negotiations that include the
parties along with their attorneys. They also have great interest
in the Judge Trial, which might reflect respect for authority and
perceived procedural fairness through the democratic function-
ing of the courts. In terms of court-connected ADR, our find-
ings support the choice of Mediation over Non-binding Arbi-
tration.36
To the extent that lawyers’ attitudes toward procedures differ
from those of litigants, some of these differences might be due
to litigants’ misconceptions about those procedures, whereas
others might reflect incorrect assumptions that lawyers have
about how litigants view those same options. Rather than rely-
ing on their own intuitions about the litigant point-of-view,
legal actors could use research findings such as those presented
here to anticipate how litigants will perceive their options as a
function of factors such as how much litigants value a future
relationship with the other party or their perception of the
court where their case was filed. 
More globally, using research to uncover litigants’ percep-
tions of procedures could lead to a more nuanced understand-
ing of the need for court intervention in the regulation of dis-
putes in the first place. Past research suggests that litigants are
less likely to continue their dispute, and more likely to volun-
tarily comply with the terms of settlement agreements, when
they are satisfied with the legal procedures used to resolve their
dispute.37 Thus, offering litigants ADR options that they find
subjectively attractive could lead to fewer breach-of-contract
claims due to noncompliance with settlement agreements. This
scenario would result in diminished demand for scarce court
resources. Moreover, when people regard the government as
offering subjectively attractive and fair procedures, they subse-
quently demonstrate greater respect for the legal system and
tend to more readily comply with even unrelated laws and reg-
ulations.38 Courts undoubtedly benefit from such voluntary
compliance with the law. Thus, as applied to court-connected
programs, this kind of empirical research can have important
implications for governments stricken by budgetary crises. By
better understanding litigants’ preferences and designing their
programs accordingly, governments might be able to reduce
some of the challenges associated with maintaining the civil
justice system. 
Further research on litigants’ perceptions of procedures can
continue to fill gaps in the literature in ways that will be useful
to lawyers as they serve their clients, as well to court policy.
Ultimately, the advancement of procedural justice in light of lit-
igants’ preferences will depend on legal actors doing their part
to implement such research. 
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Footnotes
1. State Cases: Luciano v. WMC Mortg. Corp., No. 1 CA-CV 08-
0566, 2010 WL 1491952, at *7-8 (Ariz. Ct. App. Apr. 13, 2010)
(referring to motion as both a “counter motion” and a “cross
motion”); accord, Brumgard v. Rios, No. 2 CA-CV 2010-0007, 2010
WL 3489159, at *1 & n.3 (Ariz. Ct. App. Sept. 7, 2010); Leatherby
Ins. Co. v. City of Tustin, 143 Cal. Rptr. 153, 156 (Cal. App. 1977);
Kootenai Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. Lamar Corp., 219 P.3d 440, 443
(Idaho 2009); Robinson v. Builders Supply & Lumber Co., 586
N.E.2d 316, 319 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); Lemen v. 21st Century Nat’l
Ins. Co., 286 P.3d 240, at *8 (Kan. Ct. App. 2012); Univ. of Cum-
berlands v. Pennybacker, 308 S.W.3d 668, 672 (Ky. 2010); Sci.
Drilling Intern., Inc. v. Meche, 29 So.3d 1283, 1284-85 (La. Ct.
App. 2010); Salamon v. Progressive Classic Ins. Co., 841 A.2d 858,
861 (Md. 2004); Dep’t of Natural Res. v. Leukuma, No. 287802,
2009 WL 5194517, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2009); Carlton
v. Walters, 294 S.W.3d 513, 515-16 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009); Harris v.
Vasquez, 288 P.3d 924, 925 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012); Lawrence Twp.,
Stark Cnty., Ohio, Bd. of Twp. Tr. v. Canal Fulton, No. 2007 CA
00010, 2007 WL 3408448, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 5, 2007);
Am. Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. IDC, Inc., 844 A.2d 117, 125-26 (R.I.
2004); Robertson v. George, No. M2000-02661-COA-R3-CV, 2001
WL 1173270, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 5, 2001); Salt Lake Cnty.
Comm’n v. Salt Lake Co. Atty., 985 P.2d 899, 901 & n.1 (Utah
1999).
State Court Rules and Standing Orders: Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct.
of the State of Nev., Rule 2.20(f) (“An opposition to a motion
which contains a motion related to the same subject matter will be
considered as a counter-motion.”); cf. Utah Rules of Civ. Proc.,
Family Law Rule 101(g) (“Opposing a motion is not sufficient to
grant relief to the responding party. An application for an order
may be raised by counter motion.”); Local Rules of the Super. Ct.
for Pierce Cnty., Wash., Rule 7(b)(1)(D)(ii) (“In the event there is
an existing motion and the responding party wishes to file a
counter motion to be heard the same date they may do so without
leave of the court by electronically filing and scheduling in accor-
dance with PCLR 7(b)(1)(D) a Note for Commissioner’s Calendar,
as long as the counter motion and all supporting pleadings are filed
and served at least fourteen (14) calendar days before the hear-
ing.”).
Federal Cases: Brockert v. Skornicka, 711 F.2d 1376, 1382 (7th
Cir. 1983) (referring to motion both as a “counter motion” and a
“cross motion”); accord, White v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 04-CV-
0397, 2005 WL 1865495, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2005); Parra v.
Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 258 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1063 & n.3 (N.D.
Cal. 2003); Advanced Semiconductor Materials Am., Inc. v.
Applied Materials, Inc., 93-CV-20853, 1994 WL 715634, at *1
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 1994); Roberts v. Heim, 130 F.R.D. 430, 433
(N.D. Cal. 1990); George v. United States, 94-CV-2769, 1996 WL
437532, at *1 (D. Colo. June 14, 1996); United States v. Char-
boneau, 04-CV-0442, 2005 WL 2346947, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 26,
2005); Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Metro Mark Prods., Ltd., 43 F. Supp.
2d 951, 953 & n.1 (N.D. Ill. 1999); Maneikis v. St. Paul Ins. Co. of
Ill., 79-CV-3731, 1980 WL 343874, at *1 (N.D. Ill. May 23, 1980);
AAR, Inc. v. Century Inv. Group, LLC, 08-CV-0007, 2010 WL
497747, at *1 (E.D. La. Feb. 5, 2010); Wells v. Home Depot USA,
Inc., 11-CV-12884, 2012 WL 995206, at *1 & n.1 (E.D. Mich. Mar.
13, 2012); Barrett v. Detroit Heading, LLC, 05-CV-72341, 2006 WL
1662553, at *6 (E.D. Mich. June 8, 2006); St. Louis Trimming, Inc.
v. Am. Credit Indem. Co., 924 F. Supp. 99, 100 (E.D. Mo. 1996);
Interface Group–Nev., Inc. v. Men’s Apparel Guild in Cal. Inc., 04-
CV-0351, 2007 WL 923952, at *2 (D. Nev. Mar. 23, 2007); Dehne
v. Avanino, 219 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1100 (D. Nev. 2001); Moultrie v.
Misunderstandings regarding the definition of a cross-motion often lead to problems during the filing andbriefing of cross-motions in state and federal courts.
This article focuses on defining and illustrating the elements of
a proper cross-motion, identifying and illustrating common
problems caused by the filing and briefing of improper cross-
motions, and offering solutions to those problems.
As most commonly understood by judges and practitioners,
a cross-motion in state or federal court possesses three elements:
(1) it is filed against the originally moving party; (2) it is filed by
a party against whom the original motion was filed; and (3) it
requests an order similar to that requested by the originally mov-
ing party against the cross-moving party. Common problems
posed by the filing and briefing of improper cross-motions in
state and federal court include (1) a violation of the action’s
motion-filing deadline, (2) a violation of the court’s proscription
against the filing of replies on cross-motions, (3) a violation of
the court’s proscription against the filing of sur-replies on dis-
positive motions, and (4) a violation of the court’s page limita-
tion on memoranda of law. Possible solutions to those common
problems include (1) filing a motion before the opposing party
files its motion, (2) requesting leave to depart from the action’s
scheduling order or the court’s local rules, (3) moving to strike
the improper cross-motion, and (4) in the context of pleading
amendments, filing a timely amended complaint rather than a
cross-motion for leave to file an amended complaint in response
to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.                        
I. DEFINITION OF A CROSS-MOTION
A. TERM AS COMPARED TO “COUNTER-MOTION”
Sometimes, a motion is referred to as both a “cross-motion”
and a “counter-motion.”1 In such cases, either the terms are
used interchangeably or the term “counter-motion” refers to a
particular type of “cross-motion”: specifically, that type of
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S. Carolina Election Com’n, 06-CV-3073, 2007 WL 445383, at *1
(D.S.C. Feb. 6, 2007); United States v. Hill, 533 F. Supp. 810, 813
(D. Tenn. 1982).
Federal Court Rules and Standing Orders: E.D. Cal. Civ. L.R.
230(e) (“Any counter-motion or other motion that a party may
desire to make that is related to the general subject matter of the
original motion shall be served and filed in the manner and on the
date prescribed for the filing of opposition.”); N.D. Cal. Civil L.R.
16-5 (“Defendant must serve and file any opposition or counter-
motion within 28 days of service of plaintiff’s motion.”); U.S.
Bankr. Ct. Rules N.D.Cal., B.L.R. 7007-1(d) (“Together with an
opposition, a party responding to a motion may file a counter-
motion related to the subject matter of the original motion.”); E.D.
Mich. L.R. Appendix ECF, R5(e) (“[A] response or reply to a
motion must not be combined with a counter-motion. Papers filed
in violation of this rule will be stricken.”); N.D. Miss. L.R.
7(b)(3)(C) (“A response to a motion may not include a counter-
motion in the same document. Any motion must be an item dock-
eted separately from a response.”).
2. State Cases: Leatherby Ins. Co. v. City of Tustin, 143 Cal. Rptr.
153, 156 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977); Kootenai Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. Lamar
Corp., 219 P.3d 440, 443 (Idaho 2009); Robinson v. Builders Sup-
ply & Lumber Co., 586 N.E.2d 316, 319 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991);
Lemen v. 21st Century Nat’l Ins. Co., 286 P.3d 240, at *8 (Kan. Ct.
App. 2012); Salamon v. Progressive Classic Ins. Co., 841 A.2d 858,
861 (Md. 2004); Dep’t of Natural Res. v. Leukuma, No. 287802,
2009 WL 5194517, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2009); Carlton
v. Walters, 294 S.W.3d 513, 515-16 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009); Harris v.
Vasquez, 288 P.3d 924, 925 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012); Am. Condo.
Ass’n, Inc. v. IDC, Inc., 844 A.2d 117, 125-26 (R.I. 2004); Robert-
son v. George, No. M2000-02661-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 1173270,
at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 5, 2001); Salt Lake County Com’n v. Salt
Lake Co. Atty., 985 P.2d 899, 901 & n.1 (Utah 1999).
Federal Cases: Brockert v. Skornicka, 711 F.2d 1376, 1382 (7th
Cir. 1983); White v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 04-CV-0397, 2005 WL
1865495, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2005); Roberts v. Heim, 130
F.R.D. 430, 433 (N.D. Cal. 1990); George v. United States, 94-CV-
2769, 1996 WL 437532, at *1 (D. Colo. June 14, 1996); Maneikis
v. St. Paul Ins. Co. of Ill., 79-CV-3731, 1980 WL 343874, at *1
(N.D. Ill. May 23, 1980); AAR, Inc. v. Century Inv. Group, LLC,
08-CV-0007, 2010 WL 497747, at *1 (E.D. La. Feb. 5, 2010); Wells
v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 11-CV-12884, 2012 WL 995206, at *1 &
n.1 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 13, 2012); St. Louis Trimming, Inc. v. Am.
Credit Indem. Co., 924 F. Supp. 99, 100 (E.D. Mo. 1996); Moultrie
v. S. Carolina Election Com’n, 06-CV-3073, 2007 WL 445383, at
*1 (D.S.C. Feb. 6, 2007); United States v. Hill, 533 F. Supp. 810,
813 (D. Tenn. 1982).
3. State Cases: Bohac v. Akbani, 29 S.W.3d 407, 414, n.6 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2000) (“The parties refer to Father’s [motion] as a ‘cross-
motion’ to modify, although it should be denominated a ‘counter-
motion’ to modify.”); Vives v. Verzino, 213 P.3d 823, 825 (N.M. Ct.
App. 2009) (“The parties refer to Respondents’ counter-motion for
summary judgment as a cross-motion, a fact this Court does not
change for consistency.”); Tex. v. Rhodes, No. 04-96-00040-CV,
1997 WL 81257, at *1, n.7 (Tex. App. Feb. 26, 1997) (“Appellant
has denominated its motion a cross-motion rather than a counter
motion. We will do the same.”). 
Federal Cases: Copas v. E. Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 61 F. Supp. 2d
1017, 1041, n.9 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (“The court does not consider a
‘counter-motion’ filed two weeks after the dispositive motions fil-
ing deadline to be a cross-motion.”); Tyler v. Butler, 06-CV-0861,
2009 WL 2447918, at *6, n.10 (E.D. Cal. July 29, 2009) (“Buried
within this exhibit is a putative cross-motion for summary judg-
ment, which plaintiff calls a ‘counter-motion’ . . . .”); Stringham v.
Lee, 04-CV-1530 2008 WL 2880406, at *1 (E.D. Cal. July 22,
2008) (“Pending before the court are . . . plaintiff’s cross-motion
for summary judgment (denominated by plaintiff a ‘counter
motion’) . . . .”); Cook v. Cashler, 11-CV-0637, 2013 WL
1213678, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 5, 2013) (“Plaintiff refers to his
cross-motions for summary judgment as ‘counter motions’ for
summary judgment.”); Cannon v. City of Phila., 86 F. Supp. 2d
460, 462, n.1 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (“Plaintiff refers to her motion as a
countermotion. I will interpret plaintiff’s motion as a cross-motion
for summary judgment.”); cf. PAETEC Commc’ns, Inc. v. Comm-
Partners, LLC, 08-CV-0397, 2010 WL 1767193, at *1 (D.D.C. Feb.
18, 2010) (calling defendant’s motion a “cross motion” even
though defendant labeled it a “counter-motion,” which term the
court placed in quotation marks).
4. State Case: Zaloudek Grain Co. v. CompSource Okla., No.
110,662, 2012 WL 4077382, at *1 (Okla. Sept. 18, 2012) (describ-
ing how plaintiff filed a “motion” for summary judgment on a cer-
tain ground, then defendant filed a “cross motion” for summary
judgment with regard to the same ground, and then plaintiff filed
a “counter motion” for summary judgment on a different ground).
Federal Case: Forkwar v. Empire Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 487 F.
App’x 775, 777 (4th Cir. June 27, 2012) (“The district court denied
Forkwar’s motion for summary judgment, granted Empire’s cross-
motion for summary judgment, and denied Forkwar’s counter
motion for summary judgment.”).
5. Federal Case: Kowalski v. Mommy Gina Tuna Resources, 05-CV-
00679, 2008 WL 4216267, at *1 (D. Haw. Sept. 15, 2008) (draw-
ing distinction between a counter-motion and a cross-motion, not-
ing that the former refers to a motion raising the same subject mat-
ter as an original motion, and the latter refers to an “independent”
motion unrelated to the subject matter of the original motion).
Federal Rule: D. Haw. L.R. 7.9 (“Counter Motions. . . . Any motion
raising the same subject matter as an original motion may be filed
by the responding party together with the party’s opposition . . . .”).   
6. State Cases: Berger v. Pubco Corp., 976 A.2d 132, 135 (Del. 2009)
(describing how defendants filed a “motion to dismiss,” plaintiff
filed a “counter-motion for summary judgment,” and defendants
filed a “cross-motion for summary judgment”); Dillon v. Typaldos,
cross-motion filed responsively as opposed to originally. For
example, when a party files a motion and another party files a
“counter-motion,” some courts treat that counter-motion as
rendering the original motion and counter-motion together as
“cross-motions.”2
Other times, however, a nominal distinction is recognized
between a “cross-motion” and a “counter-motion.”3 Still other
times, a material distinction is recognized between the two
terms. For example, sometimes a “counter-motion” refers to a
motion filed subsequent, and in opposition, to an initial
motion but based on different grounds as those of the initial
motion.4 Other times, a “counter-motion” refers to a motion
related to the subject matter of the original motion, while a
“cross-motion” refers to an independent motion unrelated to
the subject matter of the original motion.5 Yet other times, a
“counter-motion” refers to a motion filed against a moving
party seeking relief dissimilar to that sought in the original
motion (as opposed to a “cross-motion,” which refers to a
motion filed against a moving party seeking relief that is simi-
lar to that sought in the original motion).6
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2006 WL 1381625, at *1, 6, 13 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div., May 19,
2006) (describing how plaintiff filed a “motion” to reinstate the
complaint, defendants filed a “cross-motion to dismiss” the com-
plaint, and plaintiff filed a “counter motion” to add defendants). 
Federal Cases: Wang Labs., Inc. v. Ma Labs., Inc., 95-CV-2274,
1995 WL 729298, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 1995) (“Ma . . . and
Wang . . . bring cross motions for summary judgment based on the
provisions of a license agreement executed between the parties. Ma
also brings a counter motion for summary judgment arguing that
certain accused devices fall outside of the licensing agreement.”);
Kingdom 5-KR-41, Ltd. v. Star Cruises PLC, 01-CV-2946, 2005 WL
110434, at *1, 3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2005) (referring to NCL’s
motion to revive a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60[b], filed in
response to motion to alter or amend judgment under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 59 [e] or 60, as a “countermotion,” and referring to NCL’s motion
for summary judgment on that claim, filed in response to motion
for summary judgment on that claim, as a “cross-motion”); Health-
point, Ltd. v. Ethex Corp., 273 F. Supp. 2d 817, 826 (W.D. Tex.
2001) (“Beginning March 22, 2001 . . . , the Court held a consoli-
dated evidentiary hearing on Ethex’s motion for preliminary
injunction and Healthpoint’s cross motion for preliminary injunc-
tion. . . . In addition, this report also addresses Ethex’s related
motion to dismiss or to stay and Healthpoint’s counter-motion to
partially dismiss . . . .”); cf. Hawkins v. Sup. Ct. of NJ, 04-CV-1317,
2005 WL 2133588, at *10, n.11 (D.N.J. Aug. 31, 2005) (noting
that “Plaintiff’s brief filed in response to the motion to dismiss is
entitled a ‘Brief in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the
Complaint and in Support of Plaintiff’s Countermotion to Disqual-
ify the Attorney General’s Office From Representing Itself and
Codefendants Herein and In Support of Plaintiff’s Cross Motion for
Summary Judgment’”).
7. Law Dictionaries and Encyclopedias: BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
1106 (9th ed. 2009) (defining a “cross-motion” as “a competing
request for relief or order similar to that requested by another party
against the cross-moving party . . . . ”); MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DIC-
TIONARY OF LAW 116 (1996) (defining a “cross-motion” as “[a]
motion that attempts to counter a similar motion filed by an
opposing party . . . .”); MELLINKOFF’S DICTIONARY OF AM. LEGAL
USAGE 143 (1992) (defining a “cross-motion” as an “opposing
motion, usually requesting a result opposite to original motion”);
THE WOLTERS KLUWER BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY 714 (2011) (defin-
ing “cross-motion” as “[a] motion similar to a motion filed earlier
by another party. A cross motion is a motion for some ruling or
order filed by a party to an action that is similar in its request to
another motion already pending. . . . Note: a cross-motion must
seek the same order or similar relief or ruling as a prior motion,
with the cross-motion seeking an order or rule to the benefit of the
cross-movant, while the original movant sought the original order
for its own benefit.”); Lawyers.com Legal Dictionary,
http://research.lawyers.com/glossary/cross-motion.html (defining
a “cross-motion” as “a motion that attempts to counter a similar
motion filed by an opposing party . . . . ”); cf. 56 AM. JUR. 2D
Motions, Rules, and Orders § 29 (2011) (“A cross-motion generally
is an improper vehicle for seeking affirmative relief from a non-
moving party.”), accord, 60 C.J.S. Motions and Orders § 33 (2012);
7A FED. PROC. LAWYERS ED. § 19:146 (2011) (“A cross-motion
must be contained in the same document as the response to the
original motion, and a response to the cross-motion must be con-
tained in the same document as the reply . . . . ”). 
State Cases: Barrett v. Watkins, 860 N.Y.S.2d 246, 248 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2008) (“A cross motion is an improper vehicle for seeking
affirmative relief from a nonmoving party.”); accord, Terio v.
Spodek, 809 N.Y.S.2d 145, 149 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006); Mango v.
Long Is. Jewish–Hillside Med. Ctr., 507 N.Y.S.2d 456, 458 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1986); Barber v. Cornell Univ. Co-op., 37 Misc.3d 1217,
2012 WL 5392228, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 27, 2012); Sandler v.
Sophie D. Ltd., 936 N.Y.S.2d 61, 2011 WL 3558224, at *1 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Aug. 11, 2011); Cardona-Torres v. City of N.Y., 2011 N.Y.
Misc. LEXIS 6557, at *10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 9, 2011) (“A cross-
motion is merely a motion by any party against the party who
made the original motion, made returnable at the same time as the
original motion.”); accord, Hisen v. 754 Fifth Ave. Assoc., L.P., 886
N.Y.S.2d 67, 2009 WL 1098985, at *6, n.4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009);
XO Communs., LLC v. Level 3 Communs., Inc., 948 A.2d 1111,
1117 (Del. Ch. 2007) (calling motion filed against moving party a
“cross-motion”); accord, Shulas v. Estabrook, 385 N.J. Super. 91, 94
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006); Nelson v. Planet Ins. Co., 111 Nev.
1373, 1376 (Nev. 1995). 
State Court Rules and Standing Orders: Eighth Judicial Dist. of
Nev. Civ. Rule 2.20(f) (“An opposition to a motion which contains
a motion related to the same subject matter will be considered as
a counter-motion.”); N.J. Rules of Court § 1:6-3(b) (“A cross-
motion may be filed and served by the responding party together
with that party’s opposition to the motion . . . .”); N.Y. C.P.L.R. §
2215(b) (“[A] party may serve upon the moving party a notice of
cross-motion demanding relief, with or without supporting papers
. . . .”); Mass. Super. Ct. Rule 9A(b)(3) (“A cross-motion, accom-
panied by the other documents specified in Paragraph (a)(1) of
this rule, shall be served on the moving party with the opposition
to the original motion. A party opposing a cross-motion may serve
a memorandum in opposition within (A) 10 days after service of
a cross-motion other than a cross-motion for summary judgment,
(B) 21 days after service of a cross-motion for summary judgment
or (C) such additional time as is allowed by statute or order of the
court.”).
Federal Cases: Miller v. Elexco Land Servs., Inc., 09-CV-0038,
2011 WL 4499281, at *1, n.2 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2011) (applying
definition from Black’s Law Dictionary); accord, Horton v. Williams,
08-CV-0513, 2010 WL 3338920, at *2 & n.2 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 24,
2010); Lent v. Fashion Mall Partners, L.P., 243 F.R.D. 97, 100
(S.D.N.Y. 2007); New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Diller, 678 F. Supp. 2d
288, 292, n.1 (D.N.J. 2009); Oxford v. Anthem Life Ins. Co., 11-
Because of the different definitions of the term “counter-
motion,” the practice of vacillating between “cross-motion”
and “counter-motion” to refer to the same motion in the same
brief or decision, without explanation, is not recommended.
Moreover, because the term “cross-motion” appears to be com-
mon and have a generally accepted meaning, while the term
“counter-motion” is relatively rare and used in different ways,
this article will focus on the term “cross-motion,” as well as the
most common meaning of that term.
B. THREE ELEMENTS OF A “CROSS-MOTION”
The definition of a “cross-motion” that is most commonly
provided in law dictionaries, and the definition that is most
commonly applied in state and federal courts, is a competing
request for an order similar to that requested by another party
against the cross-moving party. See infra notes 7-16. As a
result, as the term is most widely understood, a “cross-motion”
has three elements. 
First, a cross-motion is a motion filed against the originally
moving party.7 Second, a cross-motion is filed by a party
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CV-0507, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137050, at *25 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 25,
2012); S. Md. Equine Veterinary Serv. v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 10-
CV-1850, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60794, at *1-2 (D. Md. June 3,
2011); Rodriguez v. Astrue, 09-CV-2668, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7049, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2010). 
Federal Court Rules and Standing Orders: N.D.N.Y. L.R. 7.1(c)
(defining a “cross-motion” as “a competing request for relief or
order similar to that requested by another party against the cross-
moving party”); D. Md. Rule 105(2)(c) (defining, in summary-
judgment context, a “cross-motion” as a motion filed “[a]fter th[e]
[original] motion has been filed” in “a two-party case”); W.D.N.Y.
L.R. Civ. P. 7(b)(2)(A) (noting, in summary-judgment context, that
a “cross-motion” is against “the moving party”); cf. N.D. Cal.,
B.L.R. 7007-1(d) (“Together with an opposition, a party respond-
ing to a motion may file a counter-motion related to the subject
matter of the original motion.”). 
8. Law Dictionaries and Encyclopedias: BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
1106 (9th ed. 2009) (defining a “cross-motion” as “a competing
request for relief or order similar to that requested by another party
against the cross-moving party . . . .”); cf. 7A FED. PROC. LAWYERS
ED. § 19:146 (2011) (“A cross-motion must be contained in the
same document as the response to the original motion, and a
response to the cross-motion must be contained in the same docu-
ment as the reply . . . .”).
State Cases: Van Horn v. Van Horn, 415 N.J. Super. 398, 409-10
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) (explaining that a properly filed
cross-motion must “relate[] to the subject matter of the original
motion”); XO Communs., LLC v. Level 3 Communs., Inc., 948
A.2d 1111, 1117 (Del. Ch. 2007) (calling motion filed by respond-
ing party a “cross-motion”); accord, Shulas v. Estabrook, 385 N.J.
Super. 91, 94 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006); Nelson v. Planet Ins.
Co., 111 Nev. 1373, 1376 (Nev. 1995); Smaland Beach Ass’n v.
Genova, 2006 Mass. Super. LEXIS 306, at *9 (Mass. May 31, 2006)
(noting that a party responding to an original motion may file a
“cross-motion or opposition”).  
State Court Rules and Standing Orders: Eighth Judicial Dist. of
Nev. Civ. Rule 2.20(f) (“An opposition to a motion which contains
a motion related to the same subject matter will be considered as a
counter-motion.”); N.J. Rules of Court § 1:6-3(b) (“A cross-motion
may be filed and served by the responding party together with that
party’s opposition to the motion and noticed for the same return
date only if it relates to the subject matter of the original motion.”);
cf. Mont. D.R. Rule 4.41(G) (“Except in CSEA cases, a party served
with a motion may file a counter-motion . . . .”); Wash. State Pierce
Cnty. Super. Ct. PCLR 7(b)(1)(D)(ii) (“In the event there is an
existing motion and the responding party wishes to file a counter
motion to be heard the same date they may do so without leave of
the court . . . .”), accord, Wash. State Pierce Cnty. Super. Ct.
PCLSPR 94.04(c)(2). 
Federal Cases: Miller v. Elexco Land Servs., Inc., 2011 WL
4499281, at *1, n.2 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2011) (applying definition
from Black’s Law Dictionary); Horton v. Williams, 08-CV-0513,
2010 WL 3338920, at *2 & n.2 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2010) (apply-
ing definition from Black’s Law Dictionary); Lent v. Fashion Mall
Partners, L.P., 243 F.R.D. 97, 100 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (applying defin-
ition from Black’s Law Dictionary); New Hampshire Ins. Co. v.
Diller, 678 F. Supp. 2d 288, 292, n.1 (D.N.J. 2009) (applying defi-
nition from Black’s Law Dictionary); see also Willingam v. Cnty. of
Albany, 593 F. Supp. 2d 446, 451 (N.D.N.Y. 2006).
Federal Court Rules and Standing Orders: N.D. Cal., B.L.R.
7007-1(d) (“Together with an opposition, a party responding to a
motion may file a counter-motion related to the subject matter of
the original motion.”); D. Md. Rule 105(2)(c) (defining, in sum-
mary-judgment context, a “cross-motion” as a motion filed “[a]fter
th[e] [original] motion has been filed” in “a two-party case,” both
“opposing the first party’s motion and in support of its own cross-
motion”); N.D.N.Y. L.R. 7.1(c) (defining a “cross-motion” as “a
competing request for relief or order similar to that requested by
another party against the cross-moving party”); D. Nev. L.R.
7056(e)(1) (“A countermotion for summary judgment that relates
to the same claim or partial claim may be filed against the
movant(s) . . . .”); W.D.N.Y. L.R. Civ. P. 7(b)(2)(A) (noting, in sum-
mary-judgment context, that a “cross-motion” is filed by “the party
opposing the original motion”). 
9. See Elexco Land Servs., Inc., 2011 WL 4499281, at *1 & n.2 (find-
ing that, where plaintiff filed motions for partial summary judg-
ment against two defendants on two trespass claims, two defen-
dants’ two motions for partial summary judgment on those two
trespass claims were each “cross-motions”).
10. See Horton, 2010 WL 3338920, at *2 (“Defendant Keller’s ‘cross-
motion’ for summary judgment, which in no way opposes Defen-
dant Williams’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and
requests dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint on a different basis than
does Defendant Williams’s motion, is not a cross-motion for sum-
mary judgment but is instead a motion for summary judgment.”)
[emphasis in original]; Lent, 243 F.R.D. at 100 (“[A] party cannot
file a ‘cross motion’ against a party that has not already moved
against it.”); Willingam v. Cnty. of Albany, 593 F. Supp. 2d 446, 451
(N.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding that, where plaintiff filed a motion for
summary judgment against first two defendants, then the third
defendant filed a motion for summary judgment against the plain-
tiff, the third defendant’s motion was “improperly cast and filed as
a cross-motion rather than as a regular motion”); cf. Diller, 678 F.
Supp. 2d 288, 292 & n.1 (finding that, where plaintiff moved for
summary judgment against defendant, third-party defendant’s
motion for summary judgment against defendant was not a “cross-
motion”).
11. Law Dictionaries and Encyclopedias: BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
1106 (9th ed. 2009) (defining a “cross-motion” as “a competing
request for relief or order similar to that requested by another party
against the cross-moving party . . . .”); MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIO-
NARY OF LAW 116 (1996) (defining a “cross-motion” as “[a] motion
that attempts to counter a similar motion filed by an opposing
party . . . . ”); MELLINKOFF’S DICTIONARY OF AM. LEGAL USAGE 143
(1992) (defining a “cross-motion” as an “opposing motion, usually
requesting a result opposite to original motion”); THE WOLTERS
against whom the original motion was filed.8
Example 1: Defendant moves for summary judgment
against Plaintiff, then Plaintiff moves for summary
judgment against Defendant. Plaintiff’s motion is a
“cross-motion.”9
Example 2: Defendant 1 moves for summary judg-
ment against Plaintiff, then Defendant 2 moves for
summary judgment against Plaintiff. Defendant 2’s
motion is not a “cross-motion.”10
Third, a cross-motion requests an order that is similar to, or
competes with, the order requested by another party.11
Example 1: Plaintiff moves for summary judgment
on its first claim (as well as its other claims), then
Defendant moves for partial summary judgment on
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KLUWER BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY 714 (2011) (defining “cross-
motion” as “[a] motion similar to a motion filed earlier by another
party. A cross motion is a motion for some ruling or order filed by
a party to an action that is similar in its request to another motion
already pending. . . . Note: a cross-motion must seek the same
order or similar relief or ruling as a prior motion, with the cross-
motion seeking an order or rule to the benefit of the cross-movant,
while the original movant sought the original order for its own
benefit.”); Lawyers.com Legal Dictionary, http://research.
lawyers.com/glossary/cross-motion.html (defining a “cross-
motion” as “a motion that attempts to counter a similar motion
filed by an opposing party . . . .”); WILLIAM C. BURTON, BURTON’S
LEGAL THESAURUS 136 (3d ed. 1999) (defining “cross” as to “con-
flict with . . . contradict, contravene, controvert . . . oppose . . . [and]
run counter to . . . ,” and listing “cross-motions” under the words
“Associated Concepts”). 
State Cases: Berger v. Pubco Corp., 76 A.2d 132, 135 (Del. 2009)
(referring to a motion for summary judgment filed in response to
a motion to dismiss as a “counter-motion” and a motion for sum-
mary judgment filed in response to a motion for summary judg-
ment as a “cross-motion”); Columbus Steel Castings Co. v. Transp.
& Transit Assocs., No. 06AP-1247, 2007 WL 4340558, at *2 (Ohio
Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2007) (“TTA made a competing request for relief
by filing a cross-motion for summary judgment.”); Dillon v. Typal-
dos, 2006 WL 1381625, at *1, 6, 13 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. May
19, 2006) (referring to a motion to dismiss a complaint filed in
response to a motion to reinstate the complaint as a “cross-motion”
and a subsequent motion to add defendants as a “counter
motion”). 
State Court Rules and Standing Orders: Eighth Judicial Dist. of
Nev. Civ. Rule 2.20(f) (“An opposition to a motion which contains
a motion related to the same subject matter will be considered as a
counter-motion.”); N.J. Rules of Court § 1:6-3(b) (“A cross-motion
may be filed and served by the responding party together with that
party’s opposition to the motion and noticed for the same return
date only if it relates to the subject matter of the original motion.”).
Federal Cases: Miller v. Elexco Land Servs., Inc., 09-CV-0038,
2011 WL 4499281, at *1, n.2 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2011) (applying
definition from Black’s Law Dictionary); Horton v. Williams, 08-CV-
0513, 2010 WL 3338920, at *2 & n.2 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2010)
(applying definition from Black’s Law Dictionary); Lent v. Fashion
Mall Partners, L.P., 243 F.R.D. 97, 100 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (applying
definition from Black’s Law Dictionary); New Hampshire Ins. Co. v.
Diller, 678 F. Supp. 2d 288, 292, n.1 (D.N.J. 2009) (applying defi-
nition from Black’s Law Dictionary); see also Birmingham v. Mizuno
USA, Inc., 09-CV-0566, 2011 WL 1299356, at *2 & n.1 (N.D.N.Y.
Mar. 31, 2011); Ramos v. Bonilla, No. 03-2683, 2006 WL 4452844,
at *3 (Bankr. D.N.J. Apr. 12, 2006); FDIC v. Modular Homes, Inc.,
859 F. Supp. 117, 125 & n.8 (D.N.J. 1994); Mulee v. United States,
648 F. Supp. 1181, 1182 & n.1 (N.D. Ill. 1986). 
Federal Court Rules and Standing Orders: D. Haw. L.R. 7.9 (“Any
motion raising the same subject matter as an original motion may
be filed by the responding party together with the party’s opposition
. . . . A party’s memorandum in support of the counter motion must
be combined into one document with the party’s memorandum in
opposition to the original motion . . . .”); D. Haw. LBR 9013-1(d)(1)
(“A respondent may file, together with the response to the motion,
a countermotion raising only the same specific issues, claims, or
defenses presented in the original motion.”); D.N.J. L.R. 7.1(h)
(requiring a “cross-motion” to be “related to the subject-matter of
the original motion”); D.N.J. L. Bankr. R. 9013-1(d) (“No motion
shall be designated a cross motion unless it is related to the original
motion.”); N.D.N.Y. L.R. 7.1(c) (defining a “cross-motion” as “a
competing request for relief or order similar to that requested by
another party against the cross-moving party”); D. Nev. L.R.
7056(e)(1) (“A countermotion for summary judgment that relates
to the same claim or partial claim [as the original motion for sum-
mary judgment] may be filed against the movant(s) . . . .”); cf. N.D.
Cal., B.L.R. 7007-1(d) (“Together with an opposition, a party
responding to a motion may file a counter-motion related to the
subject matter of the original motion.”); E.D. Cal. Order 13-0911(e)
(“Any counter-motion or other motion that a party may desire to
make that is related to the general subject matter of the original
motion shall be served and filed in the manner and on the date pre-
scribed for the filing of opposition.”); E.D. Cal. LBR 9014-1(i)
(“Any countermotion or other motion related to the general subject
matter of the original motion set for hearing pursuant to this Local
Rule may be filed and served no later than the time opposition to
the original motion is required to be filed.”). 
12. See Elexco Land Servs., Inc., 2011 WL 4499281, at *1 & n.2 (find-
ing that, where plaintiff filed motions for partial summary judg-
ment against two defendants on two trespass claims, two defen-
dants’ two motions for partial summary judgment on those two
trespass claims were each “cross-motions”).
13. See Elexco Land Servs., Inc., 2011 WL 4499281, at *1 & n.2 (find-
ing that, where plaintiff filed motion for partial summary judgment
against first defendant on two trespass claims, first defendant’s
motion for partial summary judgment on those two trespass claims
was a “cross-motion,” but first defendant’s motion for partial sum-
mary judgment on plaintiff’s third claim, for conversion, was a
“motion”; also finding that, where plaintiff filed motion for partial
summary judgment against second defendant on two trespass
claims, second defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment
on those two trespass claims was a “cross-motion,” but second
defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment on plaintiff’s
third claim, for conversion, was a “motion,” as was second defen-
dant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint); Birmingham v.
Mizuno USA, Inc., 09-CV-0566, 2011 WL 1299356, at *2 & n.1
(N.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2011) (“The reason the Court does not charac-
terize Defendant’s motion as a ‘cross-motion’ is that it seeks relief
that appears predominantly dissimilar to that requested by Plain-
tiffs, who moved for summary judgment on only three of the seven
counts of their Complaint.”); Horton, 2010 WL 3338920, at *2 &
n.2 (finding that second defendant’s motion for summary judg-
ment against plaintiff, filed after first defendant’s motion to dismiss
plaintiff’s complaint, was not a “cross-motion”); Diller, 678 F.
Supp. 2d 288, 292 (finding that, where plaintiff moved for sum-
mary judgment against defendant, defendant’s motion for partial
summary judgment against plaintiff was a “cross-motion,” but
defendant’s motion for leave to file sur-reply on its motion for par-
tial summary judgment was not a “cross-motion,” nor was third-
party defendant’s motion for summary judgment against defendant
Plaintiff’s first claim. Defendant’s motion is a “cross-
motion.”12
Example 2: Defendant moves for partial summary
judgment on Claim 2 (which seeks X as relief), then
Plaintiff moves for partial summary judgment on
Claim 3 (which seeks Y as relief). Plaintiff’s motion is
not a “cross-motion.”13
Granted, in some courts, a cross-motion may seek relief that
is unresponsive or unrelated to the relief sought in the original
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a “cross-motion”); Ramos v. Bonilla, No. 03-2683, 2006 WL
4452844, at *3 (Bankr. D.N.J. Apr. 12, 2006) (“Ramos’s cross-
motion [seeking to revoke a discharge from bankruptcy, as well as
for sanctions and damages] is procedurally improper . . . because
it does not relate to the original motion to dismiss filed by
Bonilla.”); FDIC v. Modular Homes, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 117, 125 &
n.8 (D.N.J. 1994) (“[Modular’s] cross-motion [to dismiss the
FDIC’s complaint for failing to comply with discovery] is procedu-
rally improper . . . because it does not relate to the subject matter
of the FDIC’s motion to dismiss Modular’s affirmative defenses.”);
Mulee v. United States, 648 F. Supp. 1181, 1182 & n.1 (N.D. Ill.
1986) (“Although the government has styled its motion as to
Mulee’s complaint as one for dismissal, it is more properly a cross-
motion for summary judgment in its favor and denial of Mulee’s
motion for summary judgment.”).
14. State Cases: Burke Secur., Inc. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 184
A.D.2d 1046, 1046 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (“Brownyard’s cross
motion was proper even though plaintiffs, in making the original
motion, did not seek any relief against Brownyard.”); cf. Van Horn
v. Van Horn, 415 N.J. Super. 398, 409-10 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2010) (explaining that a properly filed cross-motion responds to
the subject matter of the original motion, but noting that the judge
has the discretion to relax the rules, and deeming a non-responsive
motion to be a cross-motion).
State Court Rules and Standing Orders: N.J. Rules of Court, §
1:6-3(b) (“[I]n Family Part motions brought under Part V of these
Rules . . . [,] a notice of cross-motion may seek relief unrelated to
that sought in the original motion.”); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 2215(b)
(McKinney 2010) (“[The] relief [sought in the cross-motion] need
not be responsive to that demanded by the moving party.”); Patrick
M. Connors, Practice Commentaries, in MCKINNEY’S CONS. LAWS OF
N.Y., Book 7B, CPLR C2215:1, at 149 (“A cross-motion is merely a
motion by any party against the party who made the original
motion, made returnable at the same time as the original
motion.”); Patrick M. Connors, Practice Commentaries, in MCKIN-
NEY’S CONS. LAWS OF N.Y., Book 7B, CPLR C2215:1D, at 185 (“The
relief sought in the cross-motion need not be responsive or even
related to the relief sought in the main motion. It can be of an
entirely different kind.”). 
Federal Case: Kowalski v. Mommy Gina Tuna Resources, 05-CV-
00679, 2008 WL 4216267, at *1 (D. Haw. Sept. 15, 2008) (draw-
ing distinction between a counter-motion and a cross-motion, not-
ing that the former refers to a motion raising the same subject mat-
ter as an original motion, and the latter refers to an “independent”
motion unrelated to the subject matter of the original motion).
Federal Rule: U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Dist. of Haw. L.R. 7.9
(“Counter Motions. . . . Any motion raising the same subject mat-
ter as an original motion may be filed by the responding party
together with the party’s opposition . . . .”).    
15. State Cases: Linn v. Linn, 8 So.2d 187, 188 (Alaska 1942); Kitch
v. Moslander, 50 N.E.2d 933, 937 (Ind. Ct. App. 1943); Ryan v.
City of Emmetsburg, 293 N.W. 29, 31 (Iowa 1940); Donovan v.
Donovan, 200 N.E. 884, 886 (Mass. 1936); State ex rel. McVay v.
Dist. Court of Fourth Judicial Dist., 251 P.2d 840, 846 (Mont.
1952); Kress v. Corey, 189 P.2d 352, 361-62 (Nev. 1948); N.
Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 195 P. 988, 989 (Wyo. 1921). 
State Court Rules and Standing Orders: See NY Westchester
County Justice Tolbert Rules Doc. 1 (“Cross-motions which seek
only the denial of the relief in the original motion will not be rec-
ognized as motions with respect to which a reply may be submit-
ted.”). 
Federal Cases: C.H.R.I.S.T., Inc. v. Meyers, 00-CV-50402, 2002
WL 257814, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 20, 2002) (“[A] separate motion
to deny an opposing party’s motion for summary judgment is obvi-
ously unnecessary.”); Kan.-Neb. Natural Gas Co. v. City of St.
Edward, Neb., 135 F. Supp. 629, 633 (D. Neb. 1955) (“The defen-
dants in each case served and filed a motion to deny motion of
plaintiff for temporary injunction. Such a pleading is of no real ser-
vice. A motion to deny an antecedent motion already set for hear-
ing accomplishes nothing that could not be done by a simple
appearance in resistance to the earlier motion. Reasonable profes-
sional case is laudable. When it degenerates into illogical timidity
it approaches the status of absurdity.”); Fox v. Am. Airlines, Inc.,
00-CV-0368, 2001 WL 1597851, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 12, 2001)
(“Although styled as a Motion to Deny Summary Judgment, Plain-
tiff’s motion is in essence a response to Defendant’s summary judg-
ment motion. In light of Plaintiff’s response, a separate motion to
deny summary judgment is unnecessary, and accordingly Plaintiff’s
Motion to Deny Summary Judgment is denied as moot.”); Jones v.
Milwaukee Cnty., 74-C-0374,1979 WL 2035, at *5 (E.D. Wis. May
1, 1979) (“The defendants filed a motion to deny the plaintiffs’
motion for partial summary judgment. To oppose a motion, it is
only necessary to file a brief or affidavits in opposition. A motion
to deny the motion opposed is unnecessary. The defendants’
motion is superfluous and will therefore be dismissed.”); cf. Carl-
wood Dev. Inc. v. United States, 10-CV-1773, 2011 WL 69374, at
*1 (D. Nev. Jan. 10, 2011) (characterizing as improper govern-
ment’s purported “cross-motion” for summary judgment because it
did not “address[] any matters even remotely indicative of a
motion for summary judgment” but rather merely responded to
the matters raised by the petitioners in their opening brief on their
motion); Langley v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc., 96-CV-3107, 1998
WL 792498, at *1, n.1 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 3, 1998) (“Plaintiff filed on
October 23, 1998 a motion to deny defendant’s motion to strike
and deny defendant’s motion for summary judgment. These plead-
ings are improper under the court’s local civil rules. The pertinent
rule provides only for the filing of a motion and brief, a response,
and a reply.”).
16. State Cases: Dillon v. Typaldos, 2006 WL 1381625, at *1, 6, 13
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. May 19, 2006) (referring to a motion to
dismiss a complaint filed in response to a motion to reinstate the
complaint as a “cross-motion” and a subsequent motion to add
defendants as a “counter motion”). 
Federal Cases: Kassner v. 2nd Ave. Delicatessen, Inc., 496 F.3d
229, 237 (2d Cir. 2007) (characterizing plaintiff’s motion to
amend, filed in attempt to cure defects identified in defendants’
motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12[b][6] as a “cross-
motion”); accord, Andre v. Walgreen Co., 12-CV-5413, 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 88657, at *1-2 (D.N.J. June 25, 2013); Lesperance v.
Cnty. of St. Lawrence, 10-CV-1273, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92439,
motion.14 However, this is the minority view. Compare note 14
with notes 11-13.
Note that, while cross-motions must seek relief that com-
petes with the relief sought in the original motion, cross-
motions to “deny” or “dismiss” those original motions are
superfluous and improper because they request no relief other
than that which may be provided through a decision of the
original motions.15
Note also that a motion to amend a pleading is a cross-
motion if, and only if, that motion seeks (through the pro-
posed amendment) to remedy the defects in the original plead-
ing identified in the motion to dismiss.16
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at *1-2 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2011); Deluca v. AccessIT Group, Inc.,
695 F. Supp. 2d 54, 57, 64 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Coulter v. United States
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 07-CV-4894, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
73014, at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 23, 2008); Steiert v. Mata Servs., 111 F.
Supp. 2d 521, 523 (D.N.J. 2000).
17. State Cases: Grande v. Peteroy, 39 A.D.3d 590, 591-592 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2007) (“[A]n untimely motion or cross motion for summary
judgment may be considered by the court where, as here, a timely
motion for summary judgment was made on nearly identical
grounds [because] the nearly identical nature of the grounds may
provide the requisite good cause (see CPLR 3212 [a]) to review the
untimely motion or cross motion on the merits.”); Filannino v. Tri-
borough Bridge & Tunnel Auth., 34 A.D.3d 280, 281 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2006) (“A cross motion for summary judgment made after the
expiration of the [deadline for making dispositive motions] may be
considered by the court, even in the absence of good cause, where
a timely motion for summary judgment was made seeking relief
‘nearly identical’ to that sought by the cross motion.”).
Federal Cases: Daly v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 00-CV-0040, 2002
WL 1768887, at *1 (D. Ariz. July 17, 2002) (permitting plaintiff to
file cross-motion for summary judgment after expiration of
motion-filing deadline); Mobley v. Am. Home Assur. Co., 11-C-
1293, 2012 WL 3028031, at *1 & n.1 (W.D. Okla. July 24, 2012)
(“Defendant responded to Plaintiff’s Motion and also filed a
counter Motion for Summary Judgment . . . . Defendant’s failure to
file a separate motion for summary judgment is in violation of the
local rules. . . . However, because the deadline for filing dispositive
motions has passed . . . , the Court will consider Defendant’s
Motion despite this shortcoming.”); Jones v. Coleman Co., 39 F.3d
749, 753 (7th Cir. 1994) (affirming the decision of a magistrate to
judge to allow an untimely cross-motion where there was a
“change in circumstances whereby the issues involving the only
remaining defendant [were] addressed by the motion” that showed
“good cause”); Hahnel v. United States, 782 F. Supp. 2d 20, 30-31
(W.D.N.Y. 2011) (“This Court has routinely permitted litigants to
file a cross-motion in response to a dispositive motion, even
though the deadline for filing dispositive motions had passed, pro-
vided that such cross-motions were filed by the deadline estab-
lished for filing opposing papers, as set by the Court’s Motion
Scheduling Order. . . . The Court cannot recall an instance, though,
where a cross-motion was filed after all filing deadlines had
expired, as in this case, and it notes its disapproval of the manner
in which Plaintiff’s motion was filed. Nevertheless, the Court will,
for its own convenience, and in its discretion, consider Plaintiff’s
cross-motion . . . .”). 
Federal Court Rules and Standing Orders: Rules Ct. Fed. Claims
7.2(c)(1) (“A cross-motion may be filed within the time allowed
for responses [to motions].”); E.D. Cal. Local Rule 78-230(e)
(“Any counter-motion or other motion that a party may desire to
make that is related to the general subject matter of the original
motion shall be served and filed with the Clerk in the manner and
on the date prescribed for the filing of opposition.”); N.D.N.Y. L.R.
7.1(c) (“A party may file and serve a cross-motion (meaning a
competing request for relief or order similar to that requested by
another party against the cross-moving party) at the time it files
and serves its opposition papers to the original motion”). 
18. State Cases: Schacht v. Ameritrust Co. N.A., 1994 Ohio App.
LEXIS 1125, at *15-16 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (affirming lower
court’s decision to strike cross-motion for summary judgment filed
after deadline for all dispositive motions); Cruickshank v. Fremont
Inv. & Loan, 307 Ga. App. 489, 489-90 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010)
(affirming dismissal of untimely filed cross-motion for summary
judgment).  
Federal Cases: Baker v. AirServ Corp., 08-CV-0913, 2009 WL
1098767, at *1 (D. Colo. Apr. 20, 2009) (“[P]laintiff’s only expla-
nation for filing his motion for partial summary judgment after the
dispositive motion deadline amounts to a misreading of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a). He offers no support for his position
that Rule 56(a) permits him to file a cross-motion for summary
judgment out of time, nor can I find any.”); Kelley v. N.Y. Life Ins.
& Annuity Corp., 07-CV-01702, 2008 WL 5423343, at *4 (D.
Colo. Dec. 30, 2008) (“I first note that his Cross-Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment was filed on November 11, 2008, after the dis-
positive motions deadline set by the scheduling order had passed
on October 20, 2008. As such, his motion is untimely.”); Schroer v.
United States, 07-CV-0690, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64568, at *1-2
(D. Colo. Aug. 22, 2008) (striking cross-motion for summary judg-
ment that was filed as a response after dispositive motion deadline
passed); United States ex rel. IBM v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 112 F.
Supp. 2d 1023, 1028-29 (D. Haw. 2000) (declining to consider
“cross-motion” for summary judgment filed “well after the court
imposed deadline[,]” noting that, before the dispositive motion
deadline expired, Defendant could have “request[ed] that the court
modify its Scheduling Order, []or . . . [sought] relief from the
Scheduling Order”); Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 96-CV-
0824, 1998 WL 35235446, at *1 (E.D.N.C. June 23, 1998) (grant-
ing motion “to strike plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judg-
ment as untimely . . . under Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f).”); Serino v. Pru-
dential Ins. Co. of Am., 706 F. Supp. 2d 584, 586-87 (M.D. Pa.
2009) (striking “cross-motion” for summary judgment that was
filed after the expiration of the dispositive-motion deadline, even
though it was filed within the deadline to file a response to the
original motion for summary judgment); Falk v. Wells Fargo Bank,
09-CV-0678, 2011 WL 3702666, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 19, 2011)
(“Wells Fargo moves to strike Falk’s Cross-Motion for Partial Sum-
mary Judgment. The deadline for filing dispositive motions was
December 10, 2010. . . . On January 10, 2011, Falk submitted his
Cross-Motion as part of his Response to Defendants Motion for
Summary Judgment. Falk’s only explanation for failing to file his
motion by, or request an extension of, the dispositive motions
deadline is that it was the result of ‘inadvertence or because he had
not previously thought of filing a Cross-Motion.’ . . . Finding no
good cause to extend the dispositive motions deadline, the Court
STRIKES Falk’s untimely pleading pursuant to Federal Rule
16(f)(1)(c).”); cf. Byce v. Pruco Life Ins. Co., 09-CV-1912, 2011
WL 233390, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 21, 2011) (finding that cross-
motion for summary judgment filed after expiration of dispositive-
motion filing deadline was untimely and had to qualify for excep-
tion to be considered); Wuliger v. Reassure Am. Life Ins. Co., 03-
CV-7699, 2011 WL 767872, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 28, 2011) (find-
ing that cross-motion for summary judgment filed after expiration
of dispositive-motion filing deadline violated the court’s schedul-
ing order but would be excused under the circumstances); Seebach
v. Seebach Am., Inc., 09-CV-0326, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107568
II. PROCEDURAL RULES REGARDING CROSS-MOTIONS
A. COMMON PROCEDURAL RULES REGARDING
CROSS-MOTIONS
Sometimes, cross-motions are allowed to be filed after the
expiration of the motion-filing deadline.17 Other times, how-
ever, cross-motions are not allowed to be filed after the expira-
tion of the motion-filing deadline.18
Sometimes, the brief in support of a cross-motion must be
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(S.D. W. Va. Oct. 7, 2010) (considering arguments raised to the
extent they are in response to motion for summary judgment, but
deeming “cross-motion” to be untimely, and therefore striking
cross motion for summary judgment).
19. Law Dictionaries and Encyclopedias: 7A FED. PROC. LAWYERS ED.
§ 19:146 (2011) (“A cross-motion must be contained in the same
document as the response to the original motion, and a response to
the cross-motion must be contained in the same document as the
reply . . . .”). 
Federal Cases: Miller v. Elexco Land Servs., Inc., 09-CV-0038,
2011 WL 4499281, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2011) (“Such a bifur-
cated motion practice is prohibited by [the court’s local rule on
page limitations]. . . . The effect of this motion practice was . . . [to]
enlarge[] the number of pages of memoranda of law that Defen-
dant Elexco could submit regarding Plaintiffs’ two trespass claims
. . . .”); Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 375, 377
(U.S. Cl. Ct. 1988) (reciting court rule that “a party filing a cross-
motion is required to file its argument in support of the cross-
motion and in response to the other parties motion in the same
brief”); Big Lagoon Rancheria v. Cal., 09-CV-1471, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 47109, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2010) (“Big Lagoon’s dis-
positive motion is currently due June 17, 2010; the State’s opposi-
tion and any cross-motion, contained in a single brief, are due July
1, 2010; Big Lagoon’s reply and cross-opposition, contained in a
single brief, are due July 15, 2010; and the State’s reply on its cross-
motion is due July 22, 2010.”); Love v. Correa, 07-CV-0436, 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10544, at *41-42 (D. Haw. Feb. 11, 2009) (noting
that “Defendants Fontes and Wu violated Local Rule 7.9 by filing
separate oppositions and replies”).
Federal Court Rules and Standing Orders: D. Haw. L.R. 7.9 (“A
party’s memorandum in support of the counter motion must be
combined into one document with the party’s memorandum in
opposition to the original motion . . . .”); D. Md. Civ. Rule
105(2)(c) (“After that motion has been filed, the other party shall
file a cross-motion accompanied by a single memorandum (both
opposing the first party’s motion and in support of its own cross-
motion) . . . .”); N.D.N.Y. L.R. 7.1(c) (“If a party makes a cross-
motion, it must join its cross motion brief with its opposition brief,
and this combined brief may not exceed twenty-five (25) pages in
length, exclusive of exhibits. A separate brief in opposition to the
original motion is not permissible.”); U.S. Dist. Ct. Rules S.D.N.Y.,
Berman-Practices 2.C.2. (“Any cross-motion shall be included in
the opposition brief.”); cf. D.N.J. L.R. 7.1(h) (“A cross-motion
related to the subject matter of the original motion may be filed by
the party opposing the motion together with that party’s opposition
papers . . . .”); U.S. Court of Claims Rule 83.2(e) (stating that a
party filing a cross-motion is required to file its argument in sup-
port of the cross-motion and in response to the other parties’
motion in the same brief).
20. State Court Rules and Standing Orders: N.M. Dist. Ct. Rule 1-
007.1(E) (“Responses to motions shall be made separately from
any counter-motions or cross-motions.”); N.M. Fourth Judicial
Dist. Ct. LR4-304(E) (“The practice of filing cross-motions which
operate as both a motion and as a response or reply to the original
motion is prohibited.”); N.M. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct. LR6-204(C)
(“The practice of filing cross-motions to operate as both a motion
and as a response to the original motion is prohibited.”).  
Federal Cases: World Publ’g Co. v. United States Dep’t of Justice,
09-CV-0574, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32594, at *25 (N.D. Okla. Mar.
28, 2011) (considering defendants’ motion to strike plaintiff’s
opposition based on the argument that, “to the extent it purports
to be a cross-motion for summary judgment[,] it violates Northern
District of Oklahoma Local Civil Rule 7.2(e)[,]” which prohibits a
response to a motion to include a cross-motion, and ultimately
converting the response into a cross-motion); Mobley v. Am. Home
Assur. Co., 11-C-1293, 2012 WL 3028031, at *1 & n.1 (W.D.
Okla. July 24, 2012) (“Defendant responded to Plaintiff’s Motion
and also filed a counter Motion for Summary Judgment . . . . Defen-
dant’s failure to file a separate motion for summary judgment is in
violation of the local rules. . . . Combined motions are generally
stricken.”); Tooling, Mfg. & Techs. Ass’n v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.,
08-CV-11812, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89273, at *8 n.5 (E.D. Mich.
Aug. 30, 2010) (“[A] cross-motion must be filed independently of
the response brief, though nothing would prohibit using the same
brief for the response brief and the brief supporting the cross-
motion.”). 
Federal Court Rules and Standing Orders: D. Colo. L. Civ. R.
56.1(B) (“A cross motion for summary judgment shall not be
included in a response brief.”); E.D. Mich. ECF Rule 5(e) (“[A]
response or reply to a motion must not be combined with a
counter-motion.”); D. Miss., L.U. Civ. R. 7(b)(3)(C) (“A response
to a motion may not include a counter-motion in the same docu-
ment. Any motion must be an item docketed separately from a
response.”); New Mex. L.R. 1-007.1(E) (“Responses to motions
shall be made separately from any counter-motions or cross-
motions.”); E.D. Okla. L.R. 7.1(f) (“A response to a motion may
not also include a motion or a cross-motion made by the respond-
ing party.”); N.D. Okla. L.R. 7.2(e) (“A response to a motion may
not also include a motion or a cross-motion made by the respond-
ing party.”); W.D. Okla. L. Cv. R. 7.1(c) (“A response to a motion
may not also include a motion or a cross-motion made by the
responding party. If a party responding to a motion files a cross-
motion or other closely-related motion concurrently with the filing
of the response, the brief in support of the cross-motion or other
closely-related motion may be combined with the responsive brief
[or it may be filed separately].”) (emphasis added); U.S. Dist. Ct.
Rules N.D. W. Va. 10.1 (“Always file motions and responses sepa-
rately. For example, never file a cross-motion for summary judg-
ment with a response to a motion for summary judgment. It is crit-
ical that the cross motion be filed separately so that it will appear
on the Court’s Pending Motions Report and can be properly linked
to any subsequent responses, replies, notices and orders.”); U.S.
Dist. Ct. Rules S.D. W. Va. 10.1 (“Motions and responses must be
filed as separate documents. For example, a cross-motion for sum-
mary judgment should never be combined with a response to a
motion for summary judgment. It is critical that the cross motion
be filed separately so that it can be properly linked to any subse-
quent responses, replies, notices and orders.”).
21. State Cases: Captain Andy’s Sailing v. Dep’t of Land & Natural
Res., 113 Haw. 184, 190 (Haw. 2006); Watson v. YMCA of Greater
Boston, 14 LCR 528, 529 (Mass. Land Ct. 2006). 
State Court Rules and Standing Orders: Mass. Land Court Rule
4 (“Responses to motions or cross-motions . . . must be served
upon all other parties and filed with the court within thirty (30)
days after service of the motion or cross-motion. . . . Reply briefs,
affidavits and other materials in support of the reply (if any) must
combined with the brief in opposition to the original motion.19
Other times, however, the brief in support of a cross-motion
may, or sometimes must, be filed separately from the brief in
opposition to the original motion.20
Sometimes, replies on cross-motions are permitted without
prior leave of the court.21
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be served on the parties and filed with the court no later than ten
(10) days prior to the date the court first set for hearing . . . .”);
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 2214(b) (providing that, where answering papers
and a cross-motion are required to be served seven days in advance
of the return day, “any reply or responding affidavits shall be served
at least one day before such time”); Ohio Second District Local
Appellate Rule 8(F)(2) (“A reply brief, if any, and/or a response to
the cross-motion, if any, shall be filed within twenty (20) days after
the filing of the brief in opposition to the motion. No other briefs
or memorandum shall be filed except with leave of court, unless a
cross-motion has been filed in which event the movant may file a
reply within twenty (20) day[s] of the filing of opposing party’s
response.”), accord, Eleventh District Local Appellate Rule
101(B)(1); Utah Rules of Civ. Proc., Rule 101(g) (“The reply to the
response to the counter motion shall be filed and served at least 2
business days before the hearing.”).
Federal Cases: Young v. Thieblot Ryan, P.A., 11-CV-1562, 2012
WL 6698632, at *1 & n.3 (D. Md. Dec. 21, 2012); Small v. Bud-
Kworldwide, Inc., 895 F. Supp. 2d 438, 442 (E.D.N.Y. 2012); Tac-
cetta v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 10-CV-6194, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 90683, at *1 (D.N.J. June 29, 2012); Cnty. of Inyo v. Dep’t
of the Interior, 06-CV-1502, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135831, at *4
(E.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2010); Strong v. Horton Plaza, LP, 09-CV-2901,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86885, at *2-3 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2010);
Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 07-CV-1958, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 47413, at *2 n.1 (S.D. Tex. June 11, 2008).
Federal Court Rules and Standing Orders: N.D. Cal. Gen. Order
61 Regarding Immigration Mandamus Cases (“[I]f plaintiff filed a
counter-motion, plaintiff may serve and file a reply within 14 days
of service of defendant’s opposition.”); N.D. Cal., B.L.R. 7007-1(e)
(“Any reply to an opposition, or opposition to a counter-motion,
shall be filed and served by the moving party at least 7 days before
the hearing.”); D. Haw. L.R. 7.9 (“The movant on a counter motion
shall file and serve any reply . . . .”); W.D.N.Y. Civ. R. 7(b)(2)(A)
(“If the party opposing the original motion files a cross-motion,
. . . the party filing the cross-motion shall have fourteen days after
service of the responding papers to file and serve reply papers in
support of the cross-motion.”); D. Md. Civ. Rule 105(2)(c) (“After
that motion has been filed, the other party shall file a cross-motion
. . . , the first party shall then file an opposition/reply, and the sec-
ond party may then file a reply.”). 
22. State Case: Rizz Mgt. Inc. v. Kemper Ins. Co., 791 N.Y.S.2d 873, at
*3-5 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004). 
State Court Rules and Standing Orders: N.J. Rules of Court. §
1:6-3(b) (“No reply papers may be served or filed by the cross-
movant without leave of court.”); NY Commercial Division
Westchester County Alternative Dispute Resolution Rules Doc. 2
(“Sur-reply papers, including reply papers in support of a cross-
motion, are not permitted, absent prior permission of the Court.”);
Kentucky Rules of Civ. Proc. Rule 76.21 (“No reply to a cross
response shall be filed unless requested by the court.”). 
Federal Cases: Cross v. Potter, 09-CV-1293, 2013 WL 1149525,
at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2013) (enforcing proscription against fil-
ing replies on cross-motions without prior leave of the court);
accord, Cross v. State Farm Ins. Co., 10-CV-1179, 2013 WL
665002, at *11 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2013); Werking v. Andrews, 11-
CV-0410, 2012 WL 2885424, at *2, n.5 (N.D.N.Y. July 13, 2012);
Planck v. Schenectady Cnty., 12-CV-0336, 2012 WL 1977972, at
*2 (N.D.N.Y. June 1, 2012); Miller v. Elexco Land Servs., Inc., 09-
CV-0038, 2011 WL 4499281, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2011);
Valentine v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 12-CV-0647, 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 83680, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. June 15, 2012); Speth v.
Goode, 95-CV-0264, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101021, at *42 (D.N.J.
July 19, 2013) (stating that “Plaintiff’s reply in support of his
cross-motion . . . was filed without permission of the Court in vio-
lation of L. Civ. R. 7.1(d)(3)”).
Federal Court Rules and Standing Orders: N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R.
16-5 (“Plaintiff may serve and file a reply within 14 days after ser-
vice of defendant’s opposition or counter-motion. Unless the Court
orders otherwise, . . . [this] . . . conclu[des] . . . [the] briefing
schedule . . . .”); D.N.J. Civ. R. 7.1(d)(3) (“No reply papers shall be
filed, unless permitted by the Court, relating to the following
motions: Cross [motions] under L. Civ. R. 7.1(h) . . . .”); N.D.N.Y.
L.R. 7.1(c) (“The cross-moving party may not reply in further sup-
port of its cross-motion without the Court’s prior permission.”); D.
Nev. L.R. 7056(d) (“Unless otherwise ordered, there is no reply to
a countermotion [for summary judgment] under subsection
(e)(1).”); cf. W.D. Wash. L.C.R. 7(k) (“The court may order parties
filing cross motions for summary judgment to combine their mem-
oranda and forego reply briefs in exchange for an enlarged
response brief.”).
23. State Cases: Ex parte Novaris Pharms. Corp., 975 So.2d 297, 300,
n.2 (Ala. 2007) (“[T]he Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure . . . were
patterned after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”); Sears v.
Doty, 92 A.2d 604, 604 (Del. 1952) (noting that “Superior Court
Rule 30(h) is copied from a local rule adopted by certain Federal
District Courts.”); Fletcher v. Limeco Corp., 996 So.2d 773, 779
(Miss. 2008) (“[T]he Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, with
few exceptions, were developed to comport with the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.”); Univ. Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Ferguson, 471
S.W.2d 28, 36, n.5 (Tex. 1971) (dissent) (noting that the trial court
judge’s procedure for dismissing the case was “akin to if not taken
from the ‘automatic’ dismissal procedures which have been fol-
lowed for many years under local rules of federal district courts”). 
Federal Case: Blue v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 562 F. Supp. 2d 33, 41
n.6 (D.D.C. 2008) (“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure [13(a)] is
materially identical to Superior Court Rule 13(a) . . . .”). 
24. State Cases: Ex parte Novaris Pharms. Corp., 975 So.2d 297, 300,
n.2 (Ala. 2007) (“Federal cases construing the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure are persuasive authority in construing the Alabama
Rules of Civil Procedure, which were patterned after the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.”); Fletcher v. Limeco Corp., 996 So.2d
773, 779 (Miss. 2008) (finding “highly persuasive” a federal dis-
trict court’s decisions interpreting Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d) and an
accompanying federal court local rule, given that “the Mississippi
Rules of Civil Procedure, with few exceptions, were developed to
Other times, however, replies on cross-motions are not per-
mitted without prior leave of the court.22
B. USEFULNESS OF FEDERAL RULES IN 
INTERPRETING STATE RULES 
State court procedural rules are occasionally patterned after
federal court procedural rules.23 When the state court proce-
dural rules are patterned after federal court procedural rules,
federal cases construing the federal rules are persuasive
authority in construing the state rules.24
III. COMMON PROBLEMS CAUSED BY MISUNDER-
STANDINGS OF A CROSS-MOTION
Misunderstandings regarding the definition of a cross-
motion often lead to problems during the filing and briefing of
cross-motions, including (1) a violation of the action’s motion-
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comport with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”); Hrehorovich
v. Harbor Hosp. Ctr., Inc., 93 Md. App. 772, 788 n.5 (1992)
(“Maryland courts have frequently stated that when a local rule
and a federal rule are similar, federal court decisions interpreting
the federal rule are especially persuasive authority in interpreting
the local rule.”).
Federal Case: Blue v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 562 F. Supp. 2d 33, 41
n.6 (D.D.C. 2008) (“[F]ederal court decisions interpreting the fed-
eral rule may be considered ‘persuasive authority’ in interpreting
the local rule.”).
25. See Horton, 2010 WL 3338920, at *2 & n.2 (“Defendant Keller’s
‘cross-motion’ for summary judgment . . . is not a cross-motion for
summary judgment but is instead a motion for summary judg-
ment. As a result, Defendant Keller was required to file this dis-
positive motion by February 26, 2010. . . . However, Defendant
Keller filed his motion April 19, 2010, fifty-two (52) days after the
expiration of the disposition-motion filing deadline.”); Serino v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 706 F. Supp. 2d 584, 586-87 (M.D. Pa.
2009) (striking “cross-motion” filed after the expiration of the dis-
positive-motion deadline but within the deadline to file a response
to the original motion for summary judgment); Baker v. AirServ
Corp., 08-CV-0913, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33443, at *1-3 (D. Colo.
Apr. 20, 2009); Kelley v. N. Y. Life Ins. & Annuity Corp., 07-CV-
01702, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104750, at *11 (D. Colo. Dec. 30,
2008); Schroer v. United States, 07-CV-0690, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
64568, at *2 (D. Colo. Aug. 22, 2008).
26. See, e.g., D.N.H. L.R. 7.1(e)(2) (prohibiting filing of reply on
nondispositive motions), accord, D.N.H. L.B.R. 7102(b)(2), D.
Minn. L.R. 7.1(b)(3), N.D.N.Y. L.R. 7.1(b)(2); see also N.D.N.Y.
L.R. 7.1(c) (proscribing filing of reply on cross-motions even when
cross-motions are dispositive in nature), accord, D.N.J. Civ. R.
7.1(d)(3); cf. W.D. Wash. L.C.R. 7(k); S.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1, Advisory
Committee Comments.
27. See, e.g., C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-10; D. Del. L.R. 7.1.2(b); S.D. Fla. L.R.
7.1(c); D. Haw. L.B.R. 9013-1(c)(2); D.N.J. L. Civ. R. 7.1(d)(6);
D.N.H. 7.1(e)(3); D.N.M. LR-Civ 7.4(b); N.D.N.Y. L.R. 7.1(b)(1);
S.D. Ohio L.R. 7.2(a)(2); N.D. W. Va. L.R. Civ. P. 7.02(b)(3); S.D.
W. Va. L.R. Civ. P. 7.1(a)(7); D. Utah L.R. 7(b)(3).
28. See Carlwood Dev. Inc. v. United States, 10-CV-1773, 2011 WL
69374, at *1 (D. Nev. Jan. 10, 2011) (denying petitioner’s motion
to strike government’s improper “cross-motion”–which did not
“address[] any matters even remotely indicative of a motion for
summary judgment” but rather merely responded to the matters
raised by the petitioners in their opening brief—because “rather
than striking any portion of the [‘cross-motion’] itself, the Court
will merely construe [it] as only a response to the [petitioner’s]
opening brief, and not a cross-motion,” and strike the govern-
ment’s unauthorized reply on its improper cross-motion as “noth-
ing more than a disingenuous attempt to get the last word”).
filing deadline, (2) a violation of the court’s proscription
against the filing of replies on cross-motions, (3) a violation of
the court’s proscription against the filing of sur-replies on dis-
positive motions, and (4) a violation of the court’s page limita-
tion on memoranda of law.
A. VIOLATION OF THE MOTION-FILING DEADLINE
Almost always, courts have (through scheduling orders
and/or case-management plans) a deadline on the filing of
motions. A litigant’s misunderstanding of what a cross-motion
is can lead the litigant to violate that motion-filing deadline. 
Example: The deadline for filing dispositive motions
is February 1. On January 31, Plaintiff moves for sum-
mary judgment on Claims 1 and 2 (seeking monetary
relief). On February 18, Defendant files a response to
Plaintiff’s motion, combined with a “cross-motion” to
dismiss Claim 3 (seeking injunctive relief) for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Defendant’s motion on Claim 3 is not a “cross-
motion” but a motion (because it seeks relief different
from that requested by Plaintiff in its original motion).
As a result, while Defendant’s response is timely,
Defendant’s motion to dismiss is untimely.25
B. VIOLATION OF THE RULE AGAINST FILING
REPLIES ON CROSS-MOTIONS
Often courts have (through a local rule of practice, standing
order, and/or case-management plan) a proscription against fil-
ing a reply on a cross-motion without prior leave of the court
when the cross-motion is non-dispositive in nature, and occa-
sionally even when the cross-motion is dispositive in nature.26
A litigant’s misunderstanding of what a cross-motion is can
lead the litigant to violate a court’s proscription against filing
replies on cross-motions.
Example: The court has a local rule proscribing the
filing of replies on cross-motions. Plaintiff files a
motion for summary judgment on Claims 1 and 2.
Defendant files a response and separate “motion” for
summary judgment on Claims 1 and 2. Plaintiff files
a response to Defendant’s “motion” combined with a
reply on its own motion. Defendant then attempts to
file a reply on its own “motion” without prior leave.
Defendant has violated the court’s local rule proscrib-
ing the filing of replies on cross-motions.
C. VIOLATION OF THE RULE AGAINST FILING 
SUR-REPLIES ON DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS
Often courts have (through a local rule of practice, standing
order, and/or case-management plan) a proscription against
the filing of sur-replies on dispositive motions without prior
leave of the court.27 A litigant’s misunderstanding of what a
cross-motion is can lead the litigant to violate a court’s pro-
scription against filing sur-replies on dispositive motions.
Example: Plaintiff files a motion to set aside an
administrative decision. Defendant files a response to
the motion and a “cross-motion” for summary judg-
ment. However, Defendant’s “cross-motion” does not
address any issues related to a motion for summary
judgment but merely responds to the issues raised by
Plaintiff in its original motion. Plaintiff files a reply
on its original motion and an opposition to the
“cross-motion.” Defendant then files a reply on its
“cross-motion.” Plaintiff moves to strike the reply
because the “cross-motion” is improper. Plaintiff’s
motion to strike is granted because Defendant’s
motion practice is an attempt to evade the proscrip-
tion against filing sur-replies on dispositive
motions.28
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29. See, e.g., S.D. Ala. L.R. 7.1(b), (c); D. Ark. L.R. 10.1(m)(2); D.C.
L.Cv.R. 7(e); M.D. Ga. Civ. Rule 7.4; D. Maine Rule 7(e); D. Md.
L.R. 105(2)(c), (3); D. Nev. L.R. 7-4; D.N.J. Civ. R. 7.2(b);
N.D.N.Y. L.R. 7.1(a)(1), (b)(1), (c); D.N.D. Civ. L.R. 7.1(A)(1);
E.D. Okla. L.Cv.R. 7.1(k); N.D. Okla. L.Cv.R. 7(h); W.D.N.Y. Civ.
Rule 7(a)(2)(C); E.D. Tex. L.R. CV. 7(1); W.D. Tex. L.R. CV. 7(f);
D. Utah Civ. R. 7-1(b)(3); D. Vt. L.R. 7(a)(5).
30. See Elexco Land Servs., Inc., 2011 WL 4499281, at *6 (“Such a
bifurcated motion practice is prohibited by [the court’s local rule
on page limitations]. . . . The effect of this motion practice was
three-fold: (1) it enlarged the number of pages of memoranda of
law that Defendant Elexco could submit regarding Plaintiffs’ two
trespass claims . . . ; (2) it gave Defendant Elexco the last word
regarding Plaintiffs’ two trespass claims (by permitting Defendant
Elexco to file a reply with regard to those claims, . . . ) . . . ; and (3)
it confused the Court (and no doubt Plaintiffs) by simultaneously
(a) commingling Defendant Elexco’s arguments regarding Plain-
tiffs’ conversion claim with Defendant Elexco’s arguments regard-
ing Plaintiffs’ two trespass claims, and (b) multiplying Defendant
Elexco’s arguments regarding Plaintiffs’ two trespass claims.”).
31. See IP Innovation LLC v. Vizio, Inc., 08-CV-0393, 2010 WL
2696110, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 1, 2010) (“Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 56 does not provide a party with the opportunity to file a
separate motion for summary judgment for each argument a party
desires to present.”); DeSena v. Beekley Corp., 09-CV-0352, 2010
WL 1049873, at *1 (D. Me. Mar. 17, 2010) (“Although, as the
plaintiffs maintain, they may well have intended in filing six sepa-
rate summary judgment motions to present segregable issues in an
efficient manner rather than to skirt the page limitation of Local
Rule 7(e), their approach violates the spirit, if not the substance, of
that rule.”); BPI Energy, Inc. v. IEC (Montgomery), LLC, 07-CV-
0186, 2009 WL 3518154, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 28, 2009) (“Local
Rule 7.1(d) allows a twenty double-spaced typewritten page limit
for all briefs. Although a literal reading of the local rule does not
specifically prohibit a party from filing more than one summary
judgment motion, the rule also does not lend itself to the interpre-
tation that a party may file one supporting brief per issue raised at
the summary judgment stage of the proceedings.”); Baker v.
AirServ Corp., 08-CV-0913, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33443, at *1-3
(D. Col. Apr. 20, 2009) (striking plaintiff’s cross-motion for sum-
mary judgment, noting that the motion was untimely and
exceeded the imposed page limitations when added to the pages in
plaintiff’s separately filed response to defendants’ motion); Wal-
burn v. City of Naples, Fla., 04-CV-0194, 2005 WL 2322002, at *1,
n.3 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 22, 2005) (“This Court agrees with Plaintiff’s
statement in his response to Defendant’s dual motions for sum-
mary judgment that the unusual bifurcated approach to summary
judgment is confusing, and it manages to sidestep Rule 3.01(c) of
the Local Rules of this District, which would limit a single memo-
randum to a length of twenty pages.”) [internal quotation marks
omitted]; Paper, Allied Indus., Chem. and Energy Workers, 03-CV-
0225, 2004 WL 1484995, at *5, n.9 (D. Me. June 4, 2004) (“I also
observe that by filing two motions instead of one, the Union has
also violated, in spirit if not in substance, the 20-page limitation
imposed by Local Rule 7.”), recommendation rejected in part on
other grounds, 2004 WL 2536811 (D. Me. Nov. 10, 2004).
D. VIOLATION OF PAGE LIMITATIONS ON 
MEMORANDA OF LAW
Often courts have (through a local rule of practice, standing
order, and/or case-management plan) rules setting forth differ-
ing page limitations for motions, responses, and replies, if not
specifically for cross-motions and responses to cross-
motions.29 A litigant’s misunderstanding of what a cross-
motion is can lead the litigant to violate a court’s page limita-
tion on memoranda of law.
Example 1: The court has a local rule setting a limi-
tation of 25 pages on memoranda of law and 10 pages
on reply memoranda of law. The dispositive-motion
filing deadline is February 1. On January 15, Defen-
dant files a motion for summary judgment on all of
Plaintiff’s claims. On January 20, with due notice of
Defendant’s motion, and without filing a response to
Defendant’s motion, Plaintiff files a separate “motion”
for summary judgment on all of its claims. As a
result, not only does Plaintiff have an improper
opportunity to file a reply on its separate “motion,”
its motion practice has caused the memoranda of law
on the parties’ competing requests for relief to num-
ber 120 pages (25 + 25 + 10 + 25 + 25 + 10), rather
than 60 pages (25 + 25 + 10).30
Example 2: The court has a local rule setting a limi-
tation of 25 pages on memoranda of law. Plaintiff files
a motion for summary judgment on Claim 1 under
Theory X. Defendant files a 25-page response to
Plaintiff’s motion on Claim 1 under Theory X. Sepa-
rately, Defendant files a 25-page “motion” for sum-
mary judgment on Claim 1 under Theory Y. Both
requests for relief were similar (i.e., summary judg-
ment on Claim 1). As a result, Defendant’s “motion”
was really a “cross-motion,” and he was entitled to
only 25 pages in total.31
IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THOSE PROBLEMS
Several possible solutions exist to the procedural problems
caused by misunderstandings of the definition of a cross-
motion. Of course, from a court’s perspective, these solutions
include adopting and publishing rules regarding the definition,
timing, and briefing of a “cross-motion.”
In addition, it is useful for a court to know of several things
practitioners can do to solve procedural problems. These solu-
tions include the following: (1) filing a motion before the
opposing party files its motion; (2) requesting leave to depart
from the operative scheduling order or the court’s local rules;
(3) filing a motion to strike the improper cross-motion; and
(4) filing a timely amended complaint (rather than a motion
to amend) in response to a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim.
A. FILING A MOTION BEFORE THE OPPOSING
PARTY FILES ITS MOTION
Of course, one solution to the problems often caused by a
party’s violation of the rules regarding cross-motions is for the
party to file its motion (which would otherwise be a “cross-
motion”) before the opposing party files its motion.
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32. See Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. C & R, 05-CV-1593, 2007 WL
2815038, at *28 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2007) (“At the May 21, 2007
hearing, Defendants’ request to file a supplemental brief on the sole
issue of whether Rule 2010 applied to them was granted. Defen-
dants were notified by minute order on May 21, 2007 that upon fil-
ing the supplemental briefs the matter would be deemed submit-
ted. Defendants were not given leave to file [their untimely] cross
motion for summary judgment at the hearing on May 21, 2007.”);
United States ex rel. IBM v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 112 F. Supp. 2d
1023, 1028-29 (D. Haw. 2000) (declining to consider “cross-
motion” for summary judgment filed “well after the court imposed
deadline[,]” noting that, before the dispositive motion deadline
expired, Defendant could have “request[ed] that the court modify
its Scheduling Order, []or . . . [sought] relief from the Scheduling
Order”).
33. See Spooner v. Jackson, 251 F. App’x 919, 924 (5th Cir. Oct. 24,
2007) (finding that defendant “had demonstrated good cause for
filing his motion for summary judgment after the deadline for fil-
ing dispositive motions based on evidence that [defendant]’s coun-
sel did not receive electronic notice of the scheduling order
because of a computer virus”); Wynn v. Cate, 10-CV-0546, 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6228, at *1-2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2012) (“Th[e]
[scheduling order] deadline may only be modified upon a showing
of good cause, which exists when the moving party demonstrates
he cannot meet the deadline. . . . Plaintiff’s comparison of his
resources with those of defense counsel does not speak to plaintiff’s
diligence in preparing his own dispositive motion prior to the
court-imposed deadline. Because plaintiff fails to demonstrate
good cause for further extending the deadline for filing dispositive
motions in this case, his request to modify the scheduling order is
denied, and his cross-motion for summary judgment must there-
fore be denied as untimely.”).
34. See Fisherman’s Harvest, Inc. v. United States, 74 Fed. Cl. 681, 690
(Fed. Cl. 2006) (“Plaintiffs’ motion to strike does not comport
with RCFC 12(f) [which is identical to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f)]
because Weeks Marine’s Motion for Leave to Join as Parties and to
Join Claims Against Bertucci and Luhr does not constitute a ‘plead-
ing’ under the rule.”); Sharpe v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 19 F. Supp.
2d 483, 487 (E.D.N.C. 1998) (finding motion to strike cross-
motion for summary judgment as improper and therefore constru-
ing the motion to strike as a response to the motion); but see Ass’n
of Irritated Residents v. C & R, 05-CV-1593, 2007 WL 2815038, at
*27 (E.D. Cal Sept. 25, 2007) (recognizing that plaintiff’s motion
to strike defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment was not
technically proper under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12[f] but liberally constru-
ing that motion to strike “as an invitation by the movant to con-
sider whether [material proffered in support of the cross-motion]
may properly be relied upon.”) [internal quotation marks omit-
ted].
35. See Spooner, 251 F. App’x at 924 (“Spooner asserts that the district
court erred by striking his cross-motion for summary judgment.
He contends that it was unfair for the court to strike his cross-
motion on the ground that it was untimely after the court allowed
Jackson to file his motion for summary judgment after the deadline
for filing dispositive motions established in the scheduling order.
Spooner’s contentions are without merit. The court found that
Jackson had demonstrated good cause for filing his motion for
summary judgment after the deadline for filing dispositive motions
based on evidence that Jackson’s counsel did not receive electronic
notice of the scheduling order because of a computer virus.
Spooner did not offer any excuse for the untimely filing his cross-
motion for summary judgment.”); Wells Fargo Bank, 09-CV-0678,
2011 WL 3702666, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 19, 2011) (“Wells Fargo
moves to strike Falk’s Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judg-
ment. The deadline for filing dispositive motions was December
10, 2010. . . . On January 10, 2011, Falk submitted his Cross-
Motion as part of his Response to Defendants Motion for Summary
Judgment. Falk’s only explanation for failing to file his motion by,
or request an extension of, the dispositive motions deadline is that
it was the result of ‘inadvertence or because he had not previously
thought of filing a Cross-Motion.’ . . . Finding no good cause to
extend the dispositive motions deadline, the Court STRIKES Falk’s
untimely pleading pursuant to Federal Rule 16(f)(1)(c).”);
Wuliger v. Reassure Am. Life Ins. Co., 03-CV-7699, 2011 WL
767872, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 28, 2011) (explaining, in ruling on
motion to strike untimely cross-motion, that “[t]he Court has
broad discretion in imposing sanctions for violations of its sched-
uling orders”); Lo v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 03-CV-5055,
2005 WL 1388680, at *1, n.1 (E.D. Cal. June 10, 2005) (“The
United States moves the court to strike plaintiff’s cross-motion or
requests that plaintiff’s cross-motion otherwise be dismissed. Rule
16(f), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, allows the court to impose
such sanctions . . . .”); Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 96-CV-
0824, 1998 WL 35235446, at *1 (E.D.N.C. June 23, 1998) (grant-
ing motion “to strike plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judg-
ment as untimely . . . under Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f).”). 
36. Cf. Paliotta v. Nev., 11-CV-0121, 2012 WL 553131, at *2-3 (D. Nev.
Jan. 5, 2012) (granting in part and denying in part defendants’
motion to strike plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment,
striking his sur-reply, filed as part of his reply on his cross-motion
B. REQUESTING LEAVE TO DEPART FROM A
SCHEDULING ORDER OR LOCAL RULES
A second solution is for a party to request leave to depart
from any (1) scheduling order establishing a motion-filing
deadline or (2) local rules of practice proscribing the filing of
(a) replies on non-dispositive motions and cross-motions, (b)
sur-replies on any motions, and (c) memoranda of law exceed-
ing the applicable page limitation.32
In support of such a request, it is helpful for the party to
advise the court of the following, if applicable: (i) the good-
faith need for such a departure; (ii) the lack of undue delay in
making the request; (iii) the lack of prejudice to (and prefer-
ably the lack of opposition by) the opposing party; and (iv) the
fact that it is the first such request.33
C. FILING A MOTION TO STRIKE AN IMPROPER
CROSS-MOTION
A third solution is for a party to move to strike the improper
cross-motion or deny the cross-motion on procedural grounds.  
It is important to note that, in federal court, a motion to
strike a cross-motion is not properly made pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(f) because that rule regards the striking of “plead-
ings,” and a cross-motion is not a “pleading” under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 7(a).34 Rather, a motion to strike a cross-motion may be
properly made pursuant to the Court’s authority to impose
sanctions against a party for failing to obey a scheduling or
other pretrial order under Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f)(1)(C).35 In addi-
tion, a motion to strike a cross-motion may be properly made
pursuant to the court’s inherent authority to enforce its local
rules of practice.36
Court Review - Volume 50 147
for summary judgment, because it was in violation of the court’s
local rules of practice, and warning him that his “failure to abide
by the Local Rules, including page limitations, in the future, will
result in an order striking noncompliant documents”); World Pub-
l’g Co. v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 09-CV-0574, 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 32594, at *25 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 28, 2011) (considering
defendants’ motion to strike plaintiff’s opposition based on the
argument that, “to the extent it purports to be a cross-motion for
summary judgment[,] it violates Northern District of Oklahoma
Local Civil Rule 7.2(e)[,]” which prohibits a response to a motion
to include a cross-motion, and ultimately converting the response
into a cross-motion).     
37. See Bell v. Bowman, Heintz, Boscia & Vician, P.C., 370 F. Supp. 2d
805, 806, n.1 (S.D. Ind. 2005) (denying motion to strike cross-
motion because no prejudice was shown); cf. Carlwood Dev. Inc. v.
United States, 10-CV-1773, 2011 WL 69374, at *1 (D. Nev. Jan. 10,
2011) (striking the government’s unauthorized reply on its
improper cross-motion as “nothing more than a disingenuous
attempt to get the last word”); Byce v. Pruco Life Ins. Co., 09-CV-
1912, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6816, at *3-6 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 21, 2011)
(considering plaintiff’s “excusable neglect” and prejudice to defen-
dant in deciding whether to grant defendant’s motion to strike
plaintiff’s untimely filed cross-motion for summary judgment);
Daly v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 00-CV-0040, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16183, at *4 (D. Ariz. July 16, 2002) (considering prejudice to
defendant, finding none, and accordingly denying defendant’s
motion to strike plaintiff’s untimely filed cross-motion for sum-
mary judgment).
38. See Fisherman’s Harvest, Inc. v. United States, 74 Fed. Cl. 681, 690
(Fed. Cl. 2006) (“Instead, courts may regard a motion to strike a
motion simply as a response to that motion.”); Falk v. Wells Fargo
Bank, 09-CV-0678, 2011 WL 3702666, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 19,
2011) (“[T]he Court finds that despite being styled as a cross-
motion, Falk’s arguments are more appropriately addressed as a
response to Wells Fargo’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Accord-
ingly, the Court will address the arguments made in Falk’s Cross-
Motion along with the arguments made in Falk’s Response.”);
Sharpe v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 19 F. Supp. 2d 483, 487 (E.D.N.C.
1998) (“Because MCI has not filed a proper motion to strike under
Rule 12(f), the Court must interpret MCI’s motion as a response to
Sharpe’s motion which challenges the motion on procedural
grounds.”).
39. See, e.g., Williams v. BASF Catalysts LLC, 11-CV-1754, 2012 WL
6204182, at *5 (D.N.J. Dec. 12, 2012); Patrick v. Teays Valley Tr.,
LLC, 12-CV-0039, 2012 WL 5993163, at *1 (N.D. W.Va. Nov. 30,
2012); Leal v. McHugh, 11-CV-0249, 2011 WL 6372820, at *1
(S.D. Tex. Dec. 20, 2011); J.S. ex rel. Simpson v. Thorsen, 766 F.
Supp. 2d 695, 700 (E.D. Va. 2011).
40. Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in perti-
nent part, that “[a] party may amend its pleading once as a matter
of course within . . . 21 days after service of a responsive pleading
or 21 days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f),
whichever is earlier.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
41. See infra note 40.
The legal standard governing a motion to strike a cross-
motion varies somewhat by jurisdiction; however, generally,
that standard involves a determination of such issues as (1)
prejudice to the party opposing the cross-motion, (2) bad faith
by the cross-movant through merely attempting to get in the
last word through a reply, and/or (3) undue delay by the cross-
movant through waiting until the expiration of the motion-fil-
ing deadline to file its cross-motion.37 If the court denies the
motion to strike a cross-motion, the court generally possesses
the discretion to construe the motion to strike the cross-
motion as an opposition to the cross-motion based on proce-
dural grounds.38
D. FILING A TIMELY AMENDED COMPLAINT
(RATHER THAN A CROSS-MOTION FOR LEAVE
TO AMEND) IN RESPONSE TO A MOTION TO
DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM
A fourth solution, in federal court, is to avoid the need for
a cross-motion altogether in cases in which a motion to dis-
miss for failure to state a claim has been filed pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). This can be done by filing a timely amended
complaint as a matter of right, rather than filing a cross-motion
for leave to file an amended complaint.39 Such an amended
complaint is “timely” if it is filed within 21 days of service of
such a motion.40 Note, however, that if the motion challenging
the pleading sufficiency of the complaint is one for “judgment
on the pleadings” pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), filed after
the filing of an answer, then the amended complaint may be
filed as a matter of right only within 21 days of the service of
the answer.41
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Footnotes
1. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Remarks of the Hon. Shirley S. Abrahamson
Before the American Bar Association Commission on Separation of
Powers and Judicial Independence, 12 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT.
69, 80-81 (1996) (quoting Benjamin Cardozo, A Ministry of Jus-
tice, 35 HARV. L. REV. 113, 125 (1921)).
2. See Julian Darwall & Martin Guggenheim, Funding the Peoples’
Right, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 619, 652-53 (2012) (listing
the methods by which the judiciary communicates with the other
branches).
3. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 3.2(A)(B)(C) (2007).
4. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4B (1972).
5. Id.
6. E. WAYNE THODE, REPORTER’S NOTES TO THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CON-
DUCT 75 (1973).
7. Id. at 75-76.
8. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4C(1) (1990); see LISA
L. MILORD, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA JUDICIAL CODE 33
(1992). A few states still retain the 1972 Code provision that
restricts consultations to matters pertaining to the administration
of justice. See, e.g., ILL. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4B
(2013).
9. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4C(1) (1990).
10. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 3.2 cmt. 1 (2007).
11. Id. R. 3.2 (A).
Judges, legislators, and executives have one thing incommon: they like to talk. Unfortunately, they do nottalk enough to each other. As a result, the branches of
government “move on in proud and silent isolation,” ignor-
ing the nation’s need for interbranch understanding and
cooperation.1
The lack of effective interbranch communication does not
mean that avenues of communication do not exist. The judi-
ciary interacts with the political branches in many ways,
including through judicial-impact statements, state-of-the-
judiciary messages, judicial opinions, service on legislative and
executive commissions, and testifying before—and consulting
with—governmental committees and officials.2
Of course, every aspect of a judge’s conduct, including con-
tacts with members of the other branches, is governed by a
code of judicial conduct based on the 1972, 1990, or 2007 ABA
Model Code of Judicial Conduct (hereinafter “1972 Code,”
“1990 Code,” and “2007 Code”). Each of these codes restricts
a judge’s ability to communicate voluntarily with executive
and legislative officials. 
Rule 3.2 of the 2007 Code provides that unless one of three
exceptions applies, a judge shall not voluntarily appear at a
public hearing or otherwise consult with an executive or leg-
islative body or official. The exceptions permit judges to testify
and consult in connection with (1) matters concerning the law,
the legal system, or the administration of justice; (2) matters
about which the judge acquired knowledge or expertise while
performing judicial duties; and (3) the legal and economic
interests of the judge or someone represented by the judge in
a fiduciary capacity.3
This article examines the meaning and likely application
of Rule 3.2. We begin with a brief overview of the Canons of
the 1972 and 1990 Codes that served as the precursors of
Rule 3.2.
THE ROAD TO RULE 3.2
Because of a judge’s unique experience in law-related mat-
ters, the 1972 Code authorized judges to testify publically
before a legislative or executive body “on matters concerning
the law, the legal system, and the administration of justice.”4
Canon 4B of the 1972 Code further authorized private consul-
tations with a legislative or executive body or official “but only
on matters concerning the administration of justice.”5 The
authors of the 1972 Code believed that since judges have a
direct interest in judicial-administration issues like personnel,
budget, and facilities, they should be permitted to discuss those
matters in venues other than public hearings.6 But private con-
sultations on matters concerning the law or the legal system
that did not involve the administration of justice were forbid-
den on the theory that a judge’s views on issues not directly
related to the operation of the courts should be available to lit-
igants and lawyers as well as legislators and executives.7
The 1990 Code abandoned this distinction and authorized a
judge to both testify and privately consult “on matters con-
cerning the law, the legal system or the administration of jus-
tice.”8 Canon 4C(1) of the 1990 Code also permitted a judge to
testify before, or consult with, government officials about mat-
ters “involving the judge or the judge’s interests.”9 This “pro se”
exception certainly made sense.  It is hardly reasonable to
expect a judge to stand idly by while a governmental entity
plans to put an expressway through the judge’s backyard. 
The 2007 Code continues to recognize that a judge’s unique
professional experience should be shared with the other
branches of government.10 Accordingly, Rule 3.2(A) reiterates
the long-standing proposition that a judge may testify or con-
sult regarding matters concerning the law, the legal system, or
the administration of justice.11 The 2007 Code, however, nar-
rows the type of personal interest justifying a judge’s commu-
nication with government officials. Canon 4C(1) of the 1990
Interbranch Communication 
and Rule 3.2 of the 2007 ABA
Model Code of Judicial Conduct
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12. Id. R. 3.2(C) (emphasis added).
13. Id. The 2007 Code strictly limits the circumstances under which a
judge may serve as a fiduciary. See id. R. 3.8.
14. Id. R. 3.2(B).
15. CHARLES E. GEYH & W. WILLIAM HODES, REPORTERS’ NOTES TO THE
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 59 (2009).
16. See id.
17. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.5 cmt. 3 (2007).
18. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 3.2 (2007). Rule 3.2 falls
under Canon 3, which is titled, “A Judge Shall Conduct the
Judge’s Personal and Extrajudicial Activities to Minimize the Risk
of Conflict with the Obligations of Judicial Office.”
19. See id. R. 3.1(A) (prohibiting participation in extrajudicial “activ-
ities that will interfere with the proper performance of the judge’s
judicial duties”).
20. See, e.g., In re DiBasi, Determination (N.Y. State Comm’n on Judi-
cial Conduct Nov. 19, 2001) (disciplining a judge for attending a
college class each weekday from 9:15 a.m. until 1:00 p.m.).
21. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 3.2 cmt. 2 (2007)
(reminding judges to avoid using the prestige of office while tes-
tifying or consulting).
22. Raymond J. McKoski, Charitable Fund-Raising by Judges: The Give
and Take of the 2007 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, 2008
MICH. ST. L. REV. 769, 779-81.
23. See, e.g., JAMES P. GRAY, WHY OUR DRUG LAWS HAVE FAILED: A JUDI-
CIAL INDICTMENT OF WAR ON DRUGS 117 (2001) (quoting Senator
Robert Dole’s call for the impeachment of a federal district court
judge who granted a motion to suppress evidence in a drug pros-
ecution).
24. Id. 
25. Charles Stile, Christie Used Smear to Put Heat on Judges, HERALD
NEWS (West Patterson, N.J.), Oct. 20, 2011, at C1.
26. See Ginger Gibson, If Court Orders School Aid, Christie May Not
Comply, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Apr. 22, 2011, at 1.
27. See Brad Cooper, Kansas House Leader Turns Down Chief Justice’s
Request to Address Legislature, KANSAS CITY STAR, Dec. 31, 2012,
available at 2012 WLNR 28186943.
Code had broadly authorized testimony or consultation when-
ever “the judge’s interests” were involved. To avoid the possi-
bility that the judge’s interests could be construed to include
social and political matters, Rule 3.2(C) narrows the pro se
exemption to matters affecting “the judge’s legal or economic
interests.”12 Rule 3.2 expands the pro se exception in one
regard by permitting a judge to testify and consult, not only
regarding his own legal and economic interests, but also the
legal and economic interests of a person or entity the judge
represents in a fiduciary capacity.13
Most significantly, the 2007 Code adds a new exception to
the general rule barring judges from voluntarily providing
information to members of another governmental branch. Rule
3.2(B) permits testimonial and private contacts with executive
and legislative officials regarding matters “about which the
judge acquired knowledge or expertise in the course of the
judge’s judicial duties.”14 This exception represents a “signifi-
cant loosening” of the restrictions contained in the 1972 and
1990 Codes.15 Under Rule 3.2(B), the matter about which the
judge acquired knowledge need not have anything to do with
the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice and
may relate to social problems and public-policy issues.16
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR LIMITING COMMUNICATIONS
WITH EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE OFFICIALS
It could be convincingly argued that communicating with
legislators and executives on matters directly affecting the via-
bility of the judicial system, like facilities, staffing, and fund-
ing, is an essential part of the judicial function. Indeed, judges
have an ethical obligation to seek sufficient “court staff . . . and
resources to discharge all adjudicative and administrative
responsibilities.”17 But the 2007 Code classifies all interbranch
communications, regardless of the subject matter, as nonjudi-
cial, “extrajudicial” activities.18 As a result, the restrictions
imposed by Rule 3.2 on testimony before, and consultations
with, legislative and executive officials must be examined
against the justifications for limiting the extrajudicial activities
of judges. Four state interests support restricting a judge’s
extrajudicial activities. 
INTERFERENCE WITH 
JUDICIAL DUTIES
First, personal and extrajudi-
cial endeavors may cause undue
absences from court or otherwise
interfere with the performance of
judicial duties.19 This concern
most often arises in connection
with a judge’s civic, charitable,
and educational activities that
require substantial time away
from court.20 It is less relevant to
the interests served by Rule 3.2
because a judge’s contacts with governmental bodies and offi-
cials usually do not occur with sufficient frequency to com-
promise effective and timely case management.
ABUSING THE PRESTIGE OF JUDICIAL OFFICE
Second, a judge may misuse the prestige of office while
engaging in nonjudicial activities.21 For example, when con-
fronted by a judge soliciting money for a charity, a potential
donor might feel coerced by judicial power and prestige into
responding favorably.22 But the likelihood of judicial prestige
having a bullying effect diminishes greatly when a judge is
speaking with members of a coequal branch of government
rather than with members of the lay public. Indeed, legislators
and executives show little hesitance in ignoring, rebuking, and
criticizing judges. Whether it is calling for a judge’s impeach-
ment,23 claiming that judges “bend the laws to let drug dealers
go free,”24 calling out a judge for crafting a decision to “put
more money in her pocket and the pocket of her cronies,”25
threatening to defy court orders,26 or refusing to let a judge
speak,27 there is little chance of judicial status intimidating
political-branch officials into blindly acceding to a judge’s
request.
PROTECTING THE APPEARANCE OF IMPARTIALITY
A third and especially important basis for limiting a judge’s
personal and extrajudicial activities is to protect the appearance
[T]he restrictions
. . . must be
examined
against the 
justifications for
limiting the
extrajudicial
activities of
judges.
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28. See Fla. Comm. on Standards of Conduct Governing Judges, Op.
95-21 (1995) (disallowing membership in a plaintiffs’ bar associ-
ation).
29. Cf. Rising Violent Crime in the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110 Cong. 37-39
(2007) (statement of Judge David L. Bell) (outlining the age and
race of juveniles appearing before the court, treatment alterna-
tives, success rates of treatment modalities, and caseloads). 
30. Cf. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmt. 13 (2007).
31. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 385 (1989).
32. Id. at 372 (“We also have recognized, however, that the separa-
tion-of-powers principle, and the nondelegation doctrine in par-
ticular, do not prevent Congress from obtaining the assistance of
its coordinate Branches.”).
33. Russell R. Wheeler & Robert A. Katzmann, Project Seeks to
Improve Communications Between Courts and Legislatures, 75 JUDI-
CATURE 45, 45 (1991).
34. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 3.2 (2007); see THODE supra
note 6, at 59.
35. GEYH & HODES, supra note 15, at 59.
36. Cf. California Wilderness Coalition v. U.S. Dept. of Energy, 631
F.3d 1072, 1087 (9th Cir. 2011) (“An ordinary meaning of the
word consult is to ‘seek information or advice from (someone
with expertise in a particular area)’ or to ‘have discussions or con-
fer with (someone), typically before undertaking a course of
action.’”) (quoting The New Oxford Dictionary 369 (2001)).
of judicial impartiality. Thus, judi-
cial codes prohibit membership in
a prosecutors-only bar association
because it might reasonably call
into question the judge’s impar-
tiality in criminal cases.28 Simi-
larly, testifying at a public hearing
might adversely reflect on a
judge’s neutrality, depending to
some extent on the subject matter
of the presentation but even more
so on the tenor of the presentation. To illustrate the point,
assume that two judges testify before a state legislature in sup-
port of a bill to legalize marijuana. 
The first judge presents her remarks in an aggressive, parti-
san manner blaming Republicans for drug laws designed to
disproportionately impact certain racial and ethnic groups,
resulting in “prisoner-of-war” type incarceration. The judge
promises to “take the next step” if the legislators fail to per-
form their “God given duty.” She also promises to acquit any-
one of a marijuana offense unless the defendant is “proven
guilty beyond any shadow of a shadow of a doubt.”
Also testifying in support of the bill, the second judge
relates her courtroom observations of the racial and ethnic
makeup of persons charged with marijuana offenses, the treat-
ment alternatives available to the court, the advantages of
treatment over incarceration, reoffender rates in her county,
the internal conflicts judges face in imposing mandatory sen-
tences, and how court resources could be devoted to more seri-
ous problems if marijuana were legalized.29 The judge con-
cludes by acknowledging the separate roles of legislators and
judges and reaffirms her commitment to uphold the law, with-
out regard to her personal views.30
Both judges have testified on a controversial issue. The dif-
ference is one of approach. The first judge’s personalization of
the issue and combative tenor casts doubt on her impartiality.
Therefore, her testimony constitutes an impermissible extraju-
dicial activity. The second judge, by maintaining the dignity
and objectivity of the judicial office, basing her testimony on
courtroom observations, and affirming her commitment to fol-
low the law, allows her to advance the same position as the first
judge without casting doubt on her impartiality. Thus, the sec-
ond judge’s testimony is a permitted extrajudicial activity.
SEPARATION OF POWERS
Fourth, regulating the nonjudicial activities of judges helps
maintain the institutional independence of the judiciary.
Ensuring judicial independence means “precluding debilitat-
ing entanglements between the Judiciary and the two political
Branches, and prevent[ing] the Judiciary from encroaching
into areas reserved for the other Branches . . . .”31 But while
encroaching on the legislative or executive domain is prohib-
ited, providing assistance to co-branches is not. The separa-
tion-of-powers doctrine does not preclude the judiciary from
providing information, advice, and other nonintrusive forms of
assistance to governmental bodies and officials.32 It is simply
impossible for the legislative and judicial branches not to be
intertwined to some extent since legislatures control court
appropriations, determine court jurisdiction, set judicial
salaries and benefits, and enact statutes governing every aspect
of substantive and procedural law.33
In the final analysis, the separation-of-powers question
becomes: at what point does permissible assistance from the
judiciary turn into a prohibited entanglement? Rule 3.2 pro-
vides a bright-line test. As long as the judge’s communication
falls within one of the categories established by subsection
(A), (B), or (C) of Rule 3.2, no interference with legislative or
executive independence will result. This presumption recog-
nizes the importance of interbranch communication and
acknowledges that supplying information and recommenda-
tions is a far cry from usurping the legislative or executive
function. 
With this background in mind, we can turn to the meaning
and application of Rule 3.2 
RULE 3.2: THE GENERAL PROHIBITION 
Unless one of three exceptions applies, “[a] judge shall not
appear voluntarily at a public hearing before, or otherwise
consult with, an executive or legislative body or official . . . .”34
Rule 3.2 does not attempt to interfere with a judge’s duty to
appear and testify when officially summoned to do so.35 The
Rule restricts consulting with government officials, but not
every discussion is a consultation. The term “consultation”
implies a fact-gathering purpose related to a pending or
impending matter before the executive or legislative
branch.36 Informal conversations between, for example, a
judge and a state legislator at a Fourth of July picnic con-
cerning issues of the day should not be considered a “con-
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37. Courts and judicial ethics advisory committees have not applied
Rule 3.2 or its predecessor provisions in the 1972 and 1990 Codes
to informal gatherings that include judges and legislative officials.
See ANNOTATED MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 347-52 (2011)
(reviewing cases and judicial ethics advisory opinions construing
restrictions on a judge’s ability to testify or consult with govern-
mental officials). 
38. See ABA TASK FORCE ON PRESERVATION OF THE JUSTICE SYSTEM, CRI-
SIS IN THE COURTS: DEFINING THE PROBLEM 15 (2011) (highlighting
an Oregon program in which state legislators spend a day observ-
ing court).
39. See Joint Legislative Hearing on the 2012-2013 Judiciary Budget 1
(N.Y. 2012) (remarks of Chief Administrative Judge A. Gail Pru-
denti) (“Over the last two months I’ve tried to contact as many
legislators as possible . . . to better understand their views of the
judiciary, its mission, and its challenges. I very much look forward
to continuing that conversation here today—to working closely
with you and getting to know each of you and learning your par-
ticular concerns.”).
40. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 3.2 (2007).
41. See U.S. Judicial Conference Comm. on Codes of Conduct, Op. 93
(2009) (interpreting the phrase “matters concerning the law” nar-
rowly).
42. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Terminology (2007).
43. William Tetley, Mixed Jurisdictions: Common Law v. Civil Law (Cod-
ified and Uncodified), 60 LA. L. REV. 677, 681-82 (2000).
44. McKoski, supra note 22, at 797.
45. THODE, supra note 6, at 77.
46. See, e.g., Funding Crisis Strikes Throughout Federal Courts, Judge
Tells Senate Panel, THE THIRD BRANCH NEWS (July 23, 2013), avail-
able at http://news.uscourts.gov/funding-crisis-strikes-through-
out-federal-courts-judge-tells-senate-panel.  
47. Is Congress Listening?, THE THIRD BRANCH (Aug. 2004), available at
http:/ /www.uscourts.gov/News/TheThirdBranch/10-10-
28/Is_Congress_Listening.aspx.
48. Id.
49. Letter from Loretta A. Preska to Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Aug. 13,
2013, available at http://www.ndtexblog.com/wp-content/uploads/
2013/08/chief-judges-letter-to-joseph-biden.pdf.
50. See Keith M. Phaneuf, State Judges Press for Their First Pay
Increase in Six Years, RECORD-JOURNAL (Meriden, Conn.), Nov. 22,
2012, at 5.
51. See, e.g., Guy Clifton, Bill Adds Security in Courts, RENO GAZETTE-
JOURNAL, Feb. 14, 2009, at A1 (reporting that Washoe District
Court Judge Chuck Weller testified in support of a bill to increase
protection for judges, courthouse personnel, and visitors).
52. See, e.g., Responding to the Growing Need for Federal Judgeships: The
Federal Judiciary Act of 2009: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Administrative Oversight and the Courts of the S. Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 111th Cong. 10-11 (2009) (testimony of federal district
court judge Lawrence J. O’Neill).
53. See, e.g., Anjeanette Damon, Raggio Continues to Push Bill for
Appointed Judges, RENO GAZETTE-JOURNAL, Feb. 24, 2009, at A3
(summarizing the testimony of the Nevada Supreme Court Chief
Justice before a state senate committee on the issue of merit selec-
tion).
sultation” under Rule 3.2.37 Neither should the Rule be
implicated when legislators spend a day with judges to
observe court procedures38 or when a chief administrative
judge contacts legislative officials to develop a working rela-
tionship with the legislature.39
EXCEPTION ONE: TESTIFYING OR CONSULTING
ABOUT MATTERS CONCERNING THE LAW, THE LEGAL
SYSTEM, OR THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
Judges may testify and consult about matters “concerning
the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice.”40
Although some disagreement exists as to the scope of this
phrase,41 on its face the exception covers a lot of ground. As
defined in the 2007 Code, the term “law” includes “court
rules as well as statutes, constitutional provisions, and deci-
sional law.”42 “Legal system” and “administration of justice,”
undefined in the 2007 Code, are comprehensive terms. A legal
system “refers to the nature and content of the law generally,
and the structures and methods whereby it is legislated upon,
adjudicated upon and administered.”43 Equally broad, the
administration of justice “establishes and maintains, and
improves the methods and procedures by which the rights,
duties, and obligations established by the legal system are lit-
igated and adjudicated.”44 Professor E. Wayne Thode recog-
nized the breadth and flexibility of the phrase “the law, the
legal system and the administration of justice” when it was
first introduced in the 1972 Code by noting that it included “a
broad range of organizations and projects . . . corresponding
to the range of concerns that present themselves in the law
under modern conditions.”45
Judges frequently appear
before legislators on an issue at
the heart of the legal system
and the administration of jus-
tice—funding for the courts.
Judges testify before legislative
bodies annually to maintain or
increase a court’s appropria-
tion.46 In addition to providing
testimony, judges consult with
legislators about budgetary
matters. In 2004, the chief
judges of the Eastern, Central,
Northern, and Southern Districts of the California federal dis-
trict court presented a joint letter to California Senators Dianne
Feinstein and Barbara Boxer and each member of the state’s
congressional delegation urging adequate appropriations to
dodge a “perilous situation.”47 In the same year, Alaska federal
district court judges sent a letter to the chair of the Senate
Appropriations Committee warning that “the courts stand on
the brink of a fiscal abyss” and that if funding did not increase,
“it will plunge the courts over the precipice.”48 In 2013, the
chief judges of 87 federal district courts wrote to the ranking
members of Congress expressing concern that “flat funding”
and “sequester cuts” “have created an unprecedented financial
crisis that is adversely affecting all facets of court operations.”49
In the name of the administration of justice and the legal sys-
tem, judges freely lobby legislators and executives concerning
salaries and benefits,50 courthouse facilities and safety,51 addi-
tional judgeships,52 methods of judicial selection,53 judicial
Judges may 
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Court Review - Volume 50 153
54. See, e.g., An Examination of the Judicial Conduct and Disability Sys-
tem: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property,
and the Internet of the H.  Comm. on the Judiciary, 113 Cong. 6-8
(2013), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/_files/hear-
ings/113th/04252013_3/Scirica%2004252013.pdf (testimony of
Judge Anthony J. Scirca, United States Court of Appeals, Third
Circuit).
55. See, e.g., Closing the Justice Gap: Providing Civil Legal Assistance to
Low Income Americans: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 110th Cong. 15-17 (2008) (testimony of Texas state trial
judge Lora Livingston).
56. Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the
Meaning of Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 955 (2000) (“Mem-
bers of the [administrative office] staff and federal judges now reg-
ularly appear before Congress to testify on pending legislation.”).
57. Hannah Hoffman, Judge Testifies in Favor of Re-Entry Courts, ORE-
GON STATESMAN JOURNAL, Mar. 20, 2013 (on file with author).
58. Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Venue Reform Act of 2011 (H.R. 2533): Hear-
ing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Commercial and Administrative
Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 30-52 (2011)
(testimony of Frank J. Bailey, Chief Judge of the United States
Bankruptcy Court, District of Massachusetts).
59. See H.R. REP. No. 102-836, at 2 (1992).
60. See, e.g., Uncertain Justice: The Status of Federal Sentencing and the
U.S. Sentencing Comm’n Six Years after U.S. v. Booker: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong., 10-100 (2011) (testi-
mony of Judge Patti B. Saris, Chair, United States Sentencing
Commission); see also Gwen Filosa, Judges Criticize Sentencing
Laws: They Tell Lawmakers Rules Clog Prisons, NEW ORLEANS
TIMES-PICAYUNE, Nov. 21, 2002, at 1 (reporting that seven state
court judges testified before members of the Louisiana legislature
concerning court backlogs, mandatory sentencing, and drug
courts).
61. See, e.g., Ending School-to-Prison Pipeline: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Human Rights  of the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong., 71-79 (2012) [hereinafter
School-to-Prison] (testimony of Judge Steven C. Teske).
62. See, e.g., Strengthening Privacy Rights and National Security: Over-
sight of FISA Surveillance Programs: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2013), available at 2013 WLNR
18825425 (testimony of James G. Carr, Senior United States Dis-
trict Judge, Northern District, Ohio).
63. See, e.g., Drug and Veterans Treatment Courts: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Crime and Terrorism of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
112th Cong., 16-18 (2011) (testimony of Judge Jeanne E.
LaFazia).
64. See Aileen B. Flores, El Paso County Judge Veronica Escobar Testi-
fies in DC, Urges Reform, EL PASO TIMES, Mar. 21, 2013, available at
http://www.elpasotimes.com/newupdated/ci_22832013/el-paso-
county-judge-veronica-escobar-testifies-washington?IADID=
Search-www.elpasotimes.com-www.elpasotimes.com (reporting
the testimony of Judge Escobar regarding immigration reform).
65. See, e.g., Leading the Fight: The Violence Against Women Office:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Drugs of the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 33-39 (2002) (testimony of Judge
Vincent J. Poppiti).
66. See, e.g., Televising the Supreme Court: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Administrative Oversight of the Courts of the  S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 112th Cong. 84-91 (2011) (testimony of Judge Anthony
J. Scirica). 
67. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 3.2(B) (2007); see GEYH &
HODES, supra note 15, at 59.
68. See GEYH & HODES, supra note 15, at 59.
conduct and disability,54 and
access to justice.55
Judges also regularly testify
and consult on matters of law and
legislation.56 In 2013, a federal
judge testified in support of a bill
before the Oregon legislature
authorizing county courts to
supervise inmates released from
the department of corrections.57
Bankruptcy judge Frank J. Bailey
testified before a subcommittee of
the House Judiciary Committee in
favor of the Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2011.58
Federal court of appeals judges James L. Oakes and Roger J.
Minor, together with federal district court judge Pierre N.
Leval, testified before Congress regarding a proposed amend-
ment to the fair-use provisions of the Copyright Act.59 Bills
concerning sentencing,60 juvenile delinquency,61 foreign intel-
ligence,62 specialty courts,63 immigration,64 violence against
women,65 and televising court proceedings66 have drawn judi-
cial comment.
EXCEPTION TWO: TESTIMONY AND CONSULTATIONS
BASED ON KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED IN THE PERFOR-
MANCE OF JUDICIAL DUTIES
Court proceedings encompass a wide variety of subjects,
including medicine, gangs, addiction, fetal development, child
rearing, marriage, discrimination, natural resources, pollution,
religion, labor, taxation, elections, and virtually every other
area of human concern. In the course of their duties, judges
frequently gain knowledge in non-law-related subjects that
would be useful to legislators and executives in fashioning
solutions to societal problems. Acknowledging this fact, Rule
3.2(B) of the 2007 Code boldly broadens the scope of infor-
mation that a judge may voluntarily impart to the legislative
and executive branches by authorizing judges to testify and
consult concerning any matter “about which the judge
acquired knowledge or expertise in the course of the judge’s
judicial duties.”67
Three aspects of Rule 3.2(B) are noteworthy. First, the infor-
mation conveyed need not be law-related or concern the
judge’s personal interests. There is no restriction on the subject
of the judge’s communication, and as a result, social issues and
matters of public policy appear to be fair game.68 Second, Rule
3.2 requires only knowledge, not expertise. Third, the infor-
mation conveyed by the judge must have been obtained during
the exercise of adjudicative, administrative, or supervisory
judicial duties. Knowledge developed during nonjudicial activ-
ities cannot be voluntarily conveyed under Rule 3.2(B).
Rule 3.2(B) is tailor-made for judges presiding over drug
courts, mental health courts, veterans’ courts, and other spe-
cialty tribunals. By serving as leaders of the problem-solving
courts’ “therapeutic teams,” judges gain knowledge about
Rule 3.2(B) is
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community problems and solutions to those problems.69 And
there is every reason for judges to share this knowledge with
legislators and executives to assist them in improving the lives
of their constituents.
The testimony of Chief Judge Steve Teske of the Clayton
County, Georgia, Juvenile Court illustrates the valuable infor-
mation that a specialty-court judge can impart.70 In his appear-
ance before Congress in 2012, Judge Teske testified to matters
directly relating to the law, the legal system, and the adminis-
tration of justice when he expressed his frustration with rising
recidivism rates and the need to devote a disproportionate
share of court resources to minor juvenile infractions.71 But
Chief Judge Teske went further, advising the legislators of the
adverse effects of zero-tolerance school policies that came to
his attention as a juvenile court judge. He stated that zero-tol-
erance policies requiring that students be arrested, expelled, or
suspended for minor infractions (1) negatively impact gradua-
tion rates, school safety, and the entire community; (2)
increase juvenile crime; and (3) increase reoffender rates.72 He
further testified that zero-tolerance is contrary to adolescent
cognition, that “school connectedness” protects against delin-
quency, and that “[w]e are a nation in crisis when it comes to
educating our children.”73 Referring to school officials who
promote zero-tolerance, Judge Teske opined: “It confounds the
mind that professionals trained and certified to teach our chil-
dren are duped into believing that suspending a student who
doesn’t want to be in school is an effective tool.”74
Some of Judge Teske’s testimony clearly concerned the law,
the legal system, and the administration of justice and there-
fore was proper under Rule 3.2(A) and the analogous provi-
sions of the 1972 and 1990 Codes.  Less clear, however, is
whether the judge’s comments regarding school officials,
school policies, adolescent cognition, graduation rates, and
school and community safety related to the law, the legal sys-
tem, or the administration of justice. That question, while
determinative of whether a judge’s testimony would be proper
under previous ABA Model Codes, is of no import under Rule
3.2(B), which provides an avenue for the transfer of valuable,
but not necessarily law-related, information from the judiciary
to the other branches of government.75
EXCEPTION THREE: ACTING
PRO SE OR IN A FIDUCIARY
CAPACITY
Canon 4C(1) of the 1990 Code
permitted communication with an
executive or legislative body or
official on any matter involving
“the judge or the judge’s inter-
ests.”76 The Code did not define
“judge’s interests” or otherwise
cabin the apparent all-inclusive scope of the phrase. Permitting
judges to determine for themselves which interests were suffi-
cient to invoke Canon 4C(1) caused some apprehension that
the exception might swallow the rule.77 The disciplinary pro-
ceeding against Arkansas Appellate Court Judge Wendell Grif-
fen highlighted that concern.
Judge Griffen spoke to the Black Caucus of the Arkansas
legislature about funding for the University of Arkansas. He
urged the legislators not to reward the University financially
because of its “practices and policies that exclude, inhibit, and
mistreat black students, faculty, staff, and citizens.”78 The
judge also suggested that the legislature “send them a bud-
getary vote of no confidence concerning sorry leadership about
racial inclusion over the past 130 years at the University of
Arkansas. Show them the money!”79 The Arkansas Discipline
and Disability Commission admonished Judge Griffen for tes-
tifying on a matter not concerning the law, the legal system, or
the administration of justice.80 Judge Griffen appealed, claim-
ing that his remarks fell within Canon 4C(1) of the Arkansas
Code of Judicial Conduct, which permitted testimony on mat-
ters involving the “judge or the judge’s interests.” 81
The Arkansas Supreme Court struggled with the scope of the
term “judge’s interests.” It considered whether the phrase
included social and political concerns, or as Judge Griffen
argued, any matter of interest to a particular judge.82 After a futile
attempt to decipher what the ABA meant by a “judge’s interests,”
the court held the phrase unconstitutionally vague and vacated
the disciplinary sanction imposed on Judge Griffen.83
In response to the Griffen decision, the drafters of the 2007
Code narrowed the type of personal interest triggering the pro
se exception.84 Accordingly, Rule 3.2(C) limits a judge’s ability
to testify and consult to matters involving “the judge’s legal or
The Arkansas
Supreme Court
struggled with
the scope of the
term “judge’s
interests.”
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economic interests.”85 The Code
does not define the term “legal
interests.” The Code defines
“economic interest” in the con-
text of judicial disqualification86
but not in the context of Rule
3.2(C).87 Comment 3 to Rule 3.2
gives one illustration of an eco-
nomic interest—a zoning pro-
posal that adversely affects the
value of the judge’s real property.88 Neither the Rule nor its
comments provide an example of a judge’s legal interests.
Does Rule 3.2(C) permit the type of remarks concerning
race relations offered by Judge Griffen? Most likely, the drafters
did not intend the Rule to condone commentary on a social or
political matter unless it directly impacted the judge’s financial
position or an interest protected by a state or federal law. At
least one ethics expert opined that Judge Griffen’s remarks
would not find protection under Rule 3.2(C).89 But even
assuming that conclusion is correct, it would not take much to
turn the prohibited social interest in race relations into an eco-
nomic or legal interest. For instance, if the judge’s child
attended the University with tuition assistance from Judge
Griffen, the judge might very well possess an “economic inter-
est” in the payments to the school or a “legal interest” in his
child’s treatment by the institution. Certainly, “[i]t is not a
novel proposition to say that parents have a recognized legal
interest in the education . . . of their child.”90 Similarly, if the
judge enrolled in a course at the University, a strictly social
interest in the treatment of African-Americans by the adminis-
tration might be transformed into a legal or economic interest.
Moreover, if Judge Griffen had presided over a case involving a
discrimination claim against the University of Arkansas, his
testimony before the state legislators likely would have been
permissible under Rule 3.2(B).
Virtually all states revising their judicial codes since the
issuance of the 2007 Code have adopted the ABA’s recommen-
dation and narrowed the judge’s personal interests to those of
an economic or legal nature.91 Indiana has broadened the
exception slightly by providing that a judge may testify or con-
sult regarding not only his own economic and legal interests
but also those of family members residing with the judge.92
Most notably, the Code of Conduct for United States Judges
adopted in 2009 rejects the ABA recommendation to narrow
the pro se exception and retains the language of Canon 4 of the
1990 Code permitting judges to consult and testify on any
matter involving “the judge or the judge’s interests.”93 A few
states fail to provide any pro se exception.94 And most juris-
dictions not yet revising their code of judicial conduct in light
of the 2007 Code include the broad language of the 1990 Code
permitting appearances and consultations on any matter
involving the “judge’s interests.”95
To avoid the need to distinguish between social issues on
the one hand and economic issues on the other, Alaska permits
judges to testify and consult on both economic and social
interests.96 Although the Alaska Code leaves “social interests”
undefined, the term is often used to encompass a virtually lim-
itless array of interests, including “safety, order, and morals;
economic interests; and nonmaterial and political interests.”97
A PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF RULE 3.2
Assume that a judge assigned to a misdemeanor court
wishes to make a statement during the public-comment por-
tion of a city council meeting.98 After introducing himself as a
resident of the community, the judge plans to voice the opin-
ion that the city should amend its liquor ordinance to reduce
the number of hours that establishments may serve alcohol
from 23 hours per day to 16 hours per day. The judge will
inform the mayor and city council that he (1) is concerned for
the safety of late-night bar patrons and others who may be
harmed by late-night bar patrons; (2) believes that the current
ordinance unnecessarily diverts court resources to deal with
numerous alcohol-related incidents occurring between 2:00
a.m. and 5:00 a.m.; and (3) believes that the current ordinance
fosters a negative community image.
Clearly, Rule 3.2 governs the judge’s remarks since the judge
plans to voluntarily speak at a public hearing conducted by the
city’s legislative body and the city’s top executive official. There-
Neither the Rule
nor its comments
provide an
example of a
judge’s legal
interests.
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fore, the judge’s comments are prohibited unless an exception
contained in subsection (A), (B), or (C) of Rule 3.2 applies.
Most of the judge’s proposed statement appears to be autho-
rized by subsection (A), which permits testimony regarding
“the law” since a city ordinance is a law.99 Indeed, “[t]he plain
language of the [2007] code does not prevent a judge from act-
ing on his or her own initiative with regard to legislative
issues.”100 Rule 3.2(A) also permits judicial input on matters
concerning the administration of justice. And since the admin-
istration of justice includes case management and the use of
judicial facilities, personnel, and funds,101 the judge’s com-
ments about the impact of late-night alcohol consumption on
court resources appears permissible.102 The judge’s concern
about the safety of bar patrons and others might not qualify as
matters of law or court administration but should fall within
Rule 3.2(B)’s window for concerns about public safety devel-
oped by the judge while on the bench.
A more difficult aspect of the proposed statement is the
judge’s view that the ability to purchase alcohol 23 hours a day
fosters a negative community image. An interest in a city’s
image is most probably a personal interest. But is it a legal or
economic interest as required by Rule 3.2(C)?
An argument can be made that the city’s image affects the
judge’s economic interests. A positive or negative reputation
dictates for many communities whether they will attract new
residents and businesses, which in turn impacts property val-
ues, tax revenues, and home resale values. For example, the
city of Winston-Salem considers its image important because:
The image our community has beyond its borders as
a place to live, work and do business influences the deci-
sions of individuals and companies considering to move
to our area. So our image and reputation are very impor-
tant. A community with a positive reputation will have a
competitive advantage in attracting visitors, residents
and business investment.103
Regardless of whether community image suffices as a legal
or economic interest, it is difficult to conclude that the judge’s
comment implicates any policy consideration underlying the
need to restrict a judge’s communications with legislators and
executives. In the context of the judge’s entire statement, the
reference to community image does not misuse judicial pres-
tige, undermine judicial impartiality, or interfere with the inde-
pendence of another branch of government.
CONCLUSION
Judges provide information, unavailable from other sources,
to the political branches. When providing this valuable service,
however, judges must avoid (1) detracting from judicial impar-
tiality in fact or in appearance; (2) misusing judicial prestige;
and (3) interfering with the independence of a co-branch of
government. To help keep testimony and consultations within
ethical constraints, a judge should:
• Clearly state whether the testimony or consultation is
offered in a personal capacity or in an official capacity
as a representative of the judicial branch;
• Present information in an objective, fact-based manner;
• Mention judicial status only when it directly relates to
the manner in which the judge obtained the informa-
tion being conveyed;
• Not mention judicial status when the judge is commu-
nicating about a personal interest;
• Confirm that personal views do not play a role in the
judge’s decision-making process;
• Confirm that the judge will continue to apply the law
without regard to personal opinions or preferences;
• Acknowledge the separate functions of the legislative,
executive, and judicial branches;
• Avoid commenting on any pending or impending court
proceeding;104
• Avoid statements that might affect the outcome or
impair the fairness of a pending or impending court
proceeding.105
These cautionary measures will help ensure the free flow of
important information from the judicial branch to the execu-
tive and legislative branches while maintaining judicial inde-
pendence, integrity, and impartiality.
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AMERICAN JUDGES ASSOCIATION FUTURE CONFERENCES
AMERICAN JUDGES ASSOCIATION 2014 ANNUAL CONFERENCE
LAS VEGAS
The Golden Nugget
October 5-10
$69-$149 (depending on room type and day of the week)
AMERICAN JUDGES ASSOCIATION 2015 ANNUAL CONFERENCE
SEATTLE
Sheraton Seattle
October 4-7
$189 single/double
THE AJA ANNUAL CONFERENCE:  THE BEST JUDICIAL EDUCATION AVAILABLE ANYWHERE
For more information, go to http://amjudges.org/conferences.
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NEW BOOKS
TRENDS IN STATE COURTS: 2014 (CAROL R.
FLANGO, DEBORAH W. SMTH, NORA E.
SYDOW, CHARLES F. CAMPBELL & NEAL B.
KAUDER, EDS.). National Center for State
Courts, 2014. 88 pp. (free via download-
able PDF). 
http://www.ncsc.org/trends
The 2014 edi-
tion of Trends in
State Courts is
out, containing
its usual collec-
tion of concise
but authoritative
articles. This
year’s issue
focuses on
issues involving
juvenile justice and the elderly. Six arti-
cles cover juvenile-justice issues, begin-
ning with one that discusses the Models
for Change Juvenile Justice Reform Ini-
tiative of the John D. and Catherine T.
MacArthur Foundation. Other articles
include one on the need for early
appointment of counsel in juvenile court,
one on judicial leadership in addressing
adolescent mental-health needs, and one
on reducing racial and ethnic disparities
in the juvenile-justice system.
The section on elders begins with a
national review of reform efforts related
to elder abuse and adult guardianships.
Other articles include ones on how to
enhance access to justice for seniors and
an interview with the state-court admin-
istrators in Pennsylvania and Texas on
the work that has been done in those
states to better respond to elder-related
issues.
In addition to these themed articles,
this year’s Trends also contains several
articles on general topics:  a review of
recent developments in Alaska, New
York, and Utah on improving procedural
fairness; discussion of New Jersey’s use of
technology to improve both the percent-
age of summoned jurors who show up
and to make it easier for jurors to serve;
strategies identified to use technology to
better address the challenge of self-repre-
sented litigation; and the erosion of judi-
cial-retirement benefits during the recent
economic recession.
THE INDEPENDENCE OF JUDGES (NILS A.
ENGSTAD, ASTRID LAERDAL FROSETH &
BARD TONDER, EDS.). Eleven International
Publishing, 2014. 344 pp. ($112.50).
The Norwegian Association of Judges
published a book on judicial indepen-
dence to celebrate its 100th  anniversary
in 2012. With adaptations for an interna-
tional audience, the book, originally
issued in Norwegian, has been issued in
English, containing 22 essays on various
aspects of judicial independence.
Authors include judges, lawyers, law pro-
fessors, social scientists, and government
officials.  For those interested in cross-
national perspectives on judicial inde-
pendence, the book would be of interest.
Essays cover topics such as the origins
of judicial independence, considerations
of the tension between judicial indepen-
dence and administrative efficiency,
international standards on the protection
of judicial autonomy, special considera-
tions for judicial independence within
the European Union, the establishment
of an indepen-
dent judiciary
in Bosnia and
Herzegovina,
judicial inde-
pendence and
public trust in
courts in the
Russian Feder-
ation, the inde-
pendence of
judges in inter-
national tri-
bunals, considerations that arise in a
multicultural society, the responsibility
of judges serving under an oppressive
government, and the relationship
between judicial independence and the
independence of the legal profession.
The book closes with an interesting
essay on the relationship of judges with
the media. Law professor Ragna Aarli
notes that public confidence in Norwe-
gian courts has risen steadily from 2001
(62% with fairly high or very high confi-
dence) to 2006 (79%) to 2012 (85%).
Aarli contends that this increase “coin-
cides with the introduction and circula-
tion of the Media Handbook for judges,”
an effort of the Norwegian Association of
Judges to have judges more directly inter-
act with the media and the public.
o
WEBSITES OF INTEREST
Quarterly Summaries 
of Procedural-Fairness Research
ProceduralFairness.org
The ProceduralFairness.org website
has begun posting quarterly summaries
of new research. The website was created
in 2012 to provide background informa-
tion about how to improve procedural
fairness in court and policing, including
links to important articles and other
information. 
The quarterly research summaries are
prepared by Justine Greve, M.A., of the
Kansas Court of Appeals, and Shelley
Spacek Miller, J.D., of the National Cen-
ter for State Courts. They search the
Internet and other sources to locate the
most notable procedural-fairness scholar-
ship released over the past quarter related
to procedural-fairness issues in courts
and in law enforcement. The report also
covers recent news and events of interest.
The website also has a blog with regu-
lar commentaries on procedural-fairness
issues.
The Resource Page
g
